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The recent trend within cognitive science toward the adoption of a de re account of semantic content 
has been accepted by some theorists without due consideration, an oversight that has generated a 
number of logical inconsistencies in the literature. This thesis endeavours to shed light on this 
omission, and the effects thereof, by scrutinising the account of one such theorist: The psychologist 
Philip Johnson-Laird. Herein, Johnson-Laird’s introduction of a Peircean iconism is subjected to a 
thorough analysis and, in this way, an important example of the problematic tensions created by a 
failure to address the substantial nature of a theory, before its wholesale integration into a philosophy, 
is revealed. The philosophic method of analysis and synthesis is applied to the arguments and 
hypotheses of Philip Johnson-Laird, thereby demonstrating the base assumptions that constitute his 
account of cognition and the relationships between these assumptions. Investigation of the results of 
this method identifies logical inconsistency present in the hypothesis and, following Popper and 
Quine, logical inconsistency is taken as a disproof of a theory. The study concludes that, although 
Johnson-Laird’s updated philosophy was able to dissolve historical arguments against his theory, his 
use of Peircean iconism is inconsistent in its own right and produces serious tensions with aspects of 
his extant philosophy. As such, it is concluded that Johnson-Laird’s externalist semantics fails and it is 














Key terms: Philip Johnson-Laird; Charles Sanders Peirce; cognitive science; the representational theory 
of mind; mental representation; correspondence theory of meaning; Peircean iconism; philosophic 
analysis and synthesis. 
i 
 
Table of contents 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1 
 
Chapter One: Cognitive Science 
Introductory remarks ...................................................................................................... 11 
§i History and theoretical origins .................................................................................... 11 
Origins ............................................................................................................................. 12 
Multidisciplinarity ............................................................................................................ 13 
Ontology and epistemology .............................................................................................. 13 
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 14 
§ii The representational theory of mind .......................................................................... 15 
Folk psychology ................................................................................................................ 15 
Computation and physical symbol systems ....................................................................... 16 
Functionalism................................................................................................................... 20 
Levels of analysis .............................................................................................................. 21 
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 23 
§iii Forms of representation ............................................................................................ 25 
Mental Representation..................................................................................................... 25 
Propositional representations .......................................................................................... 26 
LoT ........................................................................................................................................................ 27 
LoT2 ...................................................................................................................................................... 30 
Analogical representations ............................................................................................... 33 
Craik and the nature of analogical models ........................................................................................... 34 
Peirce and the nature of analogical models ......................................................................................... 36 
Reasoning and mental models .............................................................................................................. 38 
Summary ............................................................................................................................................... 42 
§iv Procedural semantics ................................................................................................ 43 
Representational abstraction ............................................................................................ 44 
Early ‘compile and execute’ semantics .............................................................................. 45 
Craikean mental models ................................................................................................... 45 
Peircean mental models ................................................................................................... 48 
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 50 





Chapter Two: Critiques of cognitive science and RTM 
Introductory remarks ...................................................................................................... 53 
§i Semantic arguments ................................................................................................... 59 
The Chinese room argument ............................................................................................. 59 
Homunculus Fallacy .......................................................................................................... 64 
The symbolic Fallacy ......................................................................................................... 66 
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 68 
Semantic holism ............................................................................................................... 68 
§ii Response to semantic arguments ............................................................................... 69 
§iii Correspondence theories of meaning......................................................................... 72 
Forms of reference fixation............................................................................................... 74 
Correspondence as congruence ........................................................................................................... 74 
Correspondence as correlation............................................................................................................. 76 
Brentano’s problem ......................................................................................................... 77 
Scepticism ........................................................................................................................ 77 
Metaphysical assumptions ............................................................................................... 80 
Twin Earth Cases .............................................................................................................. 82 
Substitutivity cases........................................................................................................... 84 
The implementation problem ........................................................................................... 85 
Slingshot arguments ......................................................................................................... 86 
Summary ......................................................................................................................... 87 
§iv Correspondence theories of meaning and cognitive science ....................................... 88 
Study: The presence of critical analysis of correspondence theories of meaning and the RTM 
found within the literature ..................................................................................................... 89 
Aim of study .......................................................................................................................................... 89 
Method of study ................................................................................................................................... 89 
Sample and generalizability .................................................................................................................. 90 
Findings ................................................................................................................................................. 91 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................. 93 
§v Thesis aim .................................................................................................................. 94 
 
Chapter Three: Method 
Introductory remarks ...................................................................................................... 96 
§1 Research methodology............................................................................................... 97 
Methodology, cognitive science and Philip Johnson-Laird .................................................. 98 
Methodological entailments ........................................................................................... 100 
Quinean epistemology ........................................................................................................................ 100 
Popperian epistemology ..................................................................................................................... 102 
iii 
 
Methodological constraints ............................................................................................ 103 
§2 Research method ..................................................................................................... 103 
Suitability of quantitative methods ................................................................................. 104 
Suitability of qualitative methods ................................................................................... 106 
Suitability of alternative methods ................................................................................... 106 
Analysis and synthesis .................................................................................................... 107 
§3 Research design ....................................................................................................... 109 
§4 Design validity ......................................................................................................... 111 
Ontological validity ........................................................................................................ 112 
Epistemological validity .................................................................................................. 113 
§5 Design appropriateness ........................................................................................... 116 
§6 Generalisability ........................................................................................................ 117 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 118 
 
Chapter Four: Findings 
Introductory remarks .................................................................................................... 122 
§1 Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of 
the RTM’s commentators? ............................................................................................ 123 
Language entry and exit rules ............................................................................................................. 123 
Peircean iconism and language entry and exit rules .......................................................................... 124 
CRA 2.0 ................................................................................................................................................ 128 
CRA 2.1 ................................................................................................................................................ 130 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 131 
§2 Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent? ................................................................................................................... 131 
External consistency ....................................................................................................... 132 
Internal consistency ....................................................................................................... 134 
Interpretant ........................................................................................................................................ 134 
Negation ............................................................................................................................................. 136 
Canonical decomposition ................................................................................................................... 137 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 138 
§3 Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s broader 
philosophy of cognition logically consistent? ................................................................. 139 
A commitment to externalist semantics and a rejection of internalist hypotheses and 
arguments ........................................................................................................................... 140 
An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts ................................................. 143 
Reference fixation .......................................................................................................... 143 
Epistemic scepticism of meaning..................................................................................... 145 
Metaphysical entailments .............................................................................................. 146 
iv 
 
Surface level similarity ................................................................................................... 147 
That meaning is mutable. ............................................................................................... 147 
That the informativeness of Frege cases can be explained ............................................... 149 
The implementation problem ......................................................................................... 151 
Slingshot arguments ....................................................................................................... 151 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 152 
Findings ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..153 
Evaluation .................................................................................................................... 155 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 156 
 
Chapter Five: Discussion 
Introductory remarks .................................................................................................... 159 
§1 Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of 
the RTM’s commentators? ............................................................................................ 159 
The mereological fallacy ................................................................................................. 160 
Weak and strong externalism ......................................................................................... 161 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 163 
§2 Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent?  .................................................................................................................. 164 
Alternative correspondence theories of meaning and a criteria of success ....................... 164 
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning ....................................................................... 166 
Language as representation ............................................................................................................... 166 
Logical atomism .................................................................................................................................. 175 
The picture theory, Johnson-Laird and our criteria of success .......................................... 180 
Criteria of success tested ................................................................................................ 182 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 183 
§3 Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s broader 
philosophy of cognition logically consistent? ................................................................. 183 
Unacceptable commitments ........................................................................................... 183 
Degenerative science ..................................................................................................... 184 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 187 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 187 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 1878 
 
Appendices .............................................................................................................18797
Conclusion ...…………………………………………………………………………………….…..…. 188 
 
Appendices ..……………………………………………………………………………………………. 197 
 





In recent years there has been a theoretical shift within the field of cognitive science toward an 
externalist account of semantics. That is to say, many working within the current cognitive science 
paradigm have, since the 1980s, been motivated to shift from the syntactical account of semantic 
content that was prevalent during the field’s inception, toward variations of a correspondence theory 
of meaning. This shift and these accounts of semantic content will be the focus of this research, and 
this thesis will be scrutinising the current cognitive science paradigm, as well as correspondence 
theories of meaning, in order to determine the validity of such a referentialist move. 
Definition of terms 
However, before we proceed, it will first be helpful to define some of the key terms that will be used 
throughout this investigation, thereby providing some context for the discussion that will follow: 
Cognitive Science: Here taken as a multi-approached, or interdisciplinary, investigation into 
cognition that arose during the latter half of the twentieth century and shares an adherence to a 
post-positivist paradigm and a representational theory of mind.  
 
Representational theory of mind: A philosophy of mind that posits the manipulation of mental 
representations as the basis for cognition. This is a view of the mind that is characterised by an 
adherence to a number of theses:  
1) The ontological reality of propositional attitudes and the accuracy of folk psychology.  
2) That – following the Church-Turing thesis – computational processes over mental 
representations can account for these propositional attitudes and explain folk psychology 
(see Church 1936; Turing 1969).  
3) That any physical system capable of instantiating the function of these computational 
processes will be equally intelligent (i.e., adheres to functionalism).  
4) That Marr’s tri-level hypothesis (where, following Marr 1982, any system – such as that 
instantiating cognition – needs to be described at a computational, representational and 
physical level) is accurate. 
 
Mental representations: These are concrete (that is, ontologically real) information-bearing 
structures possessed by individuals. These structures are taken to be instantiated by a physical 
2 
 
symbol system and their manipulation, by computational processes, is said to produce cognition. 
Mental representations may be instantiated in a number of different representational formats, 
with the most common being propositional and analogical explanations (with the former taking 
a sentential symbolical format and the latter taking a congruent or simulacral symbolical format). 
 
Correspondence theory of meaning: This is an externalist, or referentialist, account of meaning 
that explains the semantic content of a particular symbol in terms of the ontologically real state 
of affairs, that can be found ‘out there’ in the world, to which that symbol corresponds. As such, 
correspondence theories of meaning state that if symbol A corresponds to entity B, A means B. 
This correspondence between sign and signified can take two broad approaches:  
1) Correspondence by correlation (where a societal, cultural or biological convention 
establishes a corresponding relation).  
2) Correspondence by congruence (where a similarity of structure, or of logical form, 
between represented and representation establishes a relation). 
 
Peircean Iconism: A congruent correspondence theory of meaning advanced by Charles Sanders 
Peirce to explain the semantic content of certain signs. Such signs are said to be meaningful and 
to represent a specific state of affairs as their own internal structure is analogous to, or mirrors, 
that of a certain object or a particular state of affairs. 
 
Analysis and synthesis: One of the many methods employed in the pursuit of knowledge by the 
discipline of philosophy. The form of analysis and synthesis that will concern this research will be 
of a decompositional format, wherein an argument, hypothesis etc. is broken down into its 
component parts by analysis and then reconstructed through synthesis. The purpose of this two-
part method is to establish the base theories that make up a position and clarify the relations and 
interactions between them, making the operation and the logical consistency, or inconsistency, 
of the hypothesis, argument etc. more perspicuous. 
Research problem 
Now that our terms have been defined and this research has been somewhat contextualised, we can 
clarify the problem with which we will be concerned. In this regard, it is important to note that within 
current cognitive science, and certain areas of philosophy of mind, much of the current work produced 
is entirely reliant upon one central philosophical framework: Computational processes operating 
within the representational theory of mind. Further, this framework has been employed to build one 
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of the most promising and potentially productive disciplines advanced in recent years (see Simon and 
Newell 1976). Nevertheless, although a lot of current research relies upon this paradigm (e.g. Pezzulo 
and Calvi 2011; Ifenthaler and Seel 2011; Eitel et al 2013; Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria 2014), it is 
not one that can be considered a confirmed, uncontroversial approach, having received many attacks 
from many angles in the past (see Churchland 1981; Putnam 1981; Dennett 1989; Bennett and Hacker 
2003; Papineau 2004; Baz 2012; Hacker 2013). However, by far the most devastating of these attacks 
are a suite of arguments that originate from accusations of the representational theory of mind’s 
inability to account for meaning. The most well-known of these arguments can be found within the 
philosopher John Searle’s 1980 article “Minds, Brains and Programs”, in which – what is commonly 
referred to as – the “Chinese Room argument” is advanced. This is an argument that purports to 
demonstrate that were an individual to go through the computations of the mind and mental 
representations prescribed by cognitive science, then the semantic content of the symbols 
manipulated would still remain hidden to that individual. Other arguments questioning cognitive 
science’s handling of semantic content can be found in works such as Harnard (1990b), Lewis (1970) 
and Searle (1980), where respective charges of a transgression of the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies are made.1 Nevertheless, all such arguments reason that all the theory under question is 
achieving is merely the replacement of one set of symbols with another, and that mental 
representations can therefore only become meaningful in the presence (and corollary mental 
computations) of some form of conscious agent, whose own mental representations can only become 
meaningful in the presence (and corollary mental computations) of some form of conscious agent, 
whose… and so on, ad infinitum.  
 
In response to these criticisms, many cognitive scientists have proposed an update to their hypotheses 
over the last few decades; an update which is purported to avert these arguments and to once again 
place cognitive science and its account of meaning back on a secure footing. For example, the 
psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird forcefully argues that if there exists a relation between language and 
the world via analogical – or iconic – mental models, then the arguments of Searle and Lewis et al are 
defeated. Johnson-Laird (1988, p115) succinctly describes this hypothesis thus:  
Logicians have only related language to models in various ways; psychologists have related it only to itself. 
The real task, however, is to show how language relates to the world through the agency of the mind.  
Johnson-Laird further argues that this putative relation between language and the world ensures that 
what is the anchor for meaning, that what constitute the ‘language entry and exit rules’ (see Putnam 
1981), under his representational theory of mind, is the world and, as such, he avouches that the 
                                                          
1 Briefly, the symbolic fallacy is the explanation of the meaning of a symbol by reference to another, equally content bearing, symbol, while 
the homunculus fallacy is an infinite regress of explanation. These fallacies will be covered in detail in due course.  
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avenues Searle and Lewis et al have exploited in their criticisms have been eliminated. Furthermore, 
this is an analysis equivalent to those that have led others operating within the same field to re-
evaluate their own semantics and to similarly adopt some form of a correspondence theory as an 
explanation for semantic content (e.g. Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Waskan 2006; Fodor 2010; 
Rapaport 2011; Schweizer 2012). 
 
However, there is an issue here: Although Johnson-Laird et al’s semantic updates are not insubstantial, 
there exists limited critical analysis of their updated position in the literature (for example, only 
Vosgerau 2006 subjects Johnson-Laird’s iconic correspondence theory to any form of detailed scrutiny 
and only Du et al 2014, Macbeth et al 2014, and Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria 2014 engage in any 
empirical investigation of central important implications of Johnson-Laird’s externalism). As such, 
what is required before the referentialist representational theory of mind can be confidently adopted 
is a thorough investigation into its logical validity. Nevertheless, to design and implement a single 
investigation of this type (i.e., one into the referentialist shift generally), which is capable of making 
comment on the success of all the myriad positions found within the literature that express some form 
of this move, is far too ambitious: The nuance that exists between all the numerous such positions 
means that no findings concerning any one body of work will be generalizable to another. Therefore, 
for this ambitious aim to be met, an individual investigation must to be conducted into each 
referentialist position. Consequently, it is recommended that a preliminary investigation of this type 
be conducted to fill one specific gap in the research. Furthermore, this is an investigation this research 
will task itself with and which is summarised by the following research problem: 
Correspondence theories of meaning, in their own right, are substantial hypotheses that 
demand many commitments. As such, their inclusion into any standing research program 
necessitates thorough analysis to ensure no problematic tensions are produced; a level of 
analysis that is currently absent in much of the cognitive science literature. 
Moreover, in this instance, this investigation will focus particularly on the hypotheses of the 
psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird (who has been chosen as he is both a vocal and a long term advocate 
of such a move); a focus that produces the following research aim: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 





An investigation that addresses this research aim will be of importance and will contribute to the 
literature in a number of ways: 
1) It will fill the identified gap in the literature in clarifying the success or otherwise of Johnson-
Laird’s referentialist shift.  
2) It will continue the nascent discussion concerning the state of Johhnson-Laird’s philosophy 
started by a small number of researchers (see Vosgerau 2006; Du et al 2014; Macbeth et al 
2014; Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria 2014). 
3) By undertaking a detailed analysis of this kind, we will inevitably be led to other related 
topics in the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of language and the field of cognitive 
science generally. The analysis and critique of such related topics, from within the 
framework of this research, will lead to novel and important contributions in their own 
right. 
Research approach 
To meet the above research aim, this thesis will apply a method that is both appropriate for the stated 
purpose and which is valid under the post-positivist paradigm to which cognitive science and Johnson-
Laird adhere, i.e., a realist ontology and an adherence to a Popperian and/or a Quinean epistemology. 
Consequently, this investigation will apply critical philosophical analysis to the logic of the hypotheses 
and arguments of Philip Johnson-Laird, through which we will establish the internal and external 
logical consistency of the inclusion of a structural correspondence theory of meaning and its corollary 
assumptions into Johnson-Laird’s philosophy. In this instance, and so as to successfully interrogate 
Johnson-Laird’s philosophy in this manner, this means that the following research questions will have 
to be answered: 
1) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic 
objections of the representational theory of mind’s detractors? 
2) Is the particular, nuanced, correspondence theory of meaning being implemented 
both internally and externally consistent? 
3) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning, generally, into Johnson-
Laird’s broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
It will be stated that if the produced results answer in the affirmative to all three of these questions, 
the theory will be considered a logically consistent position and will, following Popper (1968, p264), 
be said to remain as a “provisional conjecture”. However, once this thesis completes this processes, it 
will be found that, as the theory under question produces a negative response to two of these 
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questions (question 1) and question 2)), the inclusion of an externalist account of meaning into 
Johnson-Laird’s theory of mind will be found to be inconsistent and the theory will be said to have 
been falsified on both Popperian and Quinean grounds.2  
 
Finally, it needs to be noted that the method of philosophical analysis and synthesis will be deemed 
to be both the appropriate and a valid technique to apply in this instance for a number of reasons, 
namely:  
1) The method of analysis and synthesis is valid under the post-positivist paradigm.  
2) That the ‘traditional’ quantitative and qualitative methods more commonly employed 
within this paradigm (e.g., experimentation, observation, surveys, ethnography, 
interviews, case studies etc.) are not suitable given the object of study (i.e., meaning).  
3) As the semantic arguments that inspired the referentialist shift that is central to this 
research derive from the same method, it seems only appropriate to reapply 
decompositional analysis when scrutinising this shift’s validity.  
Additionally, it is also worth clarifying that although adherence to cognitive science’s post-positivist 
paradigm may itself be problematic, this research will not engage in any form of scrutiny of the theory 
at this level. Instead, this investigation will unquestioningly operate within this framework; this will 
serve to produce findings which are more likely to be acceptable to cognitive science and Philip 
Johnson-Laird. 
Thesis structure 
So as to present this research problem, thesis aim, the investigation itself and its findings in a detailed 
and cohesive manner, this thesis employs the following structure: 
Chapter one: Cognitive science 
This chapter will begin this research’s literature review, giving an analysis and an exposition of the 
general theories of concern and thereby contextualising the investigation. This covers: (i) Cognitive 
science as a field; (ii) the representational theory of mind; (iii) mental representation; and (iv) an 
account of semantics under the cognitive science paradigm. 
 
Chapter two: Critiques of cognitive science and the representational theory of mind 
A continuation of the literature review, that: (i) Details the current state of affairs concerning the 
arguments against the paradigm detailed in Chapter one; (ii) analyses how theorists have responded 
                                                          
2 The detail behind this investigation’s conclusions will be handled in much detail later.  
7 
 
to these arguments; and (iii) provides a detailed scrutiny of the correspondence theories that 
constitute the heart of this response. From this, it will be identified that the introduction of a 
correspondence theory is a substantial introduction to any philosophy of mind and that a limited 
amount of detailed research into such an introduction into the cognitive science paradigm has been 
conducted. Following from this observation, we will undertake a review of the literature and 
determine that this observation is accurate. As such, it will be claimed that a gap in the literature has 
been found and that research conducted in this area would constitute a contribution to knowledge. 
 
Chapter three: Methodology 
An argument for the appropriateness and validity of the method of critical philosophical (i.e., 
decompositional) analysis and synthesis, in this instance. During this discussion we will be answering 
a number of questions, including: (i) What will be done to answer our research aim? (ii) How will this 
method be implemented in this instance? And (iii) why is this approach justified here? 
 
Chapter four: Findings 
A presentation of the findings that are generated from the application of philosophic analysis to the 
arguments of Philip Johnson-Laird. These findings will concern the three central research questions 
identified earlier: Do Johnson-Laird’s updated semantics circumvent the semantic objections of the 
representational theory of mind’s commentators? Is the particular correspondence theory of meaning 
being implemented both internally and externally consistent? And, is the introduction of a 
correspondence theory of meaning, generally, into Johnson-Laird’s broader philosophy of cognition 
logically consistent? After finding and explaining the conclusion that Johnson-Laird’s philosophy is 
currently logically inconsistent, this chapter will then evaluate the validity and contribution of this 
conclusion. 
 
Chapter six: Discussion 
This chapter will draw out the inferences that can be made from the Findings chapter and offer some 
proposals for future research based on these findings and inferences. This chapter will again be 
organised into three sections, each covering the research questions that similarly structured our 
Findings chapter (i.e., Chapter four). 
Summary 
To clarify the intentions of this research, this Introduction has answered the following questions: 
Q1) Within which context will this research fit? 
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A1) This research will concern itself with the field of cognitive science. More precisely, this 
investigation will focus on the research of referentialist explanations of meaning currently found 
within this field and will be particularly interested in the arguments and hypotheses of the psychologist 
Philip Johnson-Laird concerning his externalist representational theory of mind.  
 
Q2) What gap in the literature will this research try to address? 
A2) This investigation will be attempting to establish the success of the operation and introduction of 
correspondence theories of meaning within cognitive science’s philosophy of mind. As many nuanced 
positions can be found within the literature, this research will limit its intentions to an investigation of 
the accuracy of only one such account: That of the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird. Consequently, 
this position generates the following research aim: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 
semantics into such a representational theory of mind. 
 
Q3) What method will be applied when investigating the issue at hand? 
A3) The method this research will employ to discover the success of Philip Johnson-Laird’s externalist 
representational theory of mind, will be to apply philosophic analysis and synthesis to his arguments 
and theories. This method will be employed so as to establish the logical consistency of Johnson-
Laird’s philosophy of mind and to identify any areas of tension (if any such areas exist). This use of the 
method of philosophy in this instance is deemed to be an appropriate and valid approach as it adheres 
to the post-positivist paradigm to which Johnson-Laird adheres and is appropriate under both Quinean 
(see Quine 1960, p3; Colyvan 2001) and Popperian (see Popper 1968, p264; Popper and Miller 1983, 
p155; Finocchiaro 2005, pp255-256) epistemologies. From this application, if we find Johnson-Laird’s 
theory of mind to be inconsistent then this investigation will state that there exists a problem with his 
externalist semantics and that the validity of his referentialist move is in doubt. However, if this 
investigation finds Johnson-Laird’s account to be consistent, this research will be able to assert that 
his referentialist representational theory of mind, following Popper (1968, p264), still remains as a 
“provisional conjecture”. 
 
Q4) How will this research contribute to the literature? 
A4) Any findings this research produces will constitute an important contribution to the literature, as: 
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1) There currently exists a dearth of critical analysis of the success, or otherwise, of the 
referentialist move in cognitive science generally and Johnson-Laird’s thought particularly. 
That is, any findings will fill the gap in the literature identified by this thesis. 
2) These findings will inform and continue the discussion begun by a limited number of writers 
(i.e., Vosgerau 2006; Du et al 2014; Macbeth et al 2014; Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria 
2014). 
3) A thorough analysis of the topic at hand will also contribute to addressing broader questions 
found within the literature of philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, cognitive science 
and consciousness studies; questions concerning the relationships between the world and 







Chapter One:  
Cognitive science 
Introductory remarks 
For several decades, cognitive science has been claimed to be one of the most promising and 
potentially productive fields of study. Indeed, it is considered so vital in some circles that its findings 
have been labelled a “Law of Qualitative Structure” by Simon and Newell (1976, pp115-117), who liken 
the position of the field’s discoveries within consciousness studies to that of the cell doctrine within 
biology, plate tectonics within geology and the germ theory within immunology. Given this broad 
potential, what is of particular concern for the purposes of this thesis are the many things cognitive 
science has had to say regarding the foundation of meaning and semantics. However, before we are 
able to fully engage with the relevant literature concerning this account, it is first necessary to 
orientate any discussion by fully explaining the theory and field in which it will be couched. As such, 
this chapter will follow a structure that moves from the more general aspects of cognitive science to 
the more specific, moving from a broad description of the field itself toward a strict focus upon its 
account of semantics. With this in mind, this chapter will be structured in the following manner:  
i) An adumbration of the historical and theoretical background of cognitive science. 
ii) An investigation into the representational theory of mind that drives cognitive 
science.  
iii) An explanation of the role of representation in cognitive science’s account of 
cognition (focusing specifically on propositional representations, as found in the work 
of the philosopher Jerry Fodor, and their analogical counterparts, as described by the 
psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird). 
§i History and theoretical origins 
This section is concerned with positioning the current chapter as a whole by initially clarifying the 
historical and theoretical background in which it is set. To achieve this end, this section will:  
1) Give a brief outline of the roots of cognitive science.  
2) Provide an explication of the multidisciplinary focus of the field, as well as the motivations 
for such a focus. 
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3) Detail the ontological and epistemological assumptions shared by those working within 
the field. 
Origins 
The epithet ‘cognitive science’ is being used here to designate an interdisciplinary investigation into 
cognition, perception, reasoning, language, action, emotion and consciousness. As Miller (1979) 
observes, this mode of investigation is a contemporary approach toward cognition, originating as 
recently as the 1950s, when a number of theorists from a range of disciplines collaborated on a shared 
cognitive concern. In fact, Miller (Ibid.) uses this collaboration to precisely date the birth of cognitive 
science to Tuesday 11th September 1956, at the second day of a symposium on information theory 
held at MIT. This is not a cut-and-dried issue, however, for others have put the origins of cognitive 
science at various points. For example, Fodor (1975, ppvii-ix) attributes the inception of cognitive 
science to the work of late nineteenth and early twentieth century speculative psychologists, such as 
William James and John Dewey. However its rudiment, it is widely acknowledged that cognitive 
science was truly established as a subject in its own right in the late twentieth century, with the 
founding of dedicated journals and institutions on the subject in the 1970s. In fact, the first use of the 
term ‘cognitive science’ in regard to an individual field is found during this period. The work of Norman 
and Rumelhart (1975, p409) is a contemporaneous analysis of cognition studies, which concludes that:  
the concerted efforts of a number of people from[...] linguistics, artificial intelligence, and psychology 
may be creating a new field: cognitive science.1  
Nevertheless, although by 1975 the field of cognitive science has a name, five years later the field has 
still yet to crystallise into a definitive, identifiable discipline, leading Johnson-Laird (1980, p71) to 
remark “[c]ognitive science does not quite exist: its precursors do” and that “[i]f cognitive science does 
not exist then it is necessary to invent it”. Therefore, although the history of the field can be traced 
back through to a number of points and landmarks, it only becomes a solidified subject at the very 
end of the twentieth century.  
 
Throughout cognitive science’s debatable history, however, the main characteristic used to define it, 
which has set it apart from ‘traditional’ disciplines and which has made it such a promising subject, 




                                                          
1 Yet, as Bechtel et al. (2001) observe, a second candidate for the first use of the term ‘cognitive science’ may potentially be found in the 




The multidisciplinarity of cognitive science manifests itself in the inclusion of “philosophy, psychology, 
linguistics, artificial intelligence, robotics and neuroscience” (Friedenberg and Silverman 2006, p2), as 
well as neurophysiology, anthropology, mathematics and economics (see Osherson and Lasnik 1990, 
p11), within the umbrella of the subject. The rationale for employing this multidisciplined mode of 
investigation comes from a well-worn allegory involving a number of researchers and an elephant in 
a darkened room: One researcher, focused solely upon the tail of the animal, declares that they are in 
the room with a snake; another, who has studied only the ear, says that the first researcher is wrong, 
there is an animal in the room but it is some kind of bird; the final researcher, who has found only a 
leg, declares that both are wrong and that there is not an animal in room at all, but a tree. The moral 
of this being: Without communication and cooperation between researchers, who are coming at the 
same problem from different angles, no true understanding of the issue they are tackling as a whole 
can be known, be it an elephant or the mind (see Ibid pp13-15).2 Consequently, any work conducted 
within the field of cognitive science (including this research) must be cognisant of the importance of 
drawing on the findings and practices of a number of disciplines (such as philosophy, artificial 
intelligence, psychology and linguistics).  
 
This, though, raises a concern: If all those involved in cognitive science research are doing so from 
within the practices and methods of their own disciplines, how is there any guarantee that any results 
can validly inform one another? For this potential difficulty to be avoided, the disparate disciplines 
engaged in cognitive science must be in agreement on a number of fundamental epistemological and 
ontological concerns. Consequently, cognitive scientists must all be working within the one research 
paradigm. If this were not the case, then the findings of each individual discipline could not 
communicate with, inform nor critique the findings of any other (i.e. the results from each ‘traditional’ 
subject would not be “cumulative” with one another (Hughes and Sharrock 1997, p5)). 
Ontology and epistemology 
As we have seen, in order that their findings may be cumulative (and, therefore, for the field as a 
whole to be able to advance), practitioners of cognitive science must share a number of fundamental 
assumptions. From diverse scholars (e.g. Block 1978; Dennett 1991; Fodor 1975; Johnson-Laird 1993; 
Pylyshyn 1984; Searle 1984; Waskan 2006) it is possible to identify the discipline’s theoretical 
premises: 
                                                          




1) A post-positivist research paradigm: Cognitive scientists possess a world view and 
research framework dependent on a synthesis between a realist ontology and a critical 
epistemology. 
a. A realist ontology: Cognitive scientists presuppose that there is a real world ‘out 
there’, a world that is independent from any one observer. 
b. A critical epistemology: Cognitive scientists reject the classical notion of 
knowledge as justified true belief (see Gettier 1963; Popper 1974; Quine 1953; 
1987).3 Instead, they view knowledge of the world as being, not only difficult to 
attain, but necessarily uncertain. As such, Cognitive scientists can take either one 
of two alternative views. The first of these is a Popperian line, wherein we can 
only ever be certain that knowledge is wrong, not that it is right (i.e. we can only 
falsify hypotheses, not unequivocally prove them). The second view is a Quinean 
one, in which hypotheses are taken as certain if, and only if, it fits into our pre-
existing suite of ideas without disturbance (i.e. we can take an holistic approach). 
2) A representational theory of the mind: Cognitive scientists view the mind as operating 
on the principles of computation and physical symbol systems (i.e. symbol manipulation).4 
Alternatively, it takes the position that the strong AI hypothesis is accurate (see Searle 
1980).  
Summary 
To orientate the following explication of cognitive science’s account of cognition and semantics, it is 
necessary to first define what interpretation of ‘cognitive science’ this thesis shall be taking. As such, 
it is important to make clear that henceforth ‘cognitive science’ will mean a multi-approached, or 
interdisciplinary, investigation into cognition, that, as it is generally accepted, arose during the latter 
                                                          
3 Interestingly, in the case of Gettier problems, studies conducted by the experimental philosophers Starmans & Friedman (2012, p272) 
show that there is a divide between attributions of knowledge to ‘Gettiered’ individuals by philosophers and the laity, suggesting “the lay 
concept of knowledge is roughly consistent with the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief, and also point to a major 
difference between the epistemic intuitions of laypeople and those of philosophers.” 
4 The use of the appellation ‘representational theory of mind’ here is, following Fodor (1997), intentionally being used to designate a 
philosophy of mind employed by the majority of those working in the field of cognitive science and which contains four key hypotheses: 
1)  An assumption of the truth of folk psychology and propositional attitudes. 
2)  An explanation of folk psychology using mental representations. 
3)  Is quiet about the nature of these mental representations, only stressing that they are not mental images. 
4)  Uses the computation (as specified by Turing) of mental representations to explain cognition. 
As such, the term ‘representational theory of mind’ is intentionally being used to distance itself from, yet include, specific forms of the 
philosophies employed by cognitive scientists. For example, certain labels, such as the ‘computational theory of mind’, are used to expresses 
a similar view but does so with an intimate connection to a particular branch of cognitive science, in this instance the language of thought 
hypothesis. These specific titles therefore exclude any other, computer based, branch of cognitive science that this research wishes to 
maintain. An alternative appellation here may well be ‘cognitivism’ (i.e. “the position that intelligent behaviour can be explained (only) by 
appeal to internal “cognitive processes” – that is, rational thought in a broad sense” (Haugeland 2000, p9)), and this would be correct: Those 
involved in the representational theory of mind are engaged in a fundamentally cognitivist program (just as those involved in the 
computational theory of mind are engaged in a representational theory of mind). However, ‘cognitivism’ is being defined here as a broad 
methodological approach and, as such, it has been determined that, where theories of mind are concerned, ‘representational theory of 
mind’ is, for the purposes of this research, the more appropriate title. Nevertheless, during this thesis, where it has been deemed appropriate 
the term ‘cognitivism’ may still be applied to the overarching project of cognitive scientists. 
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half of the twentieth century and shares an adherence to a post-positivist paradigm and a 
representational theory of mind (hereinafter, RTM). Although an understanding of both of the 
preceding presuppositions (post-positivism and RTM) is vital for anyone involved in cognitive science 
research – and each will be covered in greater detail – the latter of the two is by far and away the most 
important.5 This is because RTM is the motor that has driven much of cognitive science (it is also the 
theory Simon and Newell (1976, pp116-117) labelled a law of qualitative structure).6 As such, before 
engaging with the cognitive science literature itself, it is first necessary to dedicate our subsequent 
section to the exposition of this particular philosophy of mind.  
§ii The representational theory of mind 
When first introduced to the RTM, it is important to realise that it is an hypothesis that, generally, is 
composed from, or entails, a number of clearly defined, independent theories. These theories are 
dependent on each other in a structure that will inform that of this section and are as follows:  
1) The concept of propositional attitudes and folk psychology.  
2) The theory of computation and the operation of physical symbol systems.  
3) Functionalism.  
4) Marr’s tri-level hypothesis. 
Folk psychology 
When beginning to consider the RTM, it should be noted that it is a view of the mind that is a variation 
of, and a development from, an outlook that is commonly accepted by most non-specialists: That 
humans formulate and execute plans of action on current knowledge of the world and by processes 
hidden from one another (see Waskan 2006, p43). This concept of Folk psychology is defined as a body 
of everyday definitions, or generalisations, concerning behaviour, that are commonly posited in 
individuals by others to explain the causes of their behaviour. Technically, folk psychological 
explanations are distinct in their taking of causal interactions between mental states (i.e. propositional 
– belief/desire type – attitudes) and behaviour for granted (see Garnham 1991; Swiatek 2011; Strijbos 
and de Bruin 2012), such that the following principle (taken from Smith 1987, p36) can be established: 
Agent A at t has a motivating reason to Ф only if there is some Ψ such that, at t, A desires to Ψ and 
believes that were he [sic] to Ф he would Ψ.7 
                                                          
5 The details of the field’s adherence to a post-positivist paradigm will be covered in the Methodology chapter. 
6 It should be noted, however, that the representational theory of mind is not unilaterally held throughout cognitivist approaches and other 
related fields. For example, embodied and extended approaches to the mind can be found in the literature (see Clark 2003; Gallagher 2005; 
Wheeler 2005), while, similarly, technical and non-representational theories can be found within AI’s (see Brooks 1990; Müller 2007; White 
2011).  
7 This focus on propositional attitudes has led folk psychology to be referred to as the Belief-Desire Model (or, more simply, the BD-Model) 
of action theory (see Strijbos and de Bruin 2012). 
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Where Ф is a means-end belief and Ψ is a desire, such that the following explanation is produced: 
Kate (A) at noon (t) has a motivating reason to get a drink (Ф) only if there is some thirst (Ψ) 
such that, at noon (t), Kate (A) desires to quench that thirst (Ψ) and that Kate (A) believes that 
were she to get a drink (Ф) she would quench her thirst (Ψ).  
Or, to state it more succinctly:  
Kate drank some water because she was thirsty.8 
 
This, then, is ultimately a commonplace view of the causes of action, and it is one that has been held 
by a considerable number of people for a considerable length of time, but it has only held popular 
currency in the field of philosophy since Davidson (1963, pp686-686) forcefully argued that: 
for us to understand how a reason of any kind rationalizes an action it is necessary and sufficient that we 
see, at least in essential outline, how to construct a primary reason[…] The primary reason for an action 
is its cause[…] A primary reason consists of a belief and an attitude.  
Since these belief/desire type of explanations have become respectable, cognitive scientists, following 
Davidson, have taken them for granted, and, as such, are committed to the ontological reality of the 
propositional attitudes that drive them (see Waskan 2006, pp36-76; McGinn 1989, p120; Fodor 1990, 
p32). Cognitive scientists, then, are convinced of the ontological and causal reality, or truth, of 
propositional attitudes, but it is vital to note that they are not convinced by the positioning of these 
beliefs and desires as a final explanation of action, as final explanantia. Instead, cognitive science takes 
these attitudes to be explananda in their own right (see Fodor 1990, pp4-5). As such, cognitive 
scientists are not interested in these general folk explanations themselves, but in explaining the 
mechanisms operating behind these generalisations: They are interested in detailing what brings rise 
to propositional attitudes (Waskan 2006, pp50-51). To achieve this aim, those working in the field 
have drawn on the idea of physical symbol systems from the discipline of computation. 
Computation and physical symbol systems 
The central hypothesis that underlies RTM states that the mind, like a computer, is a physical symbol 
system. That is to say, both the mind and a computer function and produce intelligence through the 
operation of a physical system and that system’s manipulation of symbols. Moreover, it is claimed that 
these manipulations originate from a finite number of pre-determined operations present in the 
physical system itself. For example, in the case of the most basic Turing machine, all that is required 
is a tape divided into frames, a read/write head and a store of operations.9 Each frame of the tape is 
                                                          
8 This concise stating of the folk psychological explanation implicitly assumes that Kate believes that what she is drinking is water, that 
drinking water quenches thirst and that she desires to quench her thirst. 
9 The Turing machine is named after its inventor and the man who, it can be considered, laid the foundations for the RTM and cognitivism: 
Alan Turing (1950). However, although Turing was instrumental in the development of the RTM, further important individuals and works 
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marked with the symbol ‘1’, or the symbol ‘0’, or is left blank. When the read/write head then reads 
a frame it performs a certain pre-defined action determinate on the symbol (if any) it has found and 
the commands present in its store. The commands present in the machine defined by Turing are: 
1) Delete the current symbol (if any) and write down a ‘1’ 
2) Delete the current symbol (if any) and write down a ‘0’ 
3) Move the tape one step to the right 
4) Move the tape one step to the left 
Or, as Turing (1936, p231) explains the operation of his machine: 
We may compare a man in the process of computing a real number to a machine which is only capable 
of a finite number of conditions q1; q2; ... qR which will be called “m-configurations”, The machine is 
supplied with a “tape” (the analogue of paper) running through it, and divided into sections (called 
“squares”) each capable of bearing a “symbol”, At any moment there is just one square, say the r-th, 
bearing the symbol ∃(r) which is “in the machine”, We may call this square the “scanned square”, The 
symbol on the scanned square may be called the “scanned symbol”, The “scanned symbol” is the only 
one of which the machine is, so to speak, “directly aware”, However, by altering its m-configuration the 
machine can effectively remember some of the symbols which it has “seen” (scanned) previously. The 
possible behaviour of the machine at any moment is determined by the m-configuration qn and the 
scanned symbol ∃(r). This pair qn, ∃(r) will be called the “configuration”: thus the configuration 
determines the possible behaviour of the machine. In some of the configurations in which the scanned 
square is blank (i.e. bears no symbol) the machine writes down a new symbol on the scanned square: in 
other configurations it erases the scanned symbol. The machine may also change the square which is 
being scanned, but only by shifting it one place to right or left. 
 
With this finite number of symbols and operations, basic Turing machines are, as Turing (1936) 
demonstrates, capable of performing a vast array of variegated tasks. For example, if furnished with 
the following tape: 
 
 
0 1 1 1 0   0 1 1 0 
 
And the operation table: 
 Blank 0 1 
1 16 EL 1 
2 L2 E3 ? 
                                                          
that contributed to its foundation were Noam Chomsky’s 1955 review of Skinner’s Verbal behaviour, and the 1960 article “Minds and 
machines” by Hilary Putnam. 
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3 L3 E4 E5 
4 R4 ? L6 
5 R5 ? L1 
6 06 ! L3 
 
Wherein, the tape represents two numbers (a three and a two divided by zeroes), the arrow denotes 
the position of the read/write head, the top row of the table signifies the content of the current cell 
being read by the read/write head, the left column of the table represents the possible states to which 
the machine can be set and the contents of the cells in the table signify the instructions sent to the 
machine, where: 
‘1’ = draw a one.  
‘0’ = draw a zero. 
‘R’ = move the tape one cell to the right.  
‘L’ = move the tape one cell to the left.  
‘E’ = erase whatever is currently found in the cell.  
‘?’ = state should not be reached.  
‘!’ = end process and output result. 
Number: ‘Move to state _’ 
With this tape and store of operations, the machine will start in state 1, read that the cell contains a 
zero, erase whatever is in the current cell and move the tape one step to the left and move to state 2. 
From here, the tape is again moved one step to the left and reset to 2. The machine then follows the 
stored operations to effectively move each ‘1’ from the left number on the strip to the right number, 
thereby adding the two numbers together. Once this is finished, the machine is commanded to insert 
a final ‘0’ to the end of the new number to signify completion. In this instance, the Turing machine will 
produce the following response: 
 
    0 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 
Signifying the number five. This should demonstrate that with nothing but a simple system, an 
automatic process of addition can be achieved.10 In fact, with any two sets of numbers placed onto 
the strip (arranged in accordance with the correct symbolism) and applying the same stored 
operations, the machine would successfully add them together. But this is not the end of the power 
of the Turing machine and computation, for the store of operations shown above is only one of the 
                                                          
10 This example is based on one found in Waskin (2006, pp16-17). 
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many potential sets a machine may be loaded with, and these can be operations designed to perform 
all manner of calculations (see Turing 1936).  
 
As alluded to, the power of this theory of computation has been taken further than demonstrated 
above. The likes of Turing (1969) and Church (1936) have stated that any process is – potentially – 
algorithmically computable, or, in the terminology of Church (Ibid., p356), “effectively calculable”. 
Meaning, any process that converts an input into an output can be instantiated through the process 
of computation if the correct symbols and operations are provided, including the operations of any 
other Turing machine. This ability to store the program of special purpose machines in the memory of 
another, thereby emulating it, creates the concept of a ‘universal’ Turing machine that is capable of 
reproducing the behaviour of any, and all, possible special purpose Turing machines, such as the 
addition machine detailed above (see Turing 1969; Preston 2002, p5).11 If one accepts this Church-
Turing thesis, as it has become known, one will therefore be led to the conclusion that it is theoretically 
possible that the processes of folk psychology’s beliefs and desires (which, effectively, convert inputs 
(sense data etc.) into outputs (actions, propositional attitudes etc.)) can be computationally 
represented, just like the process of addition shown above. Although not formally provable, the 
Church-Turing thesis has so far not been refuted and still stands as motivation for the conviction that 
the beliefs and desires of folk psychology are effectively calculable by a computer (see Johnson-Laird 
2006, p2). The RTM, then, uses this Church-Turing thesis as an argument in favour of the potential 
explanatory power of computation and physical symbol systems in regard to cognition, arguing that 
an increase in the complexity of a computational system would come with an exponential growth in 
the power of the computer and the types of executable operations it is capable of performing: From 
simple calculations, to induction, deduction, linguistic capabilities and further actions of cognition.12 
This then is how cognitive science views the brain: As a processor that performs operations on hidden 
symbols, which derive from sensory input, to produce – or output – beliefs, desires and behaviour. 
That is to say, cognitive scientists, and any other RTM theorist, take cognition to operate on the same 
principles as those of a computer. Consequently, all that is required is to provide a suitable level of 
description, like Turing did with his machine, and we will have a fully detailed account of the mental 
entities and propositional attitudes that are claimed to drive mentality.  
 
With this reliance on the principles of computation made explicit, it becomes apparent that cognitive 
scientists are claiming that cognition can arise through the operation of any physical symbol system, 
                                                          
11 The digital computers and handheld devices with which we are all familiar are examples of such ‘universal’ Turing machines. 




including computers themselves (this is a position known as the strong AI hypothesis, a position that 
states that “the computer is not merely a tool in the study of the mind; rather, the appropriately 
programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that computers given the right programs can be 
literally said to understand and have other cognitive states” (Searle 1980, p417)).13 What follows from 
this is the belief that many physical systems, as long as they are capable of instantiating the correct 
operations and symbols, are capable of cognition (see Polger 2012, pp337-338). Or, as this 
interdependence of system and intelligence is articulated by Simon and Newell (1976, p120): 
physical symbol systems are capable of intelligent action, and[…] general intelligent action calls for a 
physical symbol system. 
Consequently, cognitive science and the RTM cannot be accused of what Cuda (1985) terms “neural 
chauvinism”, in that they conclude that any system, not just the neurons of brain matter, can 
instantiate intelligence.14 Instead, the RTM states that mentality is multiply realisable. As such, RTM is 
a branch of functionalism (see Johnson-Laird 1983, pp8-10; Fodor 1990, pp9-10), an explanation of 
cognition that merits its own exposition. 
Functionalism 
Although many different breeds of functionalism can currently be found within the literature, the type 
of functionalism we are concerned with here is a metaphysical position that provides a theory on the 
nature of the operation and foundation of mind.15 This theory states that what constitutes a mental 
state (e.g. a desire to quench a thirst, the belief that drinking water will quench a thirst) is a 
functionalist state. In turn, functionalist states are defined by their processing – or handling – of the 
interactions between inputs (perceptions), other mental states (beliefs/desires) and outputs 
(behaviours and other propositional attitudes) (see Putnam 1975, pp362-440). Alternatively, as Heil 
(2004, p99) has it, “a state is a functional state of a particular sort in the event that it answers to a 
particular job description”. That is to say, functionalists assert that mental states are not instantiated 
by a specific collection of neurons within a brain, but rather by the way a physical system operates or 
functions, the role it plays, and how it responds to stimuli. For example, in regard to our earlier 
example, Kate’s desire to drink water is only constituted by an appropriate input stimulus (e.g. a 
thirst), the production of appropriate beliefs in the stimulus (e.g. how to quench a thirst and how to 
behave if you are thirsty) and the activation of an appropriate action (e.g. to go pour a drink), and only 
because of them. Under a functionalist view, therefore, only systems with internal states that can 
                                                          
13 The strong AI hypothesis is opposed to the weak, or cautious, AI hypothesis: “According to weak AI, the principal value of the computer 
in the study of the mind is that it gives us a very powerful tool. For example, it enables us to formulate and test hypotheses in a more 
rigorous and precise fashion” (Searle 1980, p417). 
14 We will be ignoring the mereological fallacy during the following discussion and will be equating the mind with the brain throughout. 
However, this position is being adopted only for ease of exposition and will be reconsidered later.  
15 Examples of these alternate forms of functionalism include “machine functionalism, semantic functionalism, etiological functionalism, 
methodological functionalism and so on” (Shapiro 2008, p7). 
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adequately meet these conditions, or that can play these roles, are capable of quenching a thirst (or 
holding any other functionalist state). Consequently, functionalist states are said to be multiply 
realisable, i.e. can be instantiated by any adequate physical realiser. These physical realisers can be 
produced from any physical system as long as it is adequate for the operation of the functionalist 
state. Consequently, functionalist states and, eo ipso, functionalism is said to be “hardware neutral” 
(Shapiro 2010, p8). 
 
For the purposes of clarification, the technical term ‘realiser’ deserves extra attention. For it should 
be made clear that a physical realiser is not the same thing as the functional state that the physical 
system realises: A diamond is not the same as an element of carbon, and your computer software is 
not the same as your computer hardware (even though in both instances the latter is a necessity for 
the presence of the former). Consequently, no realiser should be mistaken for the functional state it 
realises (see Putnam 1975, pp362ff). That is to say, functional states supervene upon (emerge from, 
are enabled by, or are “correlated with” (Ibid., p337)) physical realisers. And, as Polger (2007) 
observes, this non-identical/supervenience relation follows through to minds and brains (or AI and 
computer hardware): Brains (or computer hardware) are what realise a functionalist state, but they, 
in themselves, are not minds (or AI). The power of this facet of functionalism has been observed by 
Polger (2012, p341): 
The main traditional argument for functionalism is precisely that brain states appear to be in an any-to-
one relation to psychological states—many different kinds of brains (or nonbrains, potentially) seem to 
be plausible candidates for having psychological states. According to this line of reasoning, we have 
empirical reason to think that psychological states are not uniquely made up (one-to-one) but are rather 
‘multiply realized’ by different brain states in different creatures. This was Putnam’s original argument 
for his functionalist hypothesis[.] 
 
But this now seems to raise an issue: Have cognitive scientists been led into some form of dualism by 
simultaneously positing both a physical realiser and a functional state as an explanation of the mind? 
As we shall see, this is not the case, cognitive scientists are not expanding their ontology with such a 
distinction, but are detailing the one system from divergent contexts. This is an aspect of cognitive 
science’s view of cognition that is deserving of special attention.  
Levels of analysis 
When interpreting the answers that cognitive scientists have posited over the years as an explanation 
to the questions of cognition, it must be realised that they are doing so at three separate levels of 
abstraction (see Pylyshyn 1984). This is not to say that cognitive scientists have posited three 
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independent varieties of mental operation, just that they are explaining the same thing from three 
different perspectives. From this fact it can be recognised that cognitive science’s view of the mind 
rests upon an ontological monism but a conceptual triad or ternary (i.e. it posits one substance – 
matter – but explains its behaviour through three different lenses). Consequently, these three 
separate levels are not merely taken to be synonymous, they are said to be identical. This conceptual 
ternary is a view that has become known (after its originator David Marr 1982) as Marr’s tri-level 
hypothesis (see Beebe 2004). This division into three levels of abstraction is done to manage the 
complexity of the mind, for, as Marr (1982, pp19-20) asserts: 
Almost never can a complex system of any kind be understood as a simple extrapolation from the 
properties of its elementary components. Consider, for example, some gas in a bottle. A description of 
thermodynamic effects – temperature, pressure, density, and the relationships among these factors – is 
not formulated by using a large set of equations, one for each of the particles involved. Such effects are 
described at their own level, that of an enormous collection of particles; the effort is to show that in 
principle the microscopic and macroscopic descriptions are consistent with one another. If one hopes to 
achieve a full understanding of a system as complicated as a nervous system[…] or even a large computer 
program, then one must be prepared to contemplate different kinds of explanation at different levels of 
description that are linked, at least in principle, into a cohesive whole[.]16 
Therefore, cognitive scientists must describe the mind at all three levels of abstraction before they 
can claim its complete understanding. Consequently, the levels of abstraction in computation are akin 
to those concerning the organisation of economic laws, which must be separately described and 
studied at both the macro and micro levels before a system can be said to be fully detailed (see 
Pylyshyn 1999, p5). Prior to explaining why this is the case, it is first necessary to enumerate the levels 
of abstraction that Marr and his peers have put forward: 
1) Computational abstraction: This is the most abstract level of description at which 
cognitive scientists describe the mind. This level is concerned with the broad intentions 
and operations of the system under description. As such, the computational level is 
described as being concerned with the what and the why of systems and their operation 
(Ibid., p22).  
2) Representational abstraction: This level attempts to explain the actions posited at the 
computational level: It answers the how of the computational level’s what and why. This 
is done by answering the question of how inputs are processed and converted into 
outputs (see Marr 1982, pp19-27). 
                                                          
16 This division into layers of abstraction can be thought of as an approach akin to that employed by the field of electrical engineering, 
wherein electrical phenomena are treated and described at a number of levels, from Maxwell’s equations, through the logic gate abstraction 
to a physical circuit system, because, as Agarwal and Lang (2005, p4) have it, “electrical engineering creates further abstractions to manage 
the complexity of building large systems”. 
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3) Physical abstraction: This is the least abstract level at which the mind is described. This 
level of description concerns the particular physical realiser that is being used to produce 
mentality (i.e. the neurons and tissue that make up the brain, or the specific hardware 
used to run AI) and details “[t]he structure and the principles by which the physical object 
functions” (Pylyshyn 1989, p57).17 
 
As an example for why these discrete levels of abstraction are needed, it will be enlightening to return 
to our previous example of the Turing machine, which was only fully described once we knew what it 
was doing, how it was doing it and what it was doing it on. In that instance, the computational 
description was provided by the mathematical concept of addition; the representational level was 
populated by the binary symbol system of 0s and 1s as well as the stored operations that determined 
the actions of the machine; and the physical level was completed by the strip of paper, the read/write 
head, the hardware that stored the operations and the entire cabling etc. that connected the 
equipment and enabled it to run. From this, the power and importance of David Marr’s analysis should 
become apparent: Through a description from all three level of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, Alan Turing 
has provided a full explanation of a computing machine for addition. This in turn should then explain 
our earlier observation that before we can truly understand certain phenomena, such as cognition, 
we must first provide a description of that phenomena from the perspective of all three levels of 
abstraction. This is the case because we surely cannot be said to fully comprehend a system until we 
can detail what that system is doing, state why it is doing what it is doing, specify how it is doing it and 
detail the physical realiser that is instantiating it. 
 
Finally, from this analysis, it should become apparent that the RTM is, fundamentally, a physicalist 
account of the mind, i.e. it holds that all that exists is physical even those things that do not appear as 
such (e.g. cognition). This can be seen in its adherence to the monist ontology that constitutes the 
base abstraction of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, i.e. the physical. As such, the position is committed to 
the view that phenomena that do not appear to be physical, such as the mind and mentality, are 
generated through a supervenience relation with concrete, physical matter. 
Summary 
To summarise, then, the RTM is an explanation of mentality that is founded on the following 
principles: 
                                                          
17 These levels of analysis are also referred to, respectively, as 1) the semantic or knowledge level; 2) the symbol level and 3) the physical or 
biological level (see Pylyshyn 1989, p57). 
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Folk psychology: It takes the common view of action causation in stating that the propositional 
attitudes of beliefs and desires are ontologically real and are both necessary and sufficient for 
instigating an individual’s behaviour. 
 
Computation and physical symbol systems: It follows the Church-Turing thesis, from the field 
of computation in stating that the operation of a physical system upon a finite number of 
symbols is capable of processing data and producing an infinite variety of complex behaviours. 
Taking this thesis, cognitive science uses it to explain the operation of the propositional 
attitudes central to folk psychology. 
 
Functionalism: It is led to the view that if any physical system, not just brain tissue, can play the 
role of the processes of cognition, i.e. that can function in the manner defined at the three levels 
of abstraction, then it is said to be engaged in cognition as equally as brains are claimed to be.  
 
The tri-level Hypothesis: It states that for any complex system, such as cognition, to be fully 
explained, it has to have been done so at three separate levels of abstraction:  
1) The computational level, which fully states what a system is doing.  
2) The representational level, which involves the symbols and operations that explain how a 
system is doing what it is doing.  
3) The physical level, which details the physical makeup of the system. 
 
That is to say, the RTM follows the folk conception of psychology in assuming the ontological reality 
of propositional attitudes such as beliefs and desires, as well as the causal role in action of these 
propositional attitudes, and takes these beliefs and desires as requiring explanation in their own right. 
As such, following the concept of a physical symbol system from the field of computing, cognitive 
science has provided a deeper explanation of the causal power of mental elements with the use of a 
tripartite abstraction that explains the behaviour of these beliefs and desires at three distinct levels: 
Computational, representational and physical. This is a view that results in a functionalist position, 
wherein any physical system capable of playing the roles adumbrated in these three levels (be it 
composed from neurons or microchips) is capable of cognition (see Fodor 1990, pp1-30).  
 
Now that we have clarified the theoretical positions that underlie the RTM, we are in a position to 
take a closer look at the level of abstraction that is most in need of an explanation. For, where 
cognition and the RTM are concerned, the physical and computational levels should already be 
25 
 
apparent: The physical realiser is our brain tissue (or, if we were to avoid the mereological fallacy for 
a second, the biology and electro-chemical processes that makes up a person) and the questions of 
the what and the why of mentality are answered by folk psychology. However, questions arise once 
we consider the middle, representational, level. For, as Marr (1981, p23) observes, when considering 
the representational level it is important to keep in mind that “there is usually a wide choice of 
representation”. In other words, for any computational system there is any number of 
representational descriptions (i.e. symbols and operations) that could successfully account for its 
behaviour. Accordingly, cognitive scientists have posited a number of competing, and antithetical, 
symbol systems to account for mentality over the years. Consequently, we need to continue by 
providing a brief account of these systems. 
§iii Forms of representation 
Now that the assumptions operating behind cognitive science research have been clarified, it would 
be apposite to focus on those structures theorists have posited at the representational level of 
cognition, and explain how those structures are able to produce phenomena such as reasoning and 
semantics. To achieve this end, this section will: 1) Explain the concept behind the symbols, or mental 
representations, cognitive scientists have hypothesised at the representational level of cognition; 2) 
elucidate the propositional account of representations, covering that account’s explanation of 
meaning; before 3) giving a detailed description of analogical representations, including a look at its 
historical and theoretical influences and explaining by what means these models are able to account 
for reasoning.18 
Mental Representation 
Where cognitive science and cognition is concerned, theorists have conceived of a number of 
ontologically real formal information-bearing structures, of one kind or another, at the 
representational abstraction, all of which are combined and manipulated by pre-determined specified 
rules, computations or operations to elucidate folk psychological explanations of behaviour. An 
important note here, however, is that over the years, psychologists, philosophers and cognitive 
scientists have all posited several possible, and antithetical, varieties of structural form for these 
mental representations. The most prevalent conceptions concerning these mental representations 
can be divided into two broad trends: The first toward approaches based on a mental logic that use 
formal rules of inference between representations to produce reasoning and that are based on a 
                                                          
18 It shall become clear that, in the context of this thesis, how these analogical models account for the foundations of meaning is deserving 




sentential symbolical format (i.e. propositional representations); and the other toward an isomorphic 
or analogical approach, which explain reasoning through subjecting representations to continued 
testing and use a model or simulacral symbolical structure (i.e. analogical representations or mental 
models). As such, it is apposite of us to shed some light on both of these conceptions. 
Propositional representations 
The syntactic approach to the structure of mental representation is arguably the traditional and most 
prevalent view of the operation of cognition found within the cognitive science literature (see McGinn 
1989, p172; Fodor 2001, p38).19 It is a theory of mind that is most intimately connected with the 
philosopher Jerry Fodor, who advances the view that: 
Representation presupposes a medium of representation, and there is no symbolization without symbols. 
In particular, there is no internal representation without an internal language. (see Fodor 1975, p55) 
That is to say, adherents of propositional representations, such as Fodor and others, explain cognition 
by postulating an internal Language of Thought (hereinafter, LoT) – a language that has subsequently 
become known as ‘Mentalese’ (Fodor 2000, pp63-74) – that should be viewed in the strict and literal 
sense. That is, within the propositional representation paradigm, there exist a finite number of mental, 
atomic ‘words’ that combine, following a strict grammar, to produce an infinite number of meaningful 
mental sentences and, further, that inferences between these mental sentences account for reasoning 
(see Fodor 1975, pp79-97).20, 21 However, before we continue, there is one expositional note to be 
stressed here: Although there exist numerous, nuanced permutations of the propositional doctrine, 
espoused by a number of cognitive scientists (e.g. Pinker 1999; Plotkin 2000; Rapaport 2007), for the 
purposes of exegesis this thesis will focus solely on the work on the subject by Jerry Fodor, who 
defends his syntactic conception of mental representation via a couple of arguments: 
1) That as language is infinitely productive (i.e., is capable of producing an infinity of 
meaningful propositions), then thought must itself be capable of the same level of 
production: It must be able of representing an infinity of meaningful thoughts. As such, 
mental representation must be in the form of a discrete combinatorial system, such as a 
language (see Fodor 1975, p31; 1990, pp16-19). 
2) Fodor points to the field’s reliance on Turing machines as a basis for cognition, highlighting 
the fact that the machines detailed by Turing function on syntactic representations and 
                                                          
19 In fact, concerning the syntactic view, Fodor (2000, p42) effusively states that “[c]ognitive science minus the syntactic theory of 
computation is Hamlet without the Prince”. 
20 Atomic in the sense that the meaning of any one components is not determined by any other. If this were not the case, the theory would 
be led to semantic holism and issues concerning the inability of individuals to share concepts (see Fodor 2000, p69). See the subsequent 
chapter for a more detailed discussion of this argument 
21 It is important to bear in mind that this language of thought is not identical to any natural language. This is because, as Fodor (1975, p56) 
stresses, “[t]he obvious (and, I should have thought, sufficient) refutation of the claim that natural languages are the medium of thought is 
that there are nonverbal organisms that think.” 
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argues that a theory of mind based on such machines must, eo ipso, also rely on the same 
syntactic, or “discursive”, representations of its paradigm case (Fodor 2010, p62).22 
 
When considering the philosophy of Jerry Fodor it needs to be recognised that it has undergone some 
adaptations since its first articulations in the 1970s, and that there are, consequently, essentially two 
Fodorian LoT hypotheses: The early version of the 1970s and 1980s, as advanced in The Language of 
Thought, and the later, current, incarnation, as seen in LOT2: The language of thought revisited.23 
Because of this fact, the following discussion of Fodor’s ideas will be organised chronologically: It will 
move from its first articulations to the theory as we find it today. 
LoT 
When Fodor first expresses his LoT hypothesis, he maintains the basic facts of any propositional theory 
of representation: That there exists a mental language that is composed from a finite number of 
atomic components (see Fodor 1975, pp125-126) and that the processing of these components 
produces inductive and deductive reasoning (Fodor 2000; 2001; 2007; 2010). Additionally, Fodor 
(Ibid., p133; pp95-97) states that these components are both native (i.e. unlearned) and as rich, or 
nearly as rich, as natural languages. As such, he contends that language learning essentially consists 
in learning (i.e., correlating) the appropriate translations of mental propositions into their natural 
language counterparts, with a mental “dictionary” mediating between the expressions of the two 
languages (Ibid., pp78-79; p125). This is a view that entails some rather daunting assumptions, 
however, especially concerning the “very extreme nativism” it necessitates and presupposes (Ibid., 
p96). For, Fodor must now accept that every term in language, including neologisms, corresponds to 
a concept that comes preloaded in every individual (i.e. that Plato was born with the concept 
HELICOPTER). This is an issue Fodor (Ibid.) attempts to avoid by arguing that “complex concepts (like, 
say, ‘airplane’) decompose into simpler concepts (like ‘flying machine’)”.24 
 
Were semantic content is concerned, Fodor (Ibid., pp150-151) uses this atomic nativism as a base to 
expound the view that meaning is based on a two-part process, affirming: 
A theory of the hearer can reasonably be expected to contain two distinguishable components. The first 
of these is concerned with explaining sentence comprehension proper; i.e., with characterizing the 
                                                          
22 It should be highlighted that there are issues with both these arguments. For example, although 1) is necessary for representation to be 
language-like, it is not sufficient for mentality to be in such a format, as opposed to an equally productive form, (e.g., analogical 
representations). Also, and as we have seen in our prior discussion of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, many representational systems can feasibly 
occupy the representational level. Therefore, to unquestioningly employ the traditional system used by Turing is fallacious.  
23 Nevertheless, Fodor’s work should not be presumed to comprise two discrete, clearly defined stages. Rather, there is a continuum in his 
work between the publication of The language of thought in 1975 and LOT2 in 2010. 
24 Unfortunately, however, this defence seems to fail in capturing the semantic nuance found between related terms, such as those found 
within the complex concepts ‘helicopter’, ‘glider’, and ‘jumbo jet’ (cf. Putnam 1988, pp15-18). 
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computations which effect the correspondence between wave forms and messages; i.e., with specifying 
those mental operations which eventuate in a display of the information that utterances of sentences 
convey; i.e., with showing how hearers reconstruct the communicative intentions of speakers. Call this 
component a ‘sentence understander’. The second component is concerned with representing the data 
processes (including drawing inferences) which are defined over the information that utterers of 
sentences convey; i.e., those data processes which mediate the hearer’s use of information he gleans 
from the utterances he hears. Call this component a logic. Then, roughly (abstracting from feedback and 
the like) the output of the sentence understander is the input to the logic. Equivalently, the (or a) function 
of the sentence understander is to represent utterances in the normal form for which operations in the 
logic are defined.  
That is to say, for early LoT, there are two stages to sentence comprehension: 1) A conversion of 
natural language propositions into their Mentalese counterparts (a process accomplished by a 
‘sentence understander’); and 2) A parsing of these Mentalese sentence, via inference, to recover 
meaning (completed by a ‘logic’). Within the early LoT, the sentence understander is fulfilled by truth 
rules and the logic by meaning postulates, both concepts that require further investigation. 
Truth rules 
Truth rules are formulae for converting predicates in a natural language into a LoT and are what 
establish the ‘definitions’ in an individual’s mental dictionary. They are of the form ˹y is a philosopher˺ 
is true iff x is a philosopher, where the terms on the left of the modus ponens are words in a LoT and 
those on the right are in a natural language (see Ibid. pp59-60). Consequently, the example used here 
would convert the word ‘philosopher’ into the mental concept PHILOSOPHER. Although these rules 
may seem trivial or even empty, this is not the case, for, as Fodor (2007, pp1-2) explains:  
“[Truth rules are not trivial or empty…] if you assume that the semantic properties of English sentences 
are described in some language other than English. That ‘the cat said ‘meow’’ is true if and only if ‘le chat 
a dit ‘meow’ is patently not trivial. To the contrary, it’s just the sort of fact that a French speaker who is 
trying to learn English (or an English speaker who is trying to learn French) would need to know”.25 
This is necessary as, for LoT, meaning is only present in mental predicates. Therefore, natural language 
is devoid of meaning and needs to be translated into a language where it, semantics, is present, i.e. 
Mentalese (see Fodor 1975, p64). With this in mind, a question seems to be being begged here: If the 
meaning of a natural language predicate is determined by its translation into its equivalent in the LoT, 
what determines the meaning of these Mentalese predicates? Is there a further metalanguage of 
thought that is capable of representing the extensions of predicates (a meta-metalanguage)? In his 
initial work on the LoT hypothesis, Fodor, working with Jerrold Katz, answers this question with the 
                                                          
25 This is founded on the distinction between mention and use. On the left of the truth rule an input sentence is named/mentioned, while 
the output sense on the right is not named but used. 
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introduction of ‘semantic markers and distinguishers’ into the mental dictionary, with the meaning of 
Mentalese terms being accounted for syntactically. As Katz and Fodor (1963, pp185-186) aver:  
The semantic markers and distinguishers are the means by which we can decompose the meaning of one 
sense of a lexical item into its atomic concepts, and thus exhibit the semantic structure IN a dictionary 
entry and the semantic relations BETWEEN dictionary entries. That is, the semantic relations among the 
various senses of a lexical item and among the various senses of different lexical items are represented 
by formal relations between markers and distinguishers. 
Nevertheless, by the time of the publication of The language of thought, Fodor has abandoned this 
syntactic account and instead answers the above question by stating that Mentalese is capable of 
representing the meanings of predicates as it is capable of representing the physical extensions of 
those predicates. Further, Fodor argues that it is a brute fact that Mentalese is capable of doing this: 
That it is an innate ability of individuals that their internal language is structured such that it represents 
the extension of a predicate. Or, as Fodor (1975, p66), asserts: 
there are two ways in which it can come about that a device (including, presumably, a person) 
understands a predicate. In one case, the device has and employs a representation of the extension of 
the predicate, where the representation is itself given in some language that the device understands. In 
the second case, the device is so constructed that its use of the predicate (e.g., in computations) comport 
with the conditions that such a representation would specify. I want to say that the first is true of 
predicates in the natural languages people learn and the second of predicates in the internal language in 
which you think.  
As such, although the early LoT does not have a causal theory of reference, it still, in part, relies on an 
– innate or non-causal – correspondence between the world and Mentalese for the provision of 
semantic content.26 However, this reliance on extensions of mental content is not said to be the whole 
story of the provision of semantic content, merely a necessary part of it. For Fodor (1987) argues that 
the mapping of Mentalese tokens onto their appropriate extensions within contexts is also a 
determiner of meaning, i.e., early LoT relies on both broad and narrow content.27 Fodor (1987, pp27-
54) argues for this reliance on narrow content with the following – here formally stated – argument: 
1) Premise1: Mental states are individuated by their causal powers. Explicitly, the specific 
content of a mental state is the specific cause of behaviour. (Ibid., pp33-34; p44).28 
                                                          
26 Nevertheless, this position is not uncontroversial. For example, compare Fodor’s position with that of Putnam (1975, pp261-262) or 
Pietroski (2005, p259). 
27 This conception of narrow content is later qualified by Fodor (1991). In “A modal argument for narrow content” he argues for a more 
nuanced account of narrow content, wherein only entities that share contingent, over conceptual, properties share causal powers. 
Therefore, only a difference in contingent properties between two entities establishes a difference in their causal powers. As such, any two 
entities that share contingent properties, even if they differ in their conceptual properties and broad content, are said to have the same 
narrow content. 
28 However, this does not imply that any two or more mental states that lead to, cause, identical behaviour, will be classified as identical. It 




2) Premise2: An entity’s causal powers do not alter with a change in broad content. (Ibid., pp34-
35; pp40-41). 
∴  
3) Causal powers must be an intrinsic property of an entity. That is, context must not affect the 
causal powers of an entity (Ibid., pp35-36). 
∴  
4) Mental content must be intrinsic; must be narrow (Ibid., pp44-46). 
 
As such, early Fodor proposes a two-part conception of semantic content, thereby employing a 
moderate internalism that necessitates both narrow content (i.e., the internal functions performed 
on mental states that move “from contexts onto truth conditions” (Ibid. 1987, p53)) as well as broad 
content (i.e., the truth conditions and extensions themselves) (see also Fodor 1991, p6; p10).  
Meaning postulates 
As mentioned earlier, the logic, or that which manipulates the LoT predicates created by truth rules 
to parse Mentalese sentences, is fulfilled in the early LoT by meaning postulates, which are, as Fodor 
and Fodor (1980, p761) have it, “rules of logical inference”. That is to say, they are the formulae that 
link terms in the mental language and derive the correct mental content intended by a natural 
language sentence, or, as Fodor and Fodor (Ibid., p764) have it: 
A meaning postulate[…] is like other rules of inference in that it takes as input a structure representing 
the semantic properties of a construction, and yields another semantic structure as output. 
For example the natural language sentence ‘John ate’ will be translated literally into the Mentalese 
predicate ˹John ate˺, which is, strictly, a meaningless, incomplete sentence (as it contains an empty 
functional argument). With this data as input, the logic, or meaning postulates, will infer the missing 
functional argument position and deduce, therefore, that the real state of affairs is that ˹John ate 
something˺. Meaning postulates – after the abandonment of semantic markers and distinguishers – 
also handle such semantic functions as synonymy, knowledge by description and generally inform how 
sentences are to be parsed by defining over the terms, and the associations between those terms, 
found within an individual’s mental dictionary (see Fodor 1975, pp150-152). 
 
LoT2 
Over the intervening three decades between the publication of the original Language of Thought and 
LoT2, the hypotheses at the heart of Fodor’s philosophy has undergone a number of revisions. 
Although this is the case, the modifications are not so vast as to make the theory of today 
unrecognisable from its early articulations. For example, the theory remains an explanation of 
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cognition that is based on finite, atomistic mental representations that are syntactically organised in 
a manner akin to natural languages and which use inferences between representations to account for 
reasoning (Fodor 2000; 2001; 2007; 2010). Additionally, LoT2 also adheres to the view of these 
atomistic representations as being both as profligate, or nearly as profligate, as natural languages and 
as being innate (2010, pp129-168)).29 Finally, Fodor (2007, pp1-2) still maintains a ‘sentence 
understander’, which translate natural language sentences into their Mentalese equivalents (although 
the appellation ‘truth rules’ has subsequently been replaced with the term ‘Tarski sentences’).  
 
However, where major revisions in the Language of Thought hypothesis has occurred has been within 
that theory’s account of semantics, with a move away from a moderate internalism, which 
necessitates both a non-causal reference and internal functions (i.e., broad and narrow content), to a 
purely causal theory of reference, organised within a new structure and abandoning any form of 
narrow content (see Ibid., 1994, pp1-26; 2010, pp17-18; p199).30, 31 As such, and to clarify, narrow 
content, the logic of meaning postulates and the mental dictionary of LoT have been abandoned since 
the hypothesis’ first publication in favour of a causal theory of reference.  
 
The first of these major modifications to Fodor’s LoT is a movement away from a two-part moderate 
internalism involving narrow content (see Ibid., 1994).32 In its place Fodor (Ibid., pp140-141) has 
introduced a causal theory of reference, wherein mental concepts derive their meaning through 
reference with actual and possible properties and individuals in the world alone. That is to say, Fodor 
(Ibid., p199) has introduced a one-part theory of reference into LoT2 in which the correspondence 
between representation and states of affairs is established through an individual’s experience with 
those states, rather than having the correspondence as an innate facet of cognition (as was present in 
the early LoT). This causal basis derives from an individual’s experience with the world leading to 
certain states of affairs “locking on” (Ibid., pp141-144) to nascent Mentalese concepts (nascent in the 
                                                          
29 In fact, LoT2 holds a complex position on the innateness of concepts. While still defining himself as a “raving nativist” (Ibid., p153) and 
arguing that concepts cannot be learned (Ibid., p139), Fodor (Ibid., p130) also avers that “it doesn’t quite follow that any concepts are 
innate[… because] ‘learned’ and ‘innate’ do not exhaust the options”. Instead concepts are said to be acquired via experience, but what 
contributes to an individual’s ability to acquire a concept or not is determined by their “innate endowment” (Ibid., p145). Even though this 
is the case, Fodor (Ibid., p146) concludes that: 
Concepts are, as it were, there from the beginning. We have the concepts we do because we have the neurology we do; we have the 
neurology we do because we have the phenotype we do; and we have the phenotype we do because we have the genotype we do. We have 
[the concept] CARBURETOR for the same sort of reason that we have ten fingers. 
30 Interestingly, Fodor (2010, p199) was motivated to adopt this causal reference to avert such concerns that include the homunculus fallacy, 
which, as we shall see, are issues that have motivated adaptations within the semantic theory of others.  
31 As previously remarked, the intervening years between the publication of The language of thought and LOT2 hold a developing continuum 
of positions within Fodor’s LoT hypothesis. For example, a causal theory of reference fixation and, therefore, meaning can be found in 
Fodor's philosophy as early as 1990, where it is declared that: 
there are the right kinds of causal linkages between the symbols that the device manipulates and things in the world[...] It is entirely 
reasonable (indeed it must be true) that the right kind of causal relation is the kind that holds between our brains and our transducer 
mechanisms (on the one hand) and between our brains and distal objects (on the other). (Fodor 1990, p33) 
32 For arguments that motivate Fodor’s abandonment of narrow content, see Putnam (1988, pp19-56). 
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sense that they are always present in an individual but only play any role in cognition once the locking 
on process has been “triggered” (Ibid., pp141-144)). In other words, under LoT2, concept acquisition 
is triggered by experiences of physical instantiations of that concept.33 Finally, it should be highlighted 
that the mechanics of this ‘locking on’ process is not actually detailed by Fodor, it is merely concluded 
that it is simply the “kind of thing that our brain tissue just does” (Ibid., p152).  
 
The final revision Fodor has made to the semantics of LoT is a move away from a mental ‘dictionary’ 
towards that of a mental ‘filing cabinet’ (Ibid., p94). This move constitutes a restructuring of the 
mental concepts, or representations, an individual possesses: From a flat system to one of a more 
relational, dynamic structure. Fodor (Ibid., pp94-95) describes this new structure as follows: 
Think of your head as containing (inter alia) an arbitrarily large filing cabinet, which can in turn contain 
an arbitrarily large set of files, which can in turn contain an arbitrarily large number of memos. We can 
think of these files, and of the memos that they contain, as quite like real files that contain real memos 
in the real world (except, of course, that mental memos are written in Mentalese; and, since there has to 
be room for them in people’s heads, mental filing cabinets can’t occupy much space). The basic idea is 
this: When you are introduced to John (or otherwise become apprised of him), you assign him a 
Mentalese name and you open a mental file, and the same Mentalese expression (M(John)) serves both 
as John’s Mentalese name and as the name of the file that contains your information about John; just as, 
in the ontologically untendentious files that one comes across in ontologically untendentious filing 
cabinets, the file labelled ‘John’ is likely to be the one where you’ll find stuff pertaining to John. 
As such, now, under this file analogy, each mental representation has its own named file, a name that 
also doubles as that representation’s tokening in Mentalese expressions, meaning that “we think in 
file names” (Ibid.). These files contain Mentalese ‘memos’, or pieces of information, pertaining to what 
is represented and which determine an individual’s propositional attitudes towards that which is 
represented (Ibid., p97; p143). By defining your beliefs etc. concerning entities, these memos also 
delimit the associations (including synonymy) you hold between representations. For example, your 
file HOUSE may contain a memo stating that houses tend to be paired with the concept WINDOW, 
consequently, when you hear “house” you will think “window”. Furthermore, as reference exhausts 
semantic content, the organisation of mental representations explain the relationships between 
meaning. For example, in the case of Frege (or, substitutivity) cases, where the one referent has two 
senses (e.g. ‘the evening star’ and ‘the morning star’ are filled by the one entity, Venus), is accounted 
for by a mistake in the filing system: The one entity has, for one reason or another, two different files, 
containing different memos (i.e. different, and even contradictory, belief/desire states). That is, an 
individual may possess two concepts: VENUS1 and VENUS2, one that contains a memo concerning a 
                                                          
33 For a full definition of the nature of ‘concept acquisition’, as defined by LoT2, see footnote 29 and Fodor (2010, pp129-168). 
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belief in Venus’ appearance in the morning, the other a memo concerning Venus’ appearance in the 
evening (see Ibid., p99). Consequently, in Frege cases, although there are confusions over the 
organisation and propositional attitudes (i.e., beliefs and desires) concerning mental representations, 
confusions that create linguistic misunderstandings, the meanings of the two terms are identical (Ibid., 
p82). Although this is a view that necessitates the presence of cognitive dissonance between an 
individual’s belief and desire states, this is not problematic, for, as Fodor (1990, p174) asserts: 
it couldn’t conceivably be required that the propositional objects of all the attitudes attributed to a guy 
[sic] at any one time should be to any extent mutually consistent: There’s nothing wrong with hoping that 
P while fearing that not-P; and believing that P while wishing that not-P practically defines the human 
condition.34 
Analogical representations 
In contrast to these propositional representations, stands the mental model theory (or, simply, the 
model theory). This theory is traditionally viewed as the psychologist’s approach to mental 
representation (see McGinn 1989, p172; Fodor 2008, p197), most likely due to the large amount of 
explanatory and experimental work produced on the subject within that field (most notably by Philip 
Johnson-Laird and David Marr). This is a theory based upon the hypothesis that the world is 
represented in the mind of an individual via internal simulations, isomorphs or models, which are then 
used as a basis for cognition and action (Johnson-Laird 1977, pp206-207; 1993, p275; 2005, p185). 
Johnson-Laird (1999, p116) summarises the position thus: 
The theory of mental models[…] postulates that reasoning is based not on syntactic derivations from 
logical forms but on manipulations of mental models representing situations. Models can represent the 
world, simulate a process, and yield inductive or deductive inferences. 
 
It is important to note that although it is easy to assume that these mental representations or models 
are, in form and function, essentially nothing more than a mental image, akin to those with which we 
are all conscious and familiar, a mental representation should not be confused as being constituted in 
such a format. This is the case, for, as Johnson-Laird (Ibid.) highlights, “models are distinct from images, 
they can contain abstract elements, such as negation, that cannot be visualized” (see also Johnson-
Laird 1980; 1993; 2010). To support this position on mental representation, adherents of the model 
theory have employed a number of arguments over the years (see Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013 
for an example of a raft of experiments and empirical data used to support analogical models). 
                                                          
34 This position has also been articulated by McDowell (1977, p173), concerning his own de re account of meaning, as follows: 
[T]he belief which makes the [denial of co-reference] intelligible is a (false) second-order belief to the effect that the subject has, and is 
expressing, a first-order, belief[…] This second-order belief is manifested by the subjects action, not expressed by his words. No belief is 
expressed by his words: they purport to express a belief[…] but since no appropriate belief could be thus described, there is no such belief 
as the belief which they purport to express.  
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However, one common defence, seen in the likes of Johnson-Laird (1980; 1993; 2006), can be found 
in a series of famous psychological experiments performed during the 1970s. During these studies, it 
was found that a subject’s response time in a task involving the mental manipulation of a presented 
figure varied according to said figure’s spatial properties (e.g., size, orientation, complexity, etc.), 
strongly suggesting that participants need to manipulate some form of mental representation which 
themselves have something like or akin to spatial properties (see Kosslyn 1980; Shepard 1978). 
 
Now that these preliminaries have been established, we are in a position to explicate the details of the 
model theory and its operation in more detail. However, one caveat before we begin: Although the 
analogical mental model theory is a nuanced position and a variety of different permutations can be 
found within the literature (e.g. McGinn 1989; Waskan 2006), this research will be focusing only upon 
the particular analogical framework held by the British psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird. 
Consequently, when first introduced to this particular theory of analogical mental representation, it is 
important to note that the main influences on the structure and operation of Johnson-Laird’s posited 
mental symbols’ come from two sources: The first arising in the first half of the twentieth century by 
the Scottish psychologist and philosopher Kenneth Craik (see Johnson-Laird 1980; 1983; 1993) and the 
second from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by the pragmatist philosopher and 
scientist Charles Sanders Peirce (see Johnson-Laird 2002; 2005; 2006; 2008a; 2010; 2013). As such, to 
uncover the nature of the models that function at the representational abstraction of Johnson-Laird’s 
approach to cognitive science, it will be valuable for us to examine the work and influence of these 
thinkers in turn. (N.B. These influences can be seen as defining two clear stages in the development of 
Johnson-Laird’s philosophy of mind, with an early period, covering the 1980s-2000s, defined by a 
Craikean influence and a later period, from 2002 onwards, characterised by a Peircean aspect. 
Nevertheless – and although the proceeding section (§iv Procedural semantics) will follow this 
development – this section will be ignoring this distinction and will only be looking at what the work 
of both Craik and Peirce tells us about Johnson-Laird’s model theory as we find it today.) 
Craik and the nature of analogical models 
Writing seven years before the publication of Turing’s “Computing machines and intelligence” (with 
The nature of explanation being first published in 1943), Kenneth Craik (1914-1945) puts forward a 
model-based view of the mind founded on the concept of analogue computers, rather than the digital 
computing of Turing (1950).35 These analogue computers “are devices which embody functions 
between their inputs and outputs to produce the requisite solution without going through the steps 
                                                          
35 Interestingly, writing in 1943, Craik (1966, p38) is also concerned with designing machines capable of behaving like the brain, a project 
akin to that which concerned Turing (1950, p433), i.e. "Can machines think?" 
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of mathematics or logic necessary for deriving answers by built-in mathematical or logical procedures” 
(Zangwill 1980, p6). That is to say, analogue computers use physical, mechanical or chemical systems 
to process inputs into outputs (Craik 1967, p51), whereas, as we have seen in our discussion of Turing 
(1936), digital computers electronically apply mathematics and logic to do the same (compare 
analogue and digital watches). As such, when viewing the influence of Craik’s work upon modern 
cognitive science, it must be remembered that it is not a direct influence. Rather, Craik’s reasoning is 
being applied to a digital RTM in place of an analogical one.  
 
Within his own work on modelling, Craik (1967, p54) considers that what is crucial to the constitution 
of any model is that its structure, though not necessarily its appearance (see Ibid., p51), is analogous 
to the state of affairs it is modelling. In other words, according to Craik and his followers, for a model 
to model it must share the same ‘relation-structure’ as the part of the world that is of interest, i.e. 
“the fact that it is a physical working model which works in the same way as the process it parallels, 
in the aspects under consideration at any moment” (Ibid.). Therefore, for any mechanical model of a 
situation (e.g. “[a] calculating machine, an anti-aircraft 'predictor', and Kelvin's tidal predictor” (Ibid., 
p51)) to be considered as such, it must be able to be used in place of the original state of affairs for a 
number of reasons (e.g. expense, availability, efficiency or self-preservation) (see Ibid., p52) and it 
must, like the original, operate by “the 'translation' of the external processes into their representatives 
(positions of gears, etc.) in the model; the arrival at other positions of gears etc. by mechanical 
processes in the instrument; and finally, the retranslation of these into physical processes of the 
original type” (Ibid. p51)). Ergo, for Craik, a model qua model, must take an input, process it and 
produce an output, in a natural manner that preserves the structure of the state of affairs to which it 
refers. This naturalism constraint translates as an equally important factor in the operation of mental 
models, for it imposes  
an important structural property deriving from a constraint on the set of possible mental models: a 
natural mental model of discourse has a structure that corresponds directly to the structure of the state 
of affairs that the discourse describe. (Johnson-Laird 1983, p125)  
As such, this naturalism, termed “structural preservation and naturalness” by Vosgerau (2006, p255), 
limits the representational scope of models, ensuring that they only include those things found in a 
state of affairs and are absent from such things as “sophisticated mathematical notations” (Johnson-
Laird 1983, p93).  
 
Following from Craik’s reasoning, we are led to the conclusion that cognition itself should be 
considered as some form of model of the world. For, the two phenomena (cognition and modelling) 
share a lot of the same attributes. For example, it appears that the major purpose of cognition is to 
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run a test in place of an actuality. Furthermore, Craik (Ibid., pp50-51) observes that “[d]uring the 
process of reasoning[…] there are three essential processes: 
(1) 'Translation' of external process into words, numbers or other symbols, 
(2) Arrival at other symbols by a process of reasoning, deduction, inference, etc., and 
(3) 'Retranslation' of these symbols into external processes (as in building a bridge to a design) or at 
least recognition of the correspondence between these symbols and external events (as in realising that 
a prediction is fulfilled)” (Ibid., p50). 
This is a line of reasoning that concludes in the insight of the fundamentally isomorphic nature of 
cognition; an influential conclusion Craik (1967, p61) summarises as follows: 
If the organism carries a 'small-scale model' of external reality and of its own possible actions within its 
head, it is able to try out various alternatives, conclude which is the best of them, react to future 
situations before they arise, utilise the knowledge of past events in dealing with the present and future, 
and in every way to react in a much fuller, safer, and more competent manner to the emergencies which 
face it. Most of the greatest advances of modem technology have been instruments which extended the 
scope of our sense-organs, our brains or our limbs. Such are telescopes and microscopes, wireless, 
calculating machines, typewriters, motor cars, ships and aeroplanes. Is it not possible, therefore, that our 
brains themselves utilise comparable mechanisms to achieve the same ends and that these mechanisms 
can parallel phenomena in the external world as a calculating machine can parallel the development of 
strains in a bridge? 
A conclusion that has had a direct influence on the philosophy of Philip Johnson-Laird (1980, p98), 
leading him to similarly conclude: 
human beings do not apprehend the world directly; they possess only internal representations of it[…] A 
model represents a state of affairs and accordingly its structure is not arbitrary like that of a propositional 
representation, but plays a direct representational or analogical role. Its structure mirrors the relevant 
aspects of the corresponding state of affairs in the world. 
Peirce and the nature of analogical models 
However, since the early 2000s, this idea of Craikean modelling and relation-structure finds expression 
in the work of Johnson-Laird via his employment of the terms ‘icon’ and ‘iconicity’ to describe the 
structure of his representations. Johnson-Laird has borrowed both of these terms from the work of 
the American psychologist and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce. The use and meaning 
of these terms derive from Peirce’s analysis of, and investigation into, the structure of signs (i.e. into 
the foundations of a symbol’s semantic content). From this investigation, Peirce (1906; 1931-1958) 
defines a sign as – not necessarily a physical – something that signifies a worldly state of affairs to an 
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interpreter (e.g. a conscious agent). But he also identifies that this signification occurs in three 





The first of these, icons, represent through an analogy between the relation of the parts of the sign 
and the state of affairs it signifies (e.g. a picture indicates the scene it does through having 
corresponding elements in corresponding relationships); the second mode of a sign, an index, 
represents via a physical existential relation between it and the relevant state of affairs (e.g. a sundial 
signifies the time of day through a physical connection between that which is modelled, the sun, and 
the sign, the sundial); the final form of signs, symbols, represent via formal rules (e.g. a proposition 
represents a scene via the formalised grammatical rules of its structure). Peirce (1906, p495) clarifies 
his typology thus: 
an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest limits, as anything which, being 
determined by an object, determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same object,) 
leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of 
the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected 
with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty 
that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including 
a natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. 
With our previous discussion of Craikean models in mind, it can quickly be perceived how Peirce’s 
analysis influences Johnson-Laird’s theory of analogical, or iconic, models: It both strengthens and 
supports his contention that mental representation functions through an analogy – or a shared (i.e. 
natural and structure preserving) relation-structure – with a specific state of affairs.  
 
Therefore, and to summarise, to define the fundamental nature of mental representations, Johnson-
Laird draws on the work of both Kenneth Craik and Charles Sanders Peirce. With a reliance on these 
sources, it is argued that the internal structure of a mental representation (i.e. the elements of the 
model and their relations) is a mirror of, or is identical to, the state of affairs or situation being 
                                                          
36 References made in this fashion refer, unless specified, to the numbered paragraphs found within Peirce’s collected works, 1931-1958.  
37 It needs to be clarified that Peirce drew a number of different analyses into the operation and manifestation of signs throughout his work. 
The one that concerns this thesis is, as Peirce (1906, pp496-497) affirms, "only one of ten different divisions of Signs which I have found it 
necessary more especially to study”, but it is the one which occupies Johnson-Laird (2002; 2006; 2008; 2010) and which has been described 
by Burks (1949, p673) as “the simplest of his [Peirce’s] many classifications of signs, and is, moreover, the most important of them all, for it 
contains the essence of even the most complicated of them without sharing their repetitive and unwieldy character. Historically, the more 
complicated classifications developed as expansions of the simpler one”. As such, this will be the only division of signs made by Peirce to 
which this research will give attention. 
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modelled and preserves or maintains this relation if submitted to the same operations. This iconic 
characteristic of mental models is a facet of Johnson-Laird’s philosophy that continually manifests 
itself throughout his work via the use of synonyms for iconicity to express the structure of his mental 
models (synonyms such as ‘analogical’, ‘isomorphic’, ‘parallel’ and ‘simulation’ (see Johnson-Laird 
1980; 1983; 2008a; 2008b; 2010)) and can be seen in quotes such as the following: 
Mental models are iconic insofar as possible. What “iconic” means is that their structure corresponds to 
the structure of what they represent[.] (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p9). 
 
Now that we, via its influences, have explored the nature of the mental models Johnson-Laird has 
posited in the representational level of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, we can now move on to the 
procedures or computations that are said to be performed on these types of representation to process 
them, i.e. we are able to investigate how reasoning is said to be produced under Johnson-Laird’s 
analogical mental model framework. 
Reasoning and mental models 
The distinctive feature of the operations performed on Johnson-Laird’s mental models, when used to 
explain reasoning, is that they do not rely upon any formal rules of inference, or any other axiomatic 
formal logic.38 Instead, in place of these formal inferential rules, mental models rely upon their iconic 
nature and computations to construct, investigate, compare, conjugate, remove and update models 
to explain the two kinds of reasoning employed by individuals: Induction and deduction (see Johnson-
Laird 1980; 1983; 1993; 1994a; 1994b; 1999; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2010). 
Deduction 
In the case of deduction – which moves from the general to the specific – Johnson-Laird relies on the 
aforementioned Peircean iconicity of mental models. The motivation for this reliance can be found in 
Peirce (§279), who, during his investigation into icons, identifies that:  
a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning 
its object can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its construction. Thus, by means of 
two photographs a map can be drawn, etc[...] This capacity of revealing unexpected truth is precisely that 
wherein the utility of algebraical formulae consists, so that the iconic character is the prevailing one. 
This means that the iconic nature of mental representations allows conclusions that are not explicitly 
stated in any original premises to be drawn from subsequently constructed models. For example, if 
given the premises: 
                                                          
38 For Johnson-Laird’s reasoning behind this abandonment of an innate formal logic see the work of Wason (1966), Wason and Shapiro 
(1971) and Wason and Johnson-Laird (1972). These studies demonstrate that, when trying to solve a problem, the content of that problem 
affects participants’ reasoning, a phenomena that could not possibly occur when operating under a formal logic, which sees no difference 
between ‘If x then y’ and ‘If I go to Manchester, I will take the train’ while, as Wason et al’s experiments demonstrate, people do. 
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1) Katie is to the left of Phil 
and 
2) Kath is to the left of Katie 
A mental model akin to the following can be produced: 
  Kath Katie Phil 
After investigation of which, it can be deduced that: 
3) Kath is to the left of Phil  
That is, a valid conclusion not explicitly stated in the premises can be found or deduced. 
 
This reliance upon iconicity, though, is just one strategy that can be used to produce conclusions 
through a deductive process. Where more complex propositions – such as logical and conditional 
puzzles – are concerned, additional strategies can be employed. These rely on suppositions, which are 
mental models that:  
are assumed for the sake of argument and which must be “discharged” if a derivation is to yield a 
conclusion. One way to discharge a supposition is to make it explicit in a conditional conclusion 
(conditional proof), and another way is to show that it leads to a contradiction and must therefore be 
false (reductio ad absurdum) (Johnson-Laird and Yang 2008, p341). 
Meaning, that we can reach valid conclusions by creating an initial model consistent with one of the 
proposition’s premises (taking it to be true for the sake of argument) and employing computational 
processes to update that suppositional model or conjugating it with another model consistent with 
one or more of the other premises. Once this has been achieved, we can then interrogate the resulting 
model to find if it is valid and, if it is, what conclusions can be read off from it, or, if it is not valid, 
conclude that a contradiction has been reached. Once a conclusion, of any kind, has been attained, 
models constituting counterexamples consistent with the original premises can be created to ensure 
the validity of any such conclusions (see Ibid., p345; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p14). 
 
Before we continue, however, it is important to highlight the fact that when a model is constructed 
from a proposition, it constitutes a generalisation of that proposition’s premises. For an infinity of 
nuanced models of, to take our previous example, “Katie is to the left of Phil and Kath is to the left of 
Katie” can be drawn. For example:  
Kath Katie  Phil  
and 
 Kath                Katie    Phil 
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or an infinity of other, subtly different, representations. As such, when we perceive a premise we draw 
only the one model of it, and that generalised model “captures what is common to [the] swarm of 
possibilities” (Johnson-Laird and Yang 2008, p345).39, 40 
Induction 
So far, all that these procedures and models have explained is the process of deduction, but there is 
another mode of reasoning requiring an explanation before Johnson-Laird’s models can be said to 
have fully accounted for the phenomena: That of induction (or reasoning which moves from the 
specific to the general). Johnson-Laird (1994a) explains this form of reasoning with a central reliance 
on the addition (i.e. update) procedure or computation we have just encountered (although, as we 
shall see, it must also make use of procedures for the deletion and conjugation computations). This 
central operation, addition, updates an existing representation with information garnered from 
subsequent premises or prior experiences in a process that can create two types of induction: Specific 
and general: 
Specific induction: These concern a particular event, process or object. For example, if you 
have trouble opening your car door on a frozen winter morning, and have had previous 
experience of that particular car’s lock freezing and sticking in cold temperatures, then the 
information from the models of prior experience (of the lock’s likelihood to stick) will be added 
(more accurately, conjugated) to the current model of the inoperable door (i.e. the 
representation will be updated with information from another mental model) to create the 
conclusion, induction, that the lock has again frozen in this instance (see Ibid, pp14-16).  
 
General induction: These concern a class of events, processes or objects and occur through a 
slight adaptation of the process we have just witnessed during specific induction. In the case 
of generalised inductions, information is added to a model that invalidates it, removing it from 
the suite of available representations, thereby leaving only the one, now general, 
representation (see Ibid, pp16-20). For example, if it is found that a variety of particles (either 
                                                          
39 This creation of only one generalised model is a fact taken to be one of the central assumptions of Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory 
(see Johnson-Laird 2010, p2). The theoretical difficulty of how one instance can stand for an infinity of cases was, until relevantly recently, 
explained by Johnson-Laird’s reading of the Philosophic Investigations and by reference to Wittgenstein’s discussion of ‘family resemblance’, 
stating that a single model is capable of representing a multitude through the fact that it is a schema which possesses the criteria of the 
concerned state of affairs (see Johnson-Laird 1983, pp191). Recently, Johnson-Laird (2002, p83) has updated his response to this theoretical 
question, adding to the concept of Wittgensteinian schema with an explanation based on the work of Charles Sanders Peirce and ‘iconicity’. 
Stating “a mental model captures what is common to all the different ways in which a possibility might occur. Hence, a mental model of the 
spatial proposition just given [‘The circle is to the right of the triangle’] represents what is common to any situation in which a circle is to the 
right of a triangle, but it represents nothing about size, colour, distance apart, and other such “accidents.” The model can be updated to 
take into account information about these properties and relations. But no matter how many details are added to a description, it is always 
consistent with many distinct states of affairs.” As such, it is now claimed that we create the one mental schema from a proposition, a 
schema from which we are able to “distinguish between accidental properties[…] and essential properties” (Johnson-Laird 2006, p139).  
40 The motivating reasons behind the creation of only the one mental model of a state of affairs in such cases, instead of a plurality, is one 
of processing power, i.e. it is a strategy designed to reduce the load and processing complexity placed on our finite brains during reasoning 
tasks (i.e., a finite brain cannot hold an infinitude of models). 
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A- or B-type particles) released from a nuclear reaction are damaging to tissue, a number of 
potential conclusions can be drawn, including: 
(1) Any one of the particle types (either particle A or particle B) is damaging to tissue. 
and 
(2) Particle A and particle B only damage tissue when operating in unison. 
Information can then be added to the mental representations of these conclusions, such as: 
“Particle A damages tissue when released on its own”, which would support one model (model 
(1) in this instance) and eliminate the other (model (2) here). For:  
an assertion of the form: 
If A & B then C 
corresponds to a set of models that includes: 
A [not]B [not]C 
When this model is eliminated, the resulting set is equivalent to: 
If A then C…  
 The operation of eliminating a model – by adding information that contradicts it – suffices 
for any generalisation, because generalisation is nothing more than the elimination of 
possible states of affairs (Ibid., p18). 
 
Again, as in deduction, when a conclusion is reached through any kind of induction, counterexamples 
consistent with the original premises will be created to ensure that any conclusions reached cannot 
be refuted and are therefore valid (see Johnson-Laird 2010, p7; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, 
p21). 
Human error 
Now the process of deduction and induction have been accounted for, all that is necessary to explain 
is the troubling fact that humans regularly err in making logical deductions and inductions. A fact that 
is not apparent in the strategies described above. As such, Johnson-Laird needs to clarify how this 
possibility is said to occur during human reasoning under an analogical representational framework. 
What is central to his answer here is the realisation that the human mind is not unlimited in its 
capacities; a limitation which leads to a preference, by memory, of dealing with a limited number of 
models at any one time (Johnson-Laird 1994a, p25). Due to this shortcoming, the mind is forced to cut 
corners when creating and manipulating mental models during problem solving (see Johnson-Laird 
1994a; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2010). We have already seen one of the strategies employed by the mind 
for lessening the burden put on our memory: Creating only one generalised model where a plurality 
can be produced. An additional tactic is referred to in the work of Johnson-Laird as the principle of 
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truth (see Johnson-Laird 1980; 2010; 2013; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013).41, 42 This principle 
states that, to minimise load, the brain represents only what is true in a proposition’s premises, that: 
mental models represent only those states of affairs that are possible given an assertion, and that within 
each of these possibilities they represent a clause in the assertion, whether it is affirmative or negative. 
(Johnson-Laird 2010, p209)  
For example, if given the disjunction ‘either he took the bus or he walked’ and the fact that ‘he walked’, 
only a representation of ‘him walking’ will be produced. The false clause, ‘he took the bus’, will be 
completely abandoned. This simple strategy to save load by reducing information achieves its end, but 
its implementation has a devastating impact in the mind’s ability to unerringly perform certain 
inferences. To explain this, Johnson-Laird (2008b, p5) gives the following example: 
Consider this problem, for instance: 
• Either Jane is kneeling by the fire and she is looking at the TV, or else Mark is standing at the 
window and he is peering into the garden. 
• Jane is kneeling by the fire. 
Does it follow that she is looking at the TV?  
Most individuals say yes[…] They overlook that when the second premise conjunction is true, the first 
conjunction is false, and that one way in which it can be false is when only its first clause is true, i.e. Jane 
is kneeling by the fire but not looking at the TV.43 
That is to say, the “principle of truth reduces load on our memory, and it seems innocuous. Yet, it can 
lead us into the illusion that we understand a description that, in fact, is beyond us” (Johnson-Laird 
2011, p480). Consequently, it is discovered that the heuristics the mind uses to facilitate reasoning, as 
well as to manage its inherent limitations, are the underlying causes of common errors (see Johnson-
Laird and Khemlani 2013, pp11-13). 
Summary 
To review, how the analogical mental model theory operates at the representational level of cognition 
is akin to that of Turing’s machine: It relies upon a suite of formal symbols and a finite set of operations 
to process them and to convert sensory input into intelligent action.44 In the case of a Turing machine, 
this symbol system was constituted by 0s, 1s and the four commands to the read/write head, which 
                                                          
41 This principle of truth is another of the central assumptions of Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory (see Johnson-Laird 2010, p2). 
42 This inclusion of the principle of truth in Johnson-Laird’s model theory should not be confused with the assertion that only what is the 
case can be modelled, rather than what is said to be true within a proposition. If the former state of affairs were the case, then no 
counterfactual could be modelled nor any discussion of counterfactuals be meaningful; both things which are accounted for within the 
model theory as a whole. Furthermore, as Goldvarg and Johnson-Laird (2001, p584) state, in certain instances the brain can overcome its 
prejudice toward the principle of truth and create ‘complete models’ that are capable of “overcoming the principle of truth” and 
representing states of affairs that are stated to be false within a proposition. These ‘complete models’ are also referred to as “fully explicit 
models” (Khemlani, Orenes and Johnson-Laird 2012, p543; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, pp11-13).  
43 Johnson-Laird is appealing to evidence produced from experiments he performed with Walsh for these claims (see Walsh and Johnson-
Laird 2004). 
44 As such, Johnson-Laird’s theory entails, as Fodor (2000, p12) identifies, a “nativism about[…] computational mechanisms”. 
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cover how to manipulate them appropriately; with minds, for analogical cognitive scientists, the 
following facets constitute the symbol system: 
Representations: The mind employs analogical, or iconic, mental models akin to those posited 
by Craik (1967) and Peirce (1906; 1931-58), wherein the elements of the representation, and 
the relations between them, mirror those of the state of affairs which is being represented. 
Furthermore, these models are natural and structure preserving, in that only those components 
and relations found in the worldly state of affairs are found in the model and, further, that the 
model reacts to changes, stimuli and operations as does those states of affair (see Johnson-
Laird 1980; 1983; 1988; 1993; 1994a; 1999; 2002; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2010; 2013). 
 
Computations/Operations: To process its analogical representations, thereby converting 
sensory input into an appropriate output (i.e. an intelligent action or propositional attitude), 
the mind employs computational procedures to construct, investigate, update, conjugate, 
compare and remove mental models (see Ibid.; Johnson-Laird and Yang 2008). 
 
Now we have explicated analogical representations and their explanation of the processes operating 
behind reasoning, it will be appropriate to detail how this system accounts for the appearance of 
meaning in natural language propositions, an account that Johnson-Laird has termed procedural 
semantics.45 For reasons that will soon become apparent, this account of semantic content will play a 
crucial role within the context of this research. Consequently, Johnson-Laird’s procedural semantics 
will be given a greater attention over the similar work of others, such as Jerry Fodor, and, therefore, 
will be given its own dedicated section. 
§iv Procedural semantics 
Throughout its history, procedural semantics has not been a steady, unchanging theory. Instead it is 
one that has developed and been built upon over its lifetime (this was an evolution acknowledged 
during our earlier analysis and explication of the influence of Craik and Peirce on Johnson-Laird). 
However, this does not mean that the theory of today is unrecognisable from the theory of the 1970s. 
Rather, it has developed along with Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy, maintaining many of its original 
positions but adapting to subsequent discoveries. Consequently, this section will follow Johnson-
Laird’s work chronologically: Initially concerning itself with the first articulations of the theory and 
                                                          
45 It should be noted, however, that in recent years (i.e., since his shift of focus from meaning toward reasoning), Johnson-Laird has dropped 
his use of the epithet ‘procedural semantics’ for his account of meaning. However, even though this is the case, natural language sentences 
are still said to be meaningful due to the procedures mental translations perform on mental representations under Johnson-Laird’s 
contemporary philosophy (Johnson-Laird 2006, pp23-24). As such, the title ‘procedural semantics’ is still appropriate and will be applied 
throughout this thesis. 
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then demonstrating its development over the years (e.g., adapting to such things as the theory of 
analogical models), until it becomes the complete correspondence theory of meaning we find today. 
As such, this section will:  
1) Defend the sole focus on mental representations taken when explaining meaning under 
the cognitive science paradigm.  
2) Undertake a discussion of the earliest ‘compile and execute’ version of Johnson-Laird’s 
theory.  
3) Give a report of the changes made to this early theory along with Johnson-Laird’s 
development of analogical mental models.  
4) Analyse how these analogical mental models are themselves meaningful through a 
Peircean structural correspondence theory.  
Representational abstraction 
Before commencing our discussion of Johnson-Laird’s account of meaning, it is first necessary to clarify 
why this discussion will focus solely upon the middle tier of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis (as did our 
earlier analysis of Fodor’s LoT). This is necessary because, as Marr (1982, p25) identifies, “a correct 
explanation of some psychophysical observation must be formulated at the appropriate level [of the 
tri-level hypothesis]”. As such, when considering the problems faced when explaining semantic 
content under the cognitive science framework, it is crucial that any putative answers are described 
at the correct level of abstraction. Consequently, it is informative to review comments made by 
Pylyshyn (1989, p57) concerning the definition of the representational (or, as he terms it, the symbol) 
level: 
The semantic content of knowledge and goals is assumed to be encoded by symbolic expressions. Such 
structured expressions have parts, each of which also encodes some semantic content. The codes and 
their structure, as well as the regularities by which they are manipulated, are another level of organization 
of the system. 
Therefore, any explanation of meaning, within the tri-level paradigm, should be concerned only with 
the operation of the representational abstraction to the detriment of both the computational and 
physical abstractions. Why this is so becomes apparent after consideration of the operation of the 
three levels of abstraction: The physical level must surely remain mute on the topic of semantics (on 
pain of imbuing inert pieces of matter with semantic content) and the computational level can only 
conclude in an awareness of the phenomena’s presence, an answer which would merely beg the 
question. As such, Johnson-Laird’s discussion of meaning (as well as Fodor’s and any future discussion 




Early ‘compile and execute’ semantics 
Returning to Johnson-Laird (1977), his procedural semantics was defined during its first articulations 
in the 1970s, as a theory of meaning based on a metaphor with the ‘compile and execute’ strategy 
employed by computers when interpreting programming languages. Under this metaphor, semantics 
is explained by the initial translation of natural language propositions into a ‘program’ in a hearer’s 
mental ‘processor’ (Ibid., p191) (i.e. propositions need first to be compiled before being understood). 
These stored ‘programs’ can then be converted into a state of affairs, such as an action, by its 
translation into some relevant and appropriate response by the hearer (i.e. the compiled proposition 
can be executed) (Ibid., pp206-207). For example, if given the command “Shut that door”, an individual 
will first translate the command into some mental state understandable by the mind, before 
employing that mentally understandable state to initiate the correct series of bodily movements to 
close the door, i.e. the command will be compiled and then executed.46 
 
It is important to note, however, that this first expression of procedural semantics suffers from some 
serious deficits. For, during this period, Johnson-Laird (1976, p635) ultimately explains semantic 
content by using the lexical decompositional paradigm prevalent at the time, wherein: 
The most elementary constituents of meaning are[… taken to be] various ineffable mental operation and 
states: these are the fundamental “particles” that make up the everyday use of language.  
This means that, for the Johnson-Laird of this period, a word is only meaningful once it has been 
mentally broken down (i.e. compiled) into the ‘fundamental mental particles’ from which it is 
comprised. This is a theoretical (and syntactical) position that, as Johnson-Laird (1993, p348) later 
highlights, begs the question, for all it has achieved is to explain language by merely relating it “to 
itself” (see also Ibid. 1988). 
Craikean mental models 
Due to such difficulties, Johnson-Laird’s hypothesis undertakes a number of subsequent 
improvements, the most significant of which is the development of a fully functioning analogical 
representational system in the 1980s (i.e. Johnson-Laird’s adoption of the theory of Craikean 
analogical mental models). This evolution is crucial to the growth of procedural semantics away from 
its earlier unsupportable incarnation, with the meaning of propositions now being translated (i.e. 
‘compiled’) operations or computations that are performed on mental models (as described in this 
                                                          
46 It is important to note that the mind must ‘compile’ the natural language command into a state understandable by the mind before it can 
be executed, as the mind cannot be said to operate using natural language. If this were asserted, then the question of how a vast number 
of natural languages arose must be answered. This position would also lead any adherent into accepting the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis and its 
attendant difficulties (see Gumpertz & Levinson 1996). See also Fodor (1975, p56), who makes similar comments regarding his own, 
comparable, ‘sentence understander and logic’. 
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chapter’s prior section) rather than merely broken down into their ‘fundamental elements.’ Or, as 
Johnson-Laird (1980, p91) has it: 
the meanings of words are decompositional procedures that relate to mental models of the world, and, 
in particular, on the use of lexical procedures that interact with the general procedures for constructing, 
manipulating and evaluating mental models. 
 
However, with this adoption of Craikean analogical models in the 1980s, Philip Johnson-Laird’s 
procedural semantics undergoes a further adaptation. For, the translation (or compilation of 
propositions into procedures to manipulate mental models) now requires an additional step between 
compiled propositions and action: That of a propositional representation (or ‘lexical procedure’) that 
is understandable and executable by the mind and that determines which are the correct procedures 
to affect a hearer’s analogical models. As such, procedural semantics is now:  
a theory of comprehension in which there are two stages. In the first stage, a superficial understanding 
of an utterance gives rise to a propositional representation, which is close to the surface form of a 
sentence. This symbolic representation is constructed in a mental language that has a vocabulary of 
comparable richness to that of natural language[…] The second stage of comprehension, which is 
optional, makes use of propositional representations as a basis for the construction of a mental model, 
whose structure is analogous to the state of affairs described by the discourse. Hence the recovery of a 
propositional representation is a necessary precursor to the construction of a mental model (Johnson-
Laird 1983, p244). 
 
Although this intermediate stage of propositional representations links words to mental models and 
explains comprehension and how a sentence is interpreted, it does not account for the semantic 
content present in the original proposition. All that has currently been achieved is the translation of 
one set of symbols, language, into another, mental models, thereby only relating signs to further signs. 
This final, crucial, step of grounding meaning is accomplished by linking mental models to the world. 
For, as Johnson-Laird (1987, p199) affirms:  
What has sometimes been underestimated[…] is the importance of reference, or more properly, its 
psychological correlate: the representation of specific referents, real or imaginary.  
Therefore, the early, Craik influenced, Johnson-Laird provides an explanation of the meaning of 
propositions based on a correspondence to a state of affairs in the world. Or, as Johnson-Laird (1983, 
p265) articulates this position: 
once truth conditions have[…] been taken care of there is no need to give a separate account of semantic 




As such, and to clarify, with the development of Craikean analogical mental models there is a sea 
change in Johnson-Laird’s account of meaning and the operation of procedural semantics between 
the 1970s and 1980s: That of the abandonment of lexical decomposition for the adoption of a 
prototype, or embryonic, correspondence, reference-based, theory of meaning.47, 48 
 
Moreover, the adoption of such an embryonic correspondence theory of meaning not only introduces 
a structural referentialist, externalist, account of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s philosophy of mind, it 
also provides a number of benefits to his account of semantic content as a whole. For a structural 
correspondence theory of meaning is capable of explaining such things as: 1) The productivity of 
language and thought; 2) the systematicity of language and thought; and 3) concept learning (see 
Fodor 1975, p31; 1990, pp16-19; 2010, pp17-20). For: 
1) The productivity of language and thought: Productivity, as a concept, covers the 
phenomenon that language and the mind are systems capable of producing an infinite 
number of unique and distinct propositions and thoughts. This potential of finite individuals 
to produce an infinity of representations can only be explained if this potentiality derives 
through the application of a finite number of procedures. As such, just as a strict grammar can 
produce an infinity of sentences, so a finite number of computations can be applied, following 
strict operations, so as to produce an infinity of mental models, which constitute an infinity of 
thoughts that can generate an infinity of propositions. 
 
2) The systematicity of language and thought: Systematicity covers the phenomenon that 
individuals are able to infer that a system possesses certain representations from the fact that 
other representations are found in its repertoire. For example, if an individual is capable of 
producing the representation ‘John loves Mary’, it can also be inferred that that individual is 
also able to generate ‘Mary loves John’. A grounded theory of meaning is capable of explaining 
this as, under this account, the representations underlying both ‘John loves Mary’ and ‘Mary 
loves John’ are generated by a strict grammar, a grammar that, if capable of generating the 
one, necessitates the ability to generate the other. 
 
                                                          
47 Interestingly, this hypothesis of Johnson-Laird’s (that meaning under a mental model framework must operate via some form of 
correspondence theory), is one which was foreshadowed by Craik (1967, p100), when he first articulated the analogical model theory. 
48 As such, holding such a referentialist semantics inevitably leads Johnson-Laird to the position that singular terms and thoughts, i.e., those 
that concern an ontologically real state of affairs, are Russellian in nature, i.e., must follow Russell in holding that “someone who uttered a 
sentence containing an empty singular term would fail to say anything, in the sense that he would fail to express a thought” (Evans 1982, 
p12). For reference necessitates a referent and representation necessitates something to represent, therefore, if semantics is wholly based 
on reference and representation, propositions and thoughts need a referent to be meaningful.  
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3) Concept learning: The ability to learn a concept prevents an individual having to be born with 
the mental representations for all the concepts with which they will be acquainted and can 
meaningfully represent, i.e. it prevents the need for every concept to be native. A 
correspondence theory of meaning can account for learning new concepts by the generation 
of a mental model that corresponds to a state of affairs that instantiates a concepts. This, 
therefore, avoids the necessity of a brute nativism within Johnson-Laird’s philosophy. 
(However, it still implies some level of nativism to account for the fundamental procedures 
themselves, as well as, seemingly, the building blocks of mental models, from which new 
representations are constructed.) 
Peircean mental models 
The use of the terms ‘prototype’ and ‘embryonic’ above, in reference to Johnson-Laird’s procedural 
semantics of the 1980s, is deserving of explanation. Although the procedural semantics of this period 
is clear in its reliance on reference and truth conditions (e.g., “the truth conditions of words are 
intimately dependent on the mind’s ability to relate representations to the world” (Johnson-Laird 
1987, p207) and “A model represents a state of affairs and accordingly its structure[…] plays a direct 
representational or analogical role. Its structure mirrors the relevant aspects of the corresponding 
state of affairs in the world” (Johnson-Laird 1980, p98)), Johnson-Laird’s position at this time is not 
yet clear on is the complete details of the nature and operation of this reference, i.e., it is not yet fully 
clear how, exactly, the mind relates all types of mental model to a state of affairs. This prototypical 
character of Johnson-Laird’s semantics from the 1980s, and through the 1990s, is especially apparent 
when considering the dearth of information given by Johnson-Laird during this time concerning 
negation and counterfactuals, or those mental representations of false states of affairs, where, eo 
ipso, a representation does not correspond to a physically real state of affairs.49 
 
This situation (wherein the intricacies of the operation of reference between mental model and world 
is unfortunately left unexplained) remains within Johnson-Laird’s theory of meaning through the 
1980s and 1990s, and is only resolved when Johnson-Laird (2002) connects his work to that of Charles 
Sanders Peirce’s, with his adoption of the terms ‘icon’ and ‘iconicity’. With this move, Johnson-Laird 
therefore ties the operation of reference under his theory of meaning to Peirce’s own and completes 
his previously nebulous reference based procedural semantics. Now, taking from Peirce (§§2.282-
2.279), procedural semantics relate models to the world “in respect to the relations of their parts[… 
That is,] an analogy between the relations of the parts of each”, but this also, following Peirce, include 
                                                          
49 However, the commitment of Johnson-Laird (1983, p173; 1994, pp196-197) to ontologically real modal universes could, potentially, be 




“signs[...] used for expressing negation” (§3.385) (however, this strategy has subsequently been 
extended, so as to include “other abstract concepts, such as “possibility, “truth”, and “obligation” that 
transcend iconicity” (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p11)). Consequently, mental models are now 
not only said to derive their meaning as an emergent property from the fact that their parts, and the 
relationship between those parts, mirror a physical state of affairs found in the world (e.g. through a 
congruent ““correspondence” theory” of meaning (Johnson-Laird 2006, p231-232)) but also via 
mental signs attached to these mental models. For, with an influence from the work of Peirce 
(§§3.385-3.386), Johnson-Laird is able to provide a meaningful account of false propositions based on 
the concept of negation (see Johnson-Laird 2002; 2006; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013). For 
example, and as Barres and Johnson-Laird (2003, p2) aver:  
Individuals have the option of using negation as an operator on a model. Hence, they can represent the 






where “¬” denotes negation.  
 
Therefore, when confronted by the apparently meaningful, yet false, proposition ‘You are not reading 
this sentence’, you do not understand it by converting it into a representation of yourself not reading 
the proposition, which does not correspond to any state of affairs, but by converting it into a 
representation of yourself reading the sentence, which does correspond to a state of affairs, and then, 
so it is argued, attaching a mental symbol for negation to reverse its truth values. Thereby producing 
a meaningful mental model that possesses the correct truth values as the false proposition yet still 
corresponds to a part of the world (see Khemlani, Orenes & Johnson-Laird 2012, p546). Therefore, 
and to clarify, where counterfactuals are concerned, under a Peircean correspondence theory of 
meaning, a proposition may result in the production of a model that represents the pertinent parts of 
the world concerned in the appropriate relation, but with an extra, purely mental, symbol to signify 
that the state of affairs are not the case and to reverse the truth values (it should be remembered, 
however, that this tactic of the inclusion of mental symbols to iconic representations is also applied 
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to “other abstract concepts” (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p11), e.g. “The [model] theory allows 
that models can be tagged with numerals denoting their probabilities” (Ibid., p23)).50, 51 
Summary 
Therefore, and to summarise, procedural semantics has, fundamentally, remained true to the compile 
and execute strategy it embodied in the 1970s, but has developed over the years along with Johnson-
Laird’s wider philosophy. This process of development has left us with the following complete account 
of semantic content: 
1) A proposition first needs to be interpreted, needs to be compiled. This is achieved by the 
following:  
a. A proposition is translated into a propositional representation (i.e. it is compiled into 
a rich mental language, executable by the mind). 
b. This propositional representation is used to execute relevant procedures upon the 
suite of mental models carried by the hearer, i.e. the rich mental language of the mind 
is used as the basis for creating, updating, conflating, verifying and deleting mental 
models. 
2) Although Johnson-Laird’s accounts for the meaning of propositions by relating them to 
analogical mental models, this begs the question: ‘how are mental models themselves 
meaningful?’ Johnson-Laird answers this question by explaining that a mental model receives 
its meaning via its reference to the world. This is achieved via several means:  
a) In the case of true states of affairs and proper names (i.e. that which is the case), the 
model is connected to the world via its iconic status. That is to say, the model is 
meaningful as it corresponds to the parts, and the relationship between these parts, 
of a real section of the world. 
b) Where counterfactuals are concerned (i.e. what is not the case) Johnson-Laird appeals 
to the same process of iconicity used to explain factual comments but with the 
addition of the mental symbol for negation, to reverse the truth values of a state of 
affairs.  
                                                          
50 In the case of compound, or multiple-clause, negative expressions, such as ‘You are not reading this sentence or you are not seated’, 
“individuals[…] have to enumerate the various possibilities one at a time” (Ibid., p543. See also Khemlani, Orenes and Johnson-Laird 2014). 
That is to say, that “individuals represent a disjunction such as: Viv is in Rome or Pat is in Rome or both, by considering each of its possibilities 
separately. That is, they construct three mental models representing these possibilities” (Johnson-Laird 2002, p86).  
51 Note, however, that this theory of negation and its related account of counterfactuals does not explain the occurrence of 
misrepresentation (i.e. it cannot account for the occurrence of inaccurate representations of a specific and determinable state of affairs). 
Furthermore, with the use of isomorphism to naturalise reference, as is done so under this Peircean model, Johnson-Laird is also tasked 
with explaining why, if a mental model is an icon of a state of affairs, then only the former is a representation of the latter and not vice versa. 
This latter difficulty is founded on a problem with symmetry in isomorphism and, therefore, requires an asymmetrical account of iconism – 
wherein, a mental model is reliant on a state of affairs, but not vice versa – for a solution. However, this discussion of the naturalisation of 
reference is beyond the scope of the current discourse, but this difficulty, and others, will be handled in due course. 
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3) Once a proposition has been interpreted (compiled), it can be acted upon (executed). As such, 
the resulting mental representation of a proposition – and its resulting intermediate 
propositional representation – is used as a basis for action. 
 
Consequently, Johnson-Laird’s current and full account of the meaning of sentences (here captured 
by the label of procedural semantics) is a multi-stage process: Firstly, a proposition is converted into 
an intermediary propositional representation (or lexical procedure) understandable by the mind. This, 
in turn, is employed by the mind to appropriately update, by the means of set operations or 
computations (details of which are found in the preceding section), its suite of mental models that 
correspond to states of affairs in the world.52 
Conclusion 
This chapter has moved from the more general aspects of cognitive science to specific accounts of 
cognition and meaning: Investigating the overarching goal and approach of cognitive science, as well 
as individual representational explanations of cognition and meaning that can be found within that 
approach. We have seen that the field as a whole places a focus on a post-positivist paradigm and an 
interdisciplinary research approach when investigating the workings of a folk psychological conception 
of cognition and employs a functionalist RTM and a tripartite system of explanation when describing 
these workings. After covering this broader project of the field, we then saw in detail the workings of 
the two major explanations of mentality currently operating within this paradigm: 1) Propositional; 
and 2) analogical representations. We exemplified the former of these two approaches, propositional 
representations, by the work of the philosopher Jerry Fodor. Finding that such approaches posit a 
finite number of atomistic mental entities that are organised syntactically in a manner akin to natural 
languages (so much so that these entities are referred to collectively as Mentalese). The semantic 
content of such representations are accounted for by a causal theory of reference, wherein an 
individual mental entity ‘locks on’ to its real world referent once it is learnt. The latter, analogical, 
approach was characterised with an investigation into the work of psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird. 
It was found that this approach operates at the middle, representational, abstraction of cognitive 
science’s tri-level hypothesis and accounts for cognition through the operation of a suite of ‘iconic’ 
representations posited at the representational abstraction. By this Peircean term, Johnson-Laird 
(2006, p427) means “A representation [of the world] with relations among its parts that correspond 
                                                          
52 It should be clarified that all these explanations ignore the obvious question of what, exactly, are these ‘elements’ or ‘parts’ to which icons 
correspond? Are they the medium sized objects we commonly find in the world, such as a chair? The components that make up medium 
sized objects, such as the chair’s legs, back, cushion etc? The atoms that make up these components? Sub-atomic particles? It should also 
be noted that these same questions arise with Fodor’s referentialist account of mental representations.  
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to those in what it represents”. Consequently, Johnson-Laird (2002) argues that the meaning of 
natural language propositions are ultimately derived via a congruent correspondence theory of 
meaning, with natural language being translated into operations to generate iconic mental models 




Critiques of cognitive science and 
RTM 
Introductory remarks 
Although the claims found in the previous chapter’s exposition of cognitive science is common 
currency within that field (and others, such as philosophy of mind and AI) and can be (or, similar claims 
can be) readily found within the relevant literature, it is necessary to highlight the fact that these views 
and positions are not uncontroversial or uncontested. In fact, adherents of cognitive science, as 
previously defined, have found that the majority of their foundational claims have been challenged at 
some point. For example, commentators have criticised the position due to its commitment to: 
Folk psychology and propositional attitudes: As we have seen, the RTM is based on the 
common sense assumption that propositional attitudes (i.e. belief and desire states) have the 
causal and semantic properties we suppose them to have and, further, takes these states to 
be the explanandum of its research. However, some challenge this claim and argue that 
propositional attitudes do not have the reality cognitive scientists claim. Two examples of this 
anti-realism concerning propositional attitudes are the instrumentalism of Daniel Dennett and 
the eliminitivism of Paul and Patricia Churchland. The former of these, Dennett (1989; 2000), 
argues that, strictly speaking, there are no propositional attitudes, yet they are, from the point 
of view of an observer in the ‘intentional stance’, useful fictions for predicting behaviour and 
are akin to concepts such as a centre of gravity.1 In a, superficially, similar way, while ultimately 
having a quite different agenda, Churchland (1981), appreciates the predictive success of 
propositional attitudes but argues that that criterion alone is not enough to establish a 
                                                          
1 Although it will be said in the main text that the example arguments portrayed here are not the focus of this research and, as such, will not 
be critically analysed or given their deserved attention, this research will take advantage of this space outside of the main text to make 
comment upon them when is deemed appropriate. For example, it should be noted that Dennett’s instrumentalism can be tasked with 
answering the charge that, surely, predictive success implies or infers a theory’s accuracy, i.e. with convincingly answering the question ‘if 
propositional representations are not true, why do they work?’ (cf. Dennett 1989; 2000). Furthermore, Dennett’s position inevitably 
concludes in a behaviourist view of the mind, for its ascription of mental content to a system is based solely on behavioural matrices (Ibid. 
2000 pp59-61). However, Dennett (Ibid, p72) himself claims that this conclusion is “perverse”, arguing that the internal complexity and 
variegated sensory connection humans have to the world “yields a robust version of belief after all” (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this does not seem 
convincing, for the internal complexity of a system does not alter the foundational claim of instrumentalism that: 
I [Dennett] will argue that any object – or as I shall say, any system – whose behaviour is well predicted by this strategy [the intentional 
strategy or adopting the intentional stance] is in the fullest sense of the word a believer. What it is to be a true believer is to be an 




theory’s scientific accuracy. Rather, if other measures, such as “coherence and continuity with 
fertile and well-established theories in adjacent and overlapping domains [i.e. with the 
‘traditional’ sciences]” (Ibid, p73, see also Ibid., p76), are also considered, propositional 
attitudes and folk psychology will be found, so it is argued and following the language of 
Lakatos (1984), to be a ‘degenerative’, ‘decadent’ or ‘stagnant’ science akin to alchemy, “and 
has been for millennia” (Ibid. p75). As such, what is needed is a replacement (or, more 
accurately, a ‘displacement’ or ‘transcendence’ (Ibid, p74)) of propositional attitudes with a 
scientifically respectable alternative, such as neuroscience.2  
 
Representations: As the previous chapter highlighted, a central pillar of the RTM is that our 
belief/desire states are explained by mental representations. However, some argue that this 
positioning of representation within cognition is fallacious. For example, one line of criticism 
uses the posited necessary and sufficient conditions of a representation that, in general, it is 
required to make the distinction between vehicle and content, with the former being the 
representational form of the picture etc. (e.g., the vehicle of this proposition is ink and paper 
or pixels on a VDU), and the latter the message that the picture etc. conveys. However, where 
thoughts are concerned, some argue that there is no vehicle, just content, i.e. thoughts are 
said to be all message and no medium. Consequently, we cannot make the distinction 
between vehicle and content with mental representations. Consequently, thoughts cannot 
meet the necessary and sufficient conditions to be considered a form of representation. 
Consequently, so some conclude, Marr’s tri-level hypothesis and the RTM are incorrect (see 
Hacker 2013).3 
 
Physicalism: During our earlier discussion of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis, it was identified that 
the RTM is a physicalist interpretation of the mind. That is, cognitive scientists assert that all 
phenomena (including the intelligent action of humans, such as speech etc.) must be physical 
in origin. However, some assert that this position leads those who hold it into difficulties. For 
example, it has been argued that if it is the case that physical processes are the cause of all 
our behaviour, then our mental, qualitative, experience of the world must now be nothing 
more than an inert phenomenon aligned with our actions. For, so it is argued, if it is the 
electrochemical actions of the brain that alone have potency, our propositional attitudes and 
belief/desire states can be removed and ‘intelligent’ action would still continue. That is to say, 
                                                          
2 It should be noted, that this elimintivism of the Churchlands derives from their anti-functionalism as well as an anti-realism concerning 
propositional representation and is also a paradigmatic target of Bennett and Hacker’s mereological fallacy (see below). 
3 However, that thoughts have no form is a crucial principle to this argument, a position the likes of Fodor and Johnson-Laird would dispute. 
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physicalism is said to lead to epiphenomenalism as our actions are now overdetermined and 
our mental (belief/desire) states are nothing but ‘causal danglers’ (Papineau 2004).4 This is a 
type of argument that has also been discussed by Fodor (1993). 
 
The hypothesis that the brain and neuron firings are the seat of cognition: There seems to 
be an implicit assumption operating behind the RTM that the seat of the mind is the brain; 
that propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and desires are instantiated by the neurons etc. 
of brain tissue alone. However, such a view has been criticised by the likes of Bennett and 
Hacker (2003) for its treatment of a part of cognition (the brain) as if it were the whole (a 
complete individual) and, as such, is said to have committed the mereological fallacy. This 
fallacy, whose name derives from the logic of the relations between parts and wholes, 
“consists in ascribing to a part of a creature attributes which logically can be ascribed only to 
a creature as a whole” (Ibid., p29). For, we should not say that a brain has propositional 
attitudes, as cognitive scientists are apparently doing, but that a human being believes, 
desires, hopes etc., as: 
These are all attributes of human beings. Is it a new discovery that brains also engage in such 
human activities? Or is it a linguistic innovation, introduced by neuroscientists, psychologists and 
cognitive scientists, extending the ordinary use of these psychological expressions for good 
theoretical reasons? Or, more ominously, is it a conceptual confusion? Might it be the case that 
there is simply no such thing as the brain’s thinking or knowing, seeing or hearing, believing or 
guessing, possessing and using information, constructing hypotheses, etc. – that is, that these 
forms of words make no sense? (Ibid., pp70-71) 
That is, that cognitive scientists’ supposed view of the mind as being isolated in only one part 
of a human being (their brain) is a logical confusion that has set them off on the wrong path 
and has only led them to postulate confused answers to a confused question (just as 
Descartes’ isolation of mind from body has done (see Damasio 2005)).5, 6 
 
                                                          
4 Nevertheless, it needs to be made clear that cognitive scientists, following Marr’s tri-level hypotheses, do not posit physical actions and/or 
propositional attitudes as the cause of behaviour, as though the two phenomena were distinct entities as this argument supposes. Rather, 
cognitive scientists see propositional attitudes, mental representations and the physical actions of the brain/body as the same thing: They 
hold a conceptual ternary but an ontological monism, i.e. the three phenomena are seen as being identical. Therefore, to say that mental 
states are epiphenomena of physical action, as this argument does, is senseless, for mental states are physical actions. However, it should 
be noted that if issue is conjointly taken with Marr’s tri-level hypothesis along with this epiphenomenalist argument, the defence presented 
here will not be available. 
5 However, to attribute this position to all of cognitive science and cognitive scientists may be mistaken. As we shall see (Chapter Five: 
Discussion), there is an awareness within some of the literature that an isolated brain, or ‘bed-ridden’ AI, is not capable of propositional 
attitudes and cognition proper, and that it is only within ‘embodied’ systems, within which a ‘brain’ is still central, that intelligence is capable 
(see, for example, McGinn 1989).  
6 For empirical evidence that supports these arguments, see Byrge et al 2014 and Pfeifer et al 2014.  
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The hypothesis that language is systematically analysable: Some, such as contemporary 
radical contextualist ordinary language philosophers (such as Avner Baz, Charles Travis etc.), 
say that language is ‘radically contextualised’ (or, alternatively, ‘occasion sensitive’) and 
therefore cannot be formally analysed within the monolithic format cognitive scientists wish. 
These philosophers argue that locutions only make sense once we have taken note of the 
context within which they are uttered. That is to say, there exists a view which: 
proceeds from an assumption of what speakers must know in knowing the meaning of a word, 
at least when it comes to ‘singular substantives’: namely, how to ‘apply’ the word to cases, how 
to refer to (denote, name, classify, pick out) cases or items by means of it, apart from any context 
of significant use[... Even] such philosophically innocent predicates as ‘weighs 79 kilos’ or ‘is 
green’[...], contextualists have argued, are [not] fit for (either true or false) application to cases 
apart from contexts of significant use. (Baz 2012, p82) 
For example, as Travis (1989) observes, the truth conditions for the proposition ‘There is milk 
in the refrigerator’, in reference to a mere puddle of milk at the bottom of said fridge, changes 
depending on the occasion of its locution: Whether it is said to someone cleaning the fridge 
or someone making a cup of coffee (where it will be true in the former case and false in the 
latter). Therefore, to embark on a systematic project of linguistic analysis that is not sensitive 
to context, as cognitive scientists propose, cannot succeed. In fact, so it is argued, an accurate 
and full analysis of language in all contexts is not possible, all that can be achieved is the 
analysis of propositions on a case-by-case basis.7  
 
Functionalism: Some argue that the RTM’s foundational position that any physical system that 
is capable of instantiating the functions of cognition is capable of producing mentality is 
mistaken. For example, some contest that functionalism is unable to account for qualia – the 
‘what-its-likeness’ of consciousness – or answer the ‘inverted qualia argument’ found in the 
likes of Putnam (1981, pp79-81). In these types of argument, we are asked to imagine two 
individuals looking at a vase that they both believe to be blue, but that one individual’s 
experience of blue is qualitatively identical with the other's experience of red, and vice versa. 
In such an instance the causal or functional role of the vase’s colour is the same as if it were 
being experienced identically by both persons (it causes belief in the objects ‘blueness’), but 
the intervening mental state, the phenomenal character, is not the same. Therefore, so it is 
                                                          
7 For a similar argument, based on reasoning capacities rather than radical contextualism, see Putnam (1988, pp87-89). 
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argued, not all mental states (i.e. qualitative states) can be causal/functional in origin and, 
therefore, cannot be explained by functionalism.8, 9 
 
Marr’s tri-level hypothesis: It should be remembered that cognitive scientists, in respect to 
cognition, hold a conceptual triad but an ontological monism. That is, they view propositional 
attitudes, mental representations and physical brain states to be identical. However, this may 
lead those who hold the position into theoretical difficulties. For example, during Saul Kripke’s 
discussion of metaphysical necessity (i.e. facts that are true in all possible worlds, e.g. ‘Barak 
Obama is human’) and contingency (i.e. facts that are only possible in alternate worlds, e.g. 
‘Barak Obama is President’) in relation to identity statements, in his Naming and necessity, a 
number of issues are brought to light. For example, if we take a propositional attitude (i.e. the 
belief that it will rain), a mental representation (i.e. the propositional or analogical 
representation of the possibility that it will rain) and a biological state (i.e. the electrochemical 
state of the body that realises our representation and our belief) to be rigid designators (i.e., 
to refer to the same state of affairs in all possible worlds) then we seem to be lead into some 
form of neural, or biological, chauvinism. For, as Kripke (1972, pp133-150) argues, if we take 
Mental state M to be identical to biological state B, and both B and M are rigid designators, 
then B=M must be a necessary truth, i.e. B=M must be true in all possible worlds. Therefore, 
any world in which B exists, M must also exist. This is unproblematic for followers of the RTM 
and is something they may freely concede, however identity statements go both ways: If it is 
a necessary truth that B=M then it is an equally necessary truth that M=B and any world in 
which the mental state exists then the electrochemical biological state must also exist and be 
correlated with it. (N.B. the conceptual ternary of cognitive scientists is here being simplified 
to a dualism, this is merely for the sake of exposition and will have no effect on the argument 
when extended so as to accommodate Marr’s intervening representational level, i.e., so as to 
capture the true position of Marr’s tri-level hypothesis that propositional attitude=mental 
representation=physical realiser.) Kripke (Ibid., p154) summarises this argument as follows: 
In sum, the correspondence between a brain[/biological] state and a mental state seems to have 
a certain obvious element of contingency. We have seen that identity is not a relation which can 
                                                          
8 Interestingly, as Putnam (1981, P81) observes, this form of argument is only successful “if such cases [as inverted qualia] are really possible”. 
However, Wittgenstein, within Remarks on colour, conducts an analysis of this very prospect, during paragraphs 84-88. During this 
investigation, it is observed that the qualitative nature of a colour is not determined independently, that a colour’s qualitative aspect is 
instead determined in relation to all the other colours in the spectrum, i.e. in its position within the colour wheel. Therefore, to assert that 
some of a person’s colour qualia can be inverted (e.g. from blue to red and vice versa) is nonsensical and such arguments as employed by 
Putnam fail before they begin. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein’s analysis does not preclude the possibility of an inversion of the whole colour 
wheel, i.e. that Person1’s qualitative perception of the world is the colour negative of Person2’s. As such, inverse qualia arguments may be 
logically possible, but only if whole colour systems are included within the account. 
9 For alternative arguments against functionalism, from the point of view that denies the multiple realisibiliy of cognition or which presumes 
semantic holism, see Churchland (1981) and Putnam (1988) respectively. 
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hold contingently between objects. Therefore, if the identity thesis were correct, the element of 
contingency would not lie in the relation between the mental and physical states. (Kripke 1972, 
p154) 
Therefore, it seems to hold mental states and physical states/realisers as being identical, as 
Marr’s tri-level hypothesis seems to, is to hold the unintuitive and neurally, i.e., biologically, 
chauvinistic position that only brain states can cause mental states.10 Furthermore, there are 
also objections to specific levels of the Marr’s tri-level hypothesis. See, for example, the folk 
psychology, representational and physicalism sections in this list. 
 
The above should demonstrate that cognitive science has been, and is, subject to a number of 
potentially devastating criticisms that attack the gamut of the hypotheses it puts forward. (However, 
the above should not be considered an exhaustive list of the hypotheses held by the RTM, let alone 
an exhaustive list of arguments against the RTM.11) Nevertheless, this investigation will identify that 
some of those criticisms that have been the most interesting and that have had the greatest impact 
on cognitive science (or, more accurately, the RTM), are those that derive from that approach’s 
account of semantics. As such, we will be singling out those criticisms that charge the RTM, and, 
therefore, cognitive science, with an ineffectual handling of meaning and which, thereby, conclude 
that computation is not suitable for cognition.12 Consequently, this chapter will be giving its full 
attention – or, alternately, will be limiting its attention – to cognitivist criticisms of cognitive science 
and the RTM that are of a semantic nature, to the detriment of those directed toward propositional 
attitudes, functionalism etc.13 Accordingly, this discussion will be structured around:  
i) An individual examination of a number of semantic arguments against cognitive 
science’s RTM and that can be found in the literature.  
ii) An investigation into the impact such arguments have had on cognitive science’s 
theory of mind.  
                                                          
10 However, there is an issue here. For, adherents of the RTM eo ipso hold a functionalist view of cognition. Therefore, such theorists do not 
contest that mental representations and propositional attitudes are identical to any physical state, or even any physical realiser, as portrayed 
in the above argument. Instead, they assert, following Putnam (1975, p291), that: 
Two systems are functionally isomorphic if there is a correspondence between the states of one and the states of the other that preserves 
functional relations. To start with computing machine examples, if the functional relations are just sequence relations, e.g. state A is always 
followed by state B, then, for F to be a functional isomorphism, it must be the case that state A is followed by state B in system 1 if and only 
if state F(A) is followed by state F(B) in system 2 [emphasis in original]. 
Consequently, those who subscribe to RTM adhere to the following identity statements: Functional relations=mental states and mental 
states=functional relations. And, as functional relations can be realised by a plethora of physical systems, the charges of neural chauvinism 
are avoided. However, as this defence is based on the functionalist view of cognition, if that stance is simultaneously attacked, this position 
cannot be taken.  
11 For an alternative list of this kind, see McGinn (1989, pp120-132). 
12 As we shall see, this attribution of significance and impact to such arguments derive from both the recognition of their import by those 
working within the relevant fields (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1988, p99; Harnard 1991, p47; Preston 2002, pp1-2; Müller 2007, p102), as well as the 
affect these arguments have had on the account of cognition held by such theorists (e.g. Brooks 1990, p3; Harnard 1990b, p335; Johnson-
Laird 1993, p34; Fodor 2010, p199; Rapaport 2011; Schweizer 2012, pp199-204). 
13 Moreover, to give every argument against cognitive science and/or the RTM its deserved attention, individually analysing each in turn, 
would lead this thesis into volumes. 
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iii) A full exposition of an alternate theory of meaning many theorists have been adopting 
in response to such arguments.  
iv) A study into the literature for evidence of the scale of analysis of such a response.  
v) A statement of the research aim of this thesis.14 
§i Semantic arguments 
Before beginning this investigation into the semantic arguments levelled against the RTM, it needs to 
be clarified that this section will be focused on the suite of such arguments that can be encapsulated 
by the philosopher John Searle’s Chinese room argument.15, 16 As such, this section shall follow the 
proceeding order:  
1) An exposition and examination of Searle’s Chinese room argument, its relation to the 
symbol grounding problem and its impact in relation to the RTM and those hypotheses 
within cognitive science based upon it.  
2) An investigation into the homunculus fallacy and the potential impact that it has on the 
RTM and related philosophies of mind.  
3) An analysis of the symbolic fallacy and its possible impact on the RTM and those theories 
within cognitive science that rely upon it.  
4) An exposition of the RTM’s and cognitive science’s issues concerning semantic holism. 
The Chinese room argument 
The most well-known argument against the concept that computation is a successful explanation of 
meaning, and therefore cognition, is what is known as the Chinese room argument (hereinafter, the 
CRA). This prominent thought (gedenken-)experiment has been highly influential since its first 
publication by Searle (1980, pp417-418) and follows the – now familiar – ensuing narrative, a narrative 
which deserves being quoted at length: 
Suppose that I'm locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose furthermore (as is 
indeed the case) that I know no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that I'm not even confident that I 
could recognize Chinese writing as Chinese writing distinct from, say, Japanese writing or meaningless 
squiggles. To me, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless squiggles. Now suppose further that after 
this first batch of Chinese writing I am given a second batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules 
for correlating the second batch with the first batch. The rules are in English, and I understand these rules 
                                                          
14 It needs to be highlighted, however, that although the following investigation will be focused on the semantic arguments made against 
much of cognitive science and the RTM, this thesis will not be addressing their success or otherwise. Its attention will merely be focused 
upon the impact said arguments have had on cognitive scientists’ account of cognition and on the success of the updates they have inspired.  
15 Although Searle’s Chinese room argument in “Minds, brains, and programs” is explicitly targeted toward strong AI, the RTM’s reliance on 
computation for cognition means that the argument is equally applicable to that project as well as that of those involved in strong AI.  
16 For an example of other semantic criticisms not encapsulated by Searle’s Chinese room argument, and, therefore, not included in these 
pages, see the discussion surrounding misrepresentation and the ‘disjunction problem’ in Dretske (1986), Fodor (1990) and Vosgerau (2010). 
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as well as any other native speaker of English. They enable me to correlate one set of formal symbols 
with another set of formal symbols, and all that “formal” means here is that I can identify the symbols 
entirely by their shapes. Now suppose also that I am given a third batch of Chinese symbols together with 
some instructions, again in English, that enable me to correlate elements of this third batch with the first 
two batches, and these rules instruct me how to give back certain Chinese symbols with certain sorts of 
shapes in response to certain sorts of shapes given me in the third batch. Unknown to me, the people 
who are giving me all of these symbols call the first batch “a script” they call the second batch a “story” 
and they call the third batch “questions”. Furthermore, they call the symbols I give them back in response 
to the third batch “answers to the questions” and the set of rules in English that they gave me, they call 
“the program”. Now just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give me stories 
in English, which I understand, and they then ask me questions in English about these stories, and I give 
them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a while I get so good at following the instructions 
for manipulating the Chinese symbols and the programmers get so good at writing the programs that 
from the external point of view – that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in which 
I am locked – my answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of native Chinese 
speakers. Nobody just looking at my answers can tell that I don't speak a word of Chinese. Let us also 
suppose that my answers to the English questions are, as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from 
those of other native English speakers, for the simple reason that I am a native English speaker. From the 
external point of view - from the point of view of someone reading my “answers” – the answers to the 
Chinese questions and the English questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English 
case, I produce the answers by manipulating uninterpreted formal symbols. As far as the Chinese is 
concerned, I simply behave like a computer; I perform computational operations on formally specified 
elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, I am simply an instantiation of the computer program. 
Now the claims made by strong AI [and the RTM] are that the programmed computer understands the 
stories and that the program in some sense explains human understanding. But we are now in a position 
to examine these claims in light of our thought experiment: 
1. As regards the first claim, it seems to me quite obvious in the example that I do not understand a 
word of the Chinese stories. I have inputs and outputs that are indistinguishable from those of the 
native Chinese speaker, and I can have any formal program you like, but I still understand nothing. 
For the same reasons, Schank's [story interpreting] computer understands nothing of any stories, 
whether in Chinese, English, or whatever, since in the Chinese case the computer is me, and in cases 




2. As regards the second claim, that the program explains human understanding, we can see that the 
computer and its program do not provide sufficient conditions of understanding since the computer 
and the program are functioning, and there is no understanding.17, 18 
 
To summarise: The CRA purports to demonstrate that were an individual to go through the 
computations of the mind prescribed by strong AI, the RTM, and much of cognitive science, then the 
semantic content of the symbols and mental representation being manipulated would still remain 
hidden to that individual. Ergo, it must be concluded that the semantic content of mental symbols are 
equally hidden during their purely syntactic manipulation by machine ‘intelligence’ under the strong 
AI paradigm, or human intelligence under the RTM paradigm. As Searle (Ibid., p417) identifies, the 
issue here is that a sign’s lack of intentionality (i.e. “that feature of certain mental states by which they 
are directed at or about objects and states of affairs in the world” (Ibid., p424)) means a lack of 
meaning (see Fodor 1990, p28), a deficit that no amount of syntax can rectify. Or, in other words, that 
syntax is not sufficient for semantics (see Searle 1990, 31). 
 
Since its first publication, however, the CRA has been subjected to a vast amount of criticism that has 
attempted to prove that the argument’s conclusions are incorrect (e.g. Block 2002; Rey 2002; 
Rapaport 2007; Schwartz 2012). In fact, the first publication of “Minds, brains, and programs” in The 
behavioural and brain sciences was immediately followed by twenty-six responses, or commentaries, 
covering twenty-five pages, from some of the most prominent figures in cognitive science and AI, 
including Dennett (1980), Fodor (1980), Minsky (1980) and Pylyshyn (1984), all of which criticise some 
aspect of its structure and argument. Nevertheless, although many commentators have tried to 
invalidate the CRA, attempting to show that Searle-in-the-room’s – or the room’s – failure to 
understand Chinese is either incorrect or unimportant, many of these objections, as observed by 
Searle (1987, p301; 1990, p30), focus on the form of the argument rather than on its logic; i.e. 
commentators tend to assume that the narrative of the CRA exhausts its purpose.19 This state of affairs 
has meant that much effort has been spent attempting to show that, as the form of the CRA is not 
                                                          
17 Though this argument is here being attributed to Searle (1980), it is one that can be seen to derive from the ‘Chinese Nation’ thought 
experiment from Block (1978) (and may, arguably, be one prefigured by Wittgenstein’s grocer in PI 1 (see Hutchinson 2007, p707-708)). 
18 Although the CRA, in the form presented here, is only applicable to traditional, linear, computational accounts of mind, Searle (1990, p28) 
reformulates this thought experience into the ‘Chinese Gym’ argument, to show that the CRA’s central contention (that syntax is not 
sufficient for semantics) is equally applicable to parallel, connectionist accounts. 
19 Articles that critically tackle the logic that makes up the CRA can be found in Hauser (1997) and Haugeland (2002). Such theorists contend 
that the CRA fails against the RTM, for, so it is reasoned, that view of the mind does not state that syntax exhausts semantic; rather, it states 
that syntax in addition to execution, exhausts semantics (see Ibid.; Haugeland 2002). However, this is an argument based on the ontological 
assumption that a syntax and a program are distinct from their execution; that there exists a “difference between inert instantiation[s] and 
dynamic instantiation[s]” (Hauser 1997, p211). Nevertheless, it seems implausible to suggest that an inert ‘syntax’ and an inert ‘program’ 
are syntax or programs at all; an inert ‘program’ is merely code and an inert syntax is nothing. As such, the arguments of such commentators 
of the CRA seem to be based on fallacious assumptions and, as such, fail. (Unless, that is, they are able to disprove the intuitive claim that 
you cannot have syntax in addition to execution, i.e., that syntax entails execution).  
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accurate, neither are its conclusions. This has usually meant pointing out that in the thought 
experiment, as seen above, Searle is not an analogue of a computational machine (to which strong AI 
adherents ascribe understanding), rather he is merely the analogue of a computational machine’s 
central processing unit (to which strong AI adherents ascribe no such understanding) (see Ibid. 1980, 
pp419-420). This is a response that has become known as the ‘systems reply’, as it is being claimed 
that it is the system (i.e. Searle-in-the-room, the room itself, the books, the operations, etc. all 
together) that understands Chinese, not Searle-in-the-room/the CPU. However, as Searle (Ibid., 
pp420-422; 2002, pp53-54) avers, you can update his original, vanilla, thought experiment so that the 
system has been memorised by Searle-in-the-room, who can then go through the process in his head 
away from any closed room or other system. In such an instance, it is Searle-in-the-room, and only 
Searle-in-the-room, which comprises the whole system. However, even in such a case, although 
Searle-in-the-room is the system, he still understands no Chinese. Nevertheless, commentators have 
been no more convinced by the form of this updated argument than by the original CRA and continue 
to argue its imprecision (see Block 2002; Rapaport 2007). This back and forth, and the existence of a 
similar state of affairs concerning what has become known as the Robot reply (see Dennett 1980; 
Schweizer 2012), has led to the observation that the “consensus among cognitive scientists to the 
effect that the CRA is, and has been shown to be, bankrupt” (Preston 2002, p46).20 
 
Nevertheless, the point of interest for this research is that our discussion so far has surrounded the 
inappropriateness of the form, or the logical consistency, of the CRA, not its central idea or message: 
That without intentionality, signs cannot become meaningful symbols (Searle 1980, p417). For, one 
crucial sense in which the CRA is still both important and relevant in relation to this thesis, despite its 
many failures, is not as a formal argument at all, but as a ‘reminder’ that syntax alone is not sufficient 
for semantics (see Searle 1984, p33; 1989, p701). For, so it is being argued, the CRA should be 
considered as a piece of conceptual analysis that makes certain of our concepts and their operations 
more redolent, rather than as a rigorously structured argument in its own right. Under this guise, the 
CRA is seen as expressing, what Searle (1989, p703) terms, the “brutally simple” argument 
(hereinafter, the BSA) and its real aim is “merely to illustrate or remind us of the truth” (Preston 2002, 
p28) that syntax is not sufficient for semantics. This BSA is a more fundamental argument which Searle 
(1989, p703) formally states as follows: 
1. Programs are syntactical. 
2. Minds have semantics. 
3. Syntax by itself is neither sufficient for nor constitutive of semantics. 
                                                          




4. Programs by themselves are not minds.  
 
However, though it has been made clear that the CRA should be viewed as more illustration of the 
truth of the BSA than as argument, it is not yet clear how it is an illustration, i.e. how it legitimately 
reminds us that syntax does not exhaust semantics. To answer this, we shall argue that the CRA is an 
illustration that without an account of intentionality, explanations of cognition are led into a number 
of fallacies: 1) Stating that signs only become symbols to already conscious systems and 2) explaining 
the content of a symbol by reference to another, equally meaningful, symbol. These are two issues 
Searle explicitly presents within his account of the CRA, and which he articulates as follows: 
1)  “[F]ormal symbol manipulation by themselves don’t have any intentionality; they are quite 
meaningless, they aren’t even symbol manipulations, since the symbols don’t symbolize 
anything”. (Ibid. 1980, p422). As such, “[a]ny semantic interpretation has to be from outside 
the system of the symbol manipulation”. (Ibid. 1989, p701).  
2) “The computer, to repeat, has a syntax but no semantics. Thus, if you type into the computer 
“2 plus 2 equals?” it will type out “4.” But it has no idea that “4” means 4 or that it means 
anything at all. And the point is not that it lacks some second-order information about the 
interpretation of its first-order symbols, but rather that its first-order symbols don't have any 
interpretations as far as the computer is concerned. All the computer has is more symbols”. 
(Ibid. 1980, p423) 
Therefore, the CRA reminds/shows us that without intentionality a cognitive system will be 
embarrassed as it will inevitably be led into certain destructive fallacies, including 1) the homunculus 
and 2) what Johnson-Laird (1988, p107) terms the symbolic fallacy. (Furthermore, and as we shall see, 
the transgression of these two fallacies implies the transgression of yet another: Semantic holism.) As 
such, Searle’s formal definition of the BSA (see Searle 1989, p703) can be reformulated as follows, so 
as to remove any hidden ellipses and make its operation more perspicuous: 
1. Programs are syntactical. 
2. Minds have semantics. 
3. Syntax is not sufficient for nor constitutive of intentionality (Ibid. 1980, p422). 
4. Without intentionality, the meaning of a symbol can only be another, or be derived 
externally. 
∴ 
5. Without intentionality there is no understanding, no semantics (Ibid., pp422-423). 
∴ 




7. Programs by themselves are not minds.  
 
Interestingly, and with the above in mind, it can now be seen that the CRA – and the BSA which it 
communicates – is an instantiation of what some in the field of artificial intelligence have termed ‘the 
symbol grounding problem’ (hereinafter, the SGP). This is a problem that still poses problems to those 
working within AI today (see White 2011, p179) and that Harnard (1990b, p335) defines as relating to 
the following questions: 
How can the semantic interpretation of a formal symbol system be made intrinsic to the system, rather 
than just parasitic on the meanings in our heads? How can the meanings of the meaningless symbol 
tokens, manipulated solely on the basis of their (arbitrary) shapes, be grounded in anything but other 
meaningless symbols? 
Consequently, the CRA can be seen as not only an illustration of the BSA, but also, eo ipso, a reminder 
of the truth of the SGP.21 
 
Now that this view of the CRA has been proposed (i.e. that it is an illustration of the BSA and the SGP 
and that any symbolic account of cognition that fails to provide for intentionality, or fails to address 
the symbol grounding problem, will be led into both the homunculus and symbolic fallacies and the 
difficulties they themselves entail), it would now be prudent to investigate the issues this thought 
experiment raises in their own right.22 
Homunculus Fallacy 
The homunculus fallacy (from the Latin homo, ‘man, human being’, and –culus, the diminutive suffix, 
and so, therefore, literally meaning ‘the little man fallacy’) is the error that an explanation of a 
                                                          
21 However, it should be noted that not all those in the literature agree with this one-to-one relationship between the CRA and the SGP (c.f. 
Rodríguez 2012). 
22 The use of 'ground' and 'grounding' made throughout this discussion deserves definition. It should be clarified that 'ground' is a broader 
topic of study, of which the semantic grounding concerning this research is just a facet. This broader topic of study, following Fine (2012, 
p40) "stands to philosophy as cause stands to science". As such, ground, according to Correia and Schnieder (2012, p29) concerns "a 
particular sort of non-causal priority" and attempts to “ground all of the facts which appear to presuppose the reality of the mental or of 
value in terms of facts which do not presuppose their reality” (Fine 2012, p41). Consequently, the topic of ground not only includes 
semantics, as covered in these pages, but also covers "a list of priority claims which have been held in different areas of philosophy [e.g.]: 
1. Mental facts obtain because of neurophysiological facts. 
2. Legal fact are grounded in non-legal, e.g. social, facts. 
3. Normative facts are based on natural facts. 
4. meaning is due to non-semantic facts. 
5. Dispositional properties are possessed in virtue of categorical properties. 
6. what accounts for the existence of a whole is the existence and arrangement of its parts. 
7. A set of things is less fundamental than its members. 
8. What makes something beautiful are certain facts about the reception of its beholders. 
9. A substance is prior to its tropes or modes. 
10. That snow is white is true because snow is white. (Correia and Schnieder 2012, p1) 
Although this broader topic of study is deserving of further attention, there is unfortunately no space within this study for such a provision. 
As such, any interested in the contemorary discussion surrounding ground should be directed to Correia and Schnieder's (eds.), 2012, 
Metaphysical grounding: Understanding the structure of reality. 
65 
 
cognitive process relies, ultimately, on the same cognitive process. This state of affairs is considered 
an error as it leads to the necessity of some other (or a ‘little man’ in the head of a cognitive agent) to 
perform the action in which we are interested. For example, if we explained the operation of vision 
with some sort of ‘Cartesian theatre’ (described by Dennett 1991, p39, as the belief “that somewhere, 
conveniently hidden in the obscure “center” of the mind/brain, there is a “Cartesian theatre”, a place 
where “it all comes together”“), wherein the external world is ‘projected’ as mental images within the 
brain, the following question arises ‘But how are these internal images understood and processed?’ 
Thus resulting in the logical conclusion that some homunculus is present in the brain’s Cartesian 
theatre and is processing any projected mental images. The problem with committing such a fallacy is 
not only the intuitively incorrect positing of some conscious homunculi within our heads, but that it 
leads to a question begging infinite regress. For, if, continuing our example, vision is explained by an 
homunculus observing projections within a Cartesian theatre, what explains the vision of this ‘little 
man’? Unless a new explanation of vision can be offered, it seems that he must also have an 
homunculus watching images in his Cartesian theatre. However, what then explains this second 
homunculus’ vision? A third homunculus? And so on, in a chain of reasoning that continues ad 
infinitum. Furthermore, the parasitic nature of semantic content in homunculus scenarios produces 
one further issue for ungrounded cognitive systems. For, as Searle (2002, p65) observes: 
Human success and failures exist only relative to human interests. And indeed computer success and 
failures exist only relative to human interests because the machine does not have any psychologically 
real or observer-independent interests. In the case of Deep Blue, the machine did not know that it was 
playing chess, evaluating possible moves, or even winning and losing. It did not know any of these things, 
because it does not know anything. All psychological attributions made of it were observer-dependent. 
Indeed it did not even know that it was number-crunching or carrying out a program. In an observer-
independent sense, the only things going on in the machine were very rapid state transitions in electronic 
circuits. 
In other words, without intrinsic intentionality a system is unable to imbue its own actions with 
meaning. Therefore, ungrounded cognitive systems are unable to have goals or aims, let alone engage 
in goal-orientated behaviour. Any attribution of such purpose can only originate from outside the 
system or from an homunculus.23 
 
In regard to cognitivist systems, cognitive science and the RTM, this argument is a potential threat, for 
without intentionality “[a]ny semantic interpretation [of a mental representation] has to be from 
                                                          
23 This argument is one labelled by Harnard (1990a) as the ‘hermeneutic hall of mirrors’, which he articulates as follows: 
“One need only recall that a Turing Machine, be it ever so "equivalent" to a furnace or airplane, cannot heat or fly: It merely manipulates 
symbols in a way that is formally equivalent to, and hence systematically interpretable as, heating or flying. But in the hermeneutic hall of 
mirrors created by projecting our own interpretations onto symbol manipulation, this distinction vanishes”. 
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outside the system of the symbol manipulation” (Ibid. 1989, p701). Or to state this argument 
alternatively, within physical symbol systems: 
The symbols and the symbol manipulation, being all based on shape rather than meaning, are 
systematically interpretable as having meaning -- that, after all, is what it is to be a symbol system, 
according to our definition. But the interpretation will not be intrinsic to the symbol system itself: It will 
be parasitic on the fact that the symbols have meaning for us, in exactly the same way that the meanings 
of the symbols in a book are not intrinsic, but derive from the meanings in our heads. Hence, if the 
meanings of symbols in a symbol system are extrinsic, rather than intrinsic like the meanings in our heads, 
then they are not a viable model for the meanings in our heads[.] (Harnard 1990b, p338) 
Therefore, with an absence of intentionality, as the CRA diagnoses RTM, cognitive systems necessitate 
the involvement of, what Peirce (§§274-284) terms, an ‘interpretant’ (i.e. an external conscious entity 
that imbues a sign with meaning) in order to convert a meaningless sign, or any other representations 
it employs, into a meaningful symbol. Consequently, without intentionality, for the RTM to have a 
mental symbol qua symbol necessitates an external Interpretant to imbue a mental sign with meaning, 
i.e. it necessitates an homunculus (see also McGinn 1989, p200). 
 
Now that the homunculus fallacy and its relation to the RTM has been investigated, we now progress 
to reviewing the symbolic fallacy. 
The symbolic Fallacy 
One of the first clear articulations of what this research, following Johnson-Laird (1988, p107), is calling 
the symbolic fallacy, can be seen in the discussion on the validity of ‘semantic markers’ (wherein a 
word’s meaning is exhausted by the semantic markers ascribed to it within a mental ‘dictionary’ and 
which we earlier saw in our introduction to Fodor’s LoT (see Katz and Fodor 1963; Katz and Postal 
1964)) by Lewis (1970 pp18-19), who argues: 
Semantic markers are symbols: items in the vocabulary of an artificial language we may call Semantic 
Markerese. Semantic interpretation by means of them amounts merely to a translation algorithm from 
the object language to the auxiliary language Markerese. But we can know the Markerese translation of 
an English sentence without knowing the first thing about the meaning of the English sentence: namely, 
the conditions under which it would be true. Semantics with no treatment of truth conditions is not 
semantics. Translation into Markerese is at best a substitute for real semantics, relying either on our tacit 
competence (at some future date) as speakers of Markerese or on our ability to do real semantics at least 
for the one language Markerese). Translation into Latin might serve as well, except insofar as the 
designers of Markerese may choose to build into it useful features – freedom from ambiguity, grammar 
based on symbolic logic – that might make it easier to do real semantics for Markerese than for Latin.24  
                                                          




That is to say, an account of semantics commits the symbolic fallacy if it merely explains one 
meaningful symbol/suite of symbols by replacing it/them with another (for example, explaining a 
Chinese sentence to a monolingual English speaker by translating it into Latin or even further Chinese). 
This state of affairs is problematic for any semantic theory for it begs the following question: What 
explains the meaning of the second symbol/suite of symbols? That is, it merely regresses the problem 
such theories are attempting to resolve. Moreover, as Searle (1980, p422) argues, further difficulties 
dog any hypotheses that commit the symbolic fallacy, for: 
formal symbol manipulation by themselves don’t have any intentionality; they are quite meaningless, 
they aren’t even symbol manipulations, since the symbols don’t symbolize anything. 
Consequently, any system that commits the symbolic fallacy must either:  
1) Enter into an infinite regress of symbol translation.  
2) Commit the homunculus fallacy (for whom a sign can symbolise).  
3) Completely fail as an account of meaning.  
As such, any theory of cognition that transgresses the symbolic fallacy is, if not disproved, on 
extremely dubious logical ground. 
 
In regard to the syntactic account of the RTM used within cognitive science, it is being argued that 
such a system commits the symbolic fallacy as its account of the semantic content of natural language 
is based solely in its translation into a mental symbol (i.e. a mental representation, be it either 
propositional or analogical), and, further, that the meaning of these mental symbols/representations 
are explained by their replacement, via computations, with other mental symbols. Therefore, so it is 
argued, the RTM and the fields, such as cognitive science, that employ the hypothesis commit the 
symbolic fallacy on two counts see (Searle 1980; 1984; 1990; 2002):  
1) It accounts for the meaning of natural language via its translation into a suite of mental 
symbols. 




                                                          
My own example of the symbol grounding problem has two versions, one difficult, and one, I think, impossible. The difficult version is: 
Suppose you had to learn Chinese as a second language and the only source of information you had was a Chinese/Chinese dictionary. The 
trip through the dictionary would amount to a merry-go-round, passing endlessly from one meaningless symbol or symbol-string (the 
definientes) to another (the definienda), never coming to a halt on what anything meant[…] The only reason cryptologists of ancient 
languages and secret codes seem to be able to successfully accomplish something very like this is that their efforts are grounded in a first 
language and in real world experience and knowledge. The second variant of the Dictionary-Go-Round, however, goes far beyond the 
conceivable resources of cryptology: Suppose you had to learn Chinese as a first language and the only source of information you had was 
a Chinese/Chinese dictionary! This is more like the actual task faced by a purely symbolic model of the mind: How can you ever get off the 




To summarise this discussion: The semantic critiques of the RTM, encapsulated by the CRA as BSA and 
SGP, contend that any system that is based on a physical symbol system, such as the mind under RTM 
and as found in a digital computer, will be unable to account for meaning if those symbols are not 
grounded, i.e. if such a system has no intentionality. This lack of grounding on the part of the system 
causes issues to arise, for without a final ground for semantic content to reside, no atomistic 
interpretation of symbols used by the system can take place, all that can be achieved in such instances 
is the transgression of the homunculus and symbolic fallacies (that is, an infinite regress of question 
begging explanations) and an holistic account of meaning that reduces the whole theory to absurdity. 
As such, these semantic arguments against the RTM (and, therefore, cognitive science and similar 
cognitivist projects) state that as such systems fail to ground their symbols and to successfully account 
for meaning, such devices, and the philosophy of mind that motivate them, will be led into an 
unrecoverable logical position. This is a conclusion akin to Putnam’s analysis of functionalist theories 
of mind, especially in regard to his twin earth argument (see Putnam 1975, pp215ff.) – on which more 
later – from which it is deduced that: 
a more general reason why computational models of the brain/mind will not suffice for cognitive 
psychology[:] We cannot individuate concepts and beliefs without reference to the environment. 
(Putnam 1988, p73)  
Semantic holism 
However, the above discussion leads us to a final semantic argument that has so far only been implicit 
in our handling of the CRA and SGP: That of the problems of semantic holism. For, in light of the 
symbolic fallacy, it can now be inferred that any account of meaning that fails to ground its symbols 
must rely on the full suite of such symbols to determine the meaning of any one. For, if meaning is 
purely a product of the relations between, and operations on, symbols, then the meaning of any one 
symbol in isolation will not be determinable. As such, it is only in the context of the network in which 
a symbol resides that meaning can be inferred.  
 
This state of affairs causes difficulties for a system, for without an atomic, individually defined form of 
semantic content meaning will be holistic and the semantic content of any one symbol in the system 
will be dependent on all the symbols and operations found within it. In such a system, if you make a 
change in the suite of symbols or the operations between them, then the meaning of all the symbols 
changes. However, as it must be self-evident that no two individuals possess the exact same suite of 
symbols and make the same inferences between them, then no two individuals have the same 
complete system. Consequently, any account of meaning that implies an holistic approach will be led 
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into the reductio ad absurdum that no two individuals imbue the same symbols with the exact same 
meaning and that, therefore, no true communication, as it is commonly perceived, is possible and has 
never occurred.25 Or as Fodor (2000, p69), articulates this argument: 
If semantics is holistic, then the content of each of your thoughts depends on the content of each of your 
others; and, since no two people (indeed no two time slices of the same person) have all their thoughts 
in common, semantic holism implies that there are no shared intentional states. 
§ii Response to semantic arguments 
Now that these semantic arguments have been clarified, we are in a position to appreciate their 
significance, and explicate why they occupy a position of importance and interest within this thesis. 
This putative notability not only comes from the recognition they are given and the import attributed 
to them within the relevant literature (for example, Müller 2007, p102, who is concerned with the 
related field of AI, states that “The impression that AI has tacitly abandoned its original aims is 
strengthened by the widespread belief that there are arguments which have shown a fundamental 
flaw in all present AI, particularly that its symbols do not refer or represent, that they are not 
“grounded”, as one now says” – see also Johnson-Laird 1988, p99; Harnard 1991, p47; Preston 2002, 
pp1-2), but also from the reaction many theorists working within the RTM paradigm have had to such 
semantic arguments (e.g. Harnard 1990, p335, who is again only concerned with the related field of 
AI, states that he is concerned with the SGB, concluding: “The problem is analogous to trying to learn 
Chinese from a Chinese/Chinese dictionary”, and proposes that “A candidate solution is sketched 
[within the article]: Symbolic representation must be grounded bottom-up” – see also Brooks 1990, 
p3; Rapaport 2011, p7; Schweizer 2012, pp199-204). For detailed examples of this influence and 
reaction, we can look to the development of the two theories we examined in our prior chapter (i.e. 
Fodor’s LoT and Johnson-Laird’s mental models). For, a concern and response to the critiques 
summarised by the CRA, BSA and SGP can clearly be witnessed within the evolution of both theorists’ 
                                                          
25 However, compare this argument with those of Quine (1960) and Putnam (1988). Nevertheless, these authors’ arguments, to avoid the 
above reduction – with which they agree (see Putnam 1981, p22) – state that the meaning of a term is based on its relation to “the other 
statements of the theory[… or a] corporate body of statements” (ibid., pp8-9), i.e. not to all the theories or statements but to a clearly 
defined subset. Yet, this demarcation of groups of statements from one another seems arbitrary and baseless. This can be seen in one of 
Putnam’s own examples: 
If someone tells you, for example, that the thief entered through that window, and there is muddy ground outside the window, you will 
“deduce” that there are footprints in the mud. But this is not a logical consequence of the facts stated, for you obviously have made use of 
an unstated auxiliary hypothesis to the effect that if the thief entered through that window, he walked on the ground to get to that 
window[…] What has experiential import is the corporate body of statements, and this import is not the simple sum of the experiential 
imports of the individual statements. (Ibid.) 
But, if this is correct, this auxiliary hypothesis is based on at least one further ‘unstated auxiliary hypothesis’, that the thief was subject to 
gravity, which in turn is based on a large number of further hypotheses, including the behaviour of celestial bodies. That is, following this 
reasoning, statements seem to be related to hypotheses far removed from their ‘own corporate body’ and which are, following the logic of 
Quine and Putnam, themselves related to a large number of ‘unstated auxiliary hypotheses’, and which are, following the logic of Quine and 
Putnam, in turn themselves related to a large number of ‘unstated auxiliary hypotheses’, which are... As such, it seems that Putnam, and 




work, with each thinker’s early syntactical accounts of cognition, which explained the semantic 
content of natural languages by mere translation into ungrounded mental symbols (via either 
semantic markers (e.g. Katz and Fodor 1963) or lexical decomposition (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1976; 1977; 
1978a)), having today been abandoned in favour of a causal correspondence theory of meaning, in 
which the meaning of natural language propositions derive, ultimately, via reference to ontologically 
real entities (e.g. Fodor 2010; Johnson-Laird 2002; 2006).26 As such, these theorists acquiesce to 
semantic arguments against functionalist accounts of cognition, such as are found in Putnam (1975, 
p227; 1981, p19; 1988, p73) that they fail to capture the fact that “‘meanings’ just ain’t in the head”. 
Moreover, this externalist move can be seen as, in part, a response to the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies we have just encountered. That this conjectured motivation has some accuracy can be seen 
in the concerns of these writers when expounding their hypotheses, with Fodor (1990, p162) stating:  
denotation is presumably a word/world relation purely. There is thus some hope that an extensional 
semantics can avoid the holism that plagues use theories. 
and subsequently averring: 
there’s another, more parochial reason why it would be nice to have a causal account of the semantics 
of LOT. It’s an argument that’s been raised against the LOT picture very many times (indeed, against RTM 
as such) that Mentalese formulas themselves require an internal interpreter if they’re to be meaningful. 
The immediate implication would be a homuncular regress, which is not a pretty thought[…] Patently, 
however, it is defanged if the content of a mental representation is determined not by the results of its 
interpretation but by its causal connections to things in the world. (Fodor 2010 p199) 
While Johnson-Laird (1988, p107) has asserted that: 
one decisive objection to all the theories that I have described [i.e. meaning postulates] is that they say 
nothing about how words relate to the world. They contain no machinery that explains how my warning 
about [an unseen] table could guide your movements. Networks can tell you that two words are related, 
or that one sentence is a paraphrase of another, but they cannot tell you anything about the state of the 
world. They are as circular as dictionaries; they commit the “symbolic fallacy”. 
Adding, that: 
computers have no principles for relating the numerals they use to the external world[…] as to the 
meaning of their operations and results, the interpretation is left to the people who use them. 
Philosophers sometimes conclude from this fact that mental processes cannot be computational. This 
argument will be less persuasive, perhaps, when computers are provided with the missing link – with 
processes that relate their symbols to the world. (Johnson-Laird 1993, p34. See also, Ibid. 1988) 
 
                                                          
26 See also Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1981). 
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Furthermore, this introduction of referentialism is a theoretical move in response to the concerns of 
the CRA, BSA and SGP that is not idiomatic to just these two thinkers, many other cognitive scientists 
and others working within the RTM framework have used such arguments as stimuli toward adopting 
a similar referentialist account of meaning (this is an observation that has also been made by Cole 
2009, p439, who states that “Fodor, like most everyone else, has been inﬂuenced by the rise of 
externalism”). For example, Schweizer (2012, p201), while considering those arguments encapsulated 
by CRA and SGP, deduces that:  
if meanings ain’t in the heads of individual human agents, then they’re certainly not in the data bases of 
computational artefacts[...] On the foregoing widely accepted model of ‘direct’ reference, there is an 
essential causal and chronological link that semantically tethers an individual’s linguistic behaviour to its 
environmental context. 
And Rapaport (2011, p7) discussing his response to Searle’s CRA, concludes that:  
Yes, our internal concepts (neuron firings, etc.) are, presumably, causally generated by objects and events 
in the external world, and our beliefs are true insofar as our internal ‘‘semantic networks’’ match the 
‘‘ontology’’ of the external world.27 (See also Ibid. 2007 and Ford 2011.) 
 
In light of the above, it can be seen that semantic arguments hold a notable position for the RTM 
paradigm within cognitive science, as such criticisms highlight the necessity of intentionality and 
grounded symbols. In fact, this is an issue, as has been demonstrated, that has contributed to 
numerous theorists updating their syntactic accounts of meaning to the referentialist, correspondence 
based semantics that is prevalent within the field today. Nevertheless, although such a strategy may 
be common, it is not free from concern. For, the introduction of such a referentialist semantics into 
any hypothesis should not be considered an insubstantial update, even if a full blown correspondence 
theory of meaning is proven to sidestep the CRA, the BSA, the SGP and other related difficulties. This 
is because, such an account of meaning entails a large number of assumptions, any one of which may 
conflict with those already present in a theorist’s existent philosophy of mind, and, therefore, 
demands considerable analysis before its logically consistent introduction can be confidently asserted. 
However, to see why this concern is genuine, it is apposite of this chapter to first continue with an 
analysis of the nature and history of these descriptions of semantic content themselves. As such, this 
thesis shall continue with an investigation into correspondence theories of meaning. 
 
                                                          
27 Interestingly, the influence of the CRA/SGP that is being sketched here may have led to Fodor’s observation that “in their deepest heart 
of hearts, the great majority of psychologists think that[…] they already know how to naturalise reference. Namely, it’s got to turn out to be 
some sort of association[…] between ideas and the world” (Fodor 2010, ppp197-198). 
72 
 
§iii Correspondence theories of meaning 
To put it succinctly, these accounts of language assert that meanings “aren’t in the head” (Putnam 
1988, p73), instead, semantic content is viewed as deriving from the world. That is, correspondence 
theorists assert that signs (mental or otherwise) gain their meaning through a connection to a 
particular state of affairs found in an ontologically real world ‘out there’ in some observer-
independent reality. As such, symbols are viewed as deriving their semantic content by this connection 
and mean that part of the world to which they refer, denote or correspond. This is an account of 
meaning that has a rich history in the philosophical literature, arguably being expressed as early as 
Aristotle’s On Interpretation (§1) in the 4th century BC, wherein it is expressed that:  
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are the symbols of spoken words. 
Just as all men have not the same writing, so all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental 
experiences, which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our 
experiences are the images [emphasis mine].28 
 
This position on semantic content is one that has continued throughout philosophy’s development 
since this time, with such notable thinkers as John Locke, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein (under 
certain readings), Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam adhering to a similar view at some point in their 
thought. Throughout this development, although substantial divergences may exist between 
individual instantiations of the theory, this hypothesis is characterised by its focus on an external 
semantics. As such, correspondence theories of meaning are innately antithetical to internalist 
theories of meaning that contend that semantic content is accounted for purely mentally, i.e. theories 
that state that we do not have to go outside the head to explain meaning. These theorists (e.g. 
McGilvery 1998, Chomsky 2000, Pietroski 2005) alternately argue that meanings are mental tokens 
that are derived and individuated syntactically. Or, as Pietroski (2005, p254) has it: 
knowing what sentence S means—that is, understanding S—is not a matter of somehow associating S 
with a function from contexts to truth-conditions. 
Rather, the meaning of S is a compositionally determined intrinsic property of S that constrains and guides 
without determining how S can be used to make true or false assertions in various conversational 
situations. 
Importantly, however, an externalist semantics is also antithetical to the arguments such internalists 
employ to support their position. There exist a number of such arguments within the literature, 
however this thesis will consider only a limited number: 
                                                          
28 Where ‘those things of which our experiences are the images’ is being taken to mean substance. For, as it is expressed in Aristotle’s On 
the soul (2006b, p3): 
when we are able to give an account conformable to experience of all or most of the properties of a substance, we shall be in the most 




1) Negative facts: Some (e.g. Pietroski 2005) argue that, although it is capable of explaining the 
positive facts of language (i.e., that the word ‘table’ means TABLE), externalism is incapable 
of explaining negative ones. For example, and as Belletti and Rizzi (2002, pp6-7) highlight, 
when we consider the simple word ‘he’, as used in: 
a) John said he was happy 
and 
b) He said john was happy 
it becomes apparent that there are complex grammatical structures involved that changes the 
meaning of the word ‘he’: In a) ‘he’ can potentially mean ‘John’, i.e. co-reference is possible, 
while in b) this is not so, i.e., co-reference is not possible and ‘he’ could never mean ‘John’. 
What is of interest here, however, when looking at a) and b), is that externalism may be able 
to account for the meaning of ‘he’ (i.e. the positive fact of semantic content; the state of affairs 
to which ‘he’ refers), but it is not able to tell us why the grammar of a) allows for co-reference 
while the grammar of b) does not (i.e. the negative fact of the restrictions of syntax). 
Consequently, some internalists claim that externalist semantics are unable to account for all 
aspects of language and, therefore, fail.  
 
2) Tractability: Secondly, internalists appeal to putative tractability issues for externalist 
computational accounts of cognitions to support their position. For, so internalists contest, 
externalists are guilty of “insist[ing] on relating a computational theory’s domain to users of 
cognitive states and to things outside the head” (McGilvery 1998, p232). That is, externalists 
are said to make the brain responsible for computation over both mental states and all the 
entities in the world (for it is these objects that account for meaning). Further, this is said to 
demand too much, in fact it is said to demand a “theory of everything” (Ibid., p237). 
Consequently, such an externalist system would not be constructible, i.e., could not be 
implemented by the brain or any other physical realiser, as it is to “extend the domain of a 
computational theory of a cognitive competence to things outside the head[… and] is to 
broaden the task of the theory to the point that it becomes unmanageable; it undermines the 
effort to construct an honest theory” (Ibid., p234). 
 
3) Poverty of the stimulus for language learning: Additionally, it is a truism that any theory of 
meaning must also account for how and why children are able to acquire and understand the 
meanings of natural language locutions as well as how they operate. However, internalists 
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contest that children are not exposed to a sufficient level of language use before they can 
accurately determine and use the meaning of natural language terms within all their possible, 
complex and nuanced, grammatical positions. For example, if we return to the complex 
syntactical structures at play in the use of ‘he’ between a) and b) above, there exists, so 
internalists argue, a level of nuance and difficulty within language that young children cannot 
grasp given the level of exposure they are able to have received, especially when we consider 
that this feat is achieved “at a time when they cannot even learn elementary arithmetic” 
(Chomsky 2002, p81). Consequently, certain theorists conclude that: 
A careful look at the interpretation of expressions reveals very quickly that from the earliest 
stages, the child knows vastly more than experience has provided. That is true even of simple 
words. (Ibid. 2000, p6) 
That is, it is argued that acquiring language cannot be a process of establishing relations to 
states of affairs as children can learn and use meaningful language before they could possibly 
have had the opportunity to found such correlations, so meaningful language must, therefore, 
be an internal and innate capacity of humans (see also McGilvery 1998, p236). 
Forms of reference fixation  
Nevertheless, and ignoring the challenges from internalism for now, externalism faces a number of 
questions in its own right, the main one of which being: ‘How is the reference between sign and 
signified reliably fixed?’ For, if signs cannot be fixed across both individuals and time then no form of 
communication is impossible. Furthermore, if reference fixation is not successfully established, your 
thoughts now will not have the same meaning as your previous or future thoughts, making cognition, 
as we suppose it, to be impossible. As such, for a correspondence theory of meaning to succeed, it 
first needs a determinate and reliable method of reference fixation. Within the literature, and 
following Kirkham (1997, pp119-139), who is working in the related area of correspondence theories 
of truth (cf. Putnam 1975, p269), there are two broad strategies to answer this question: 
Correspondence by congruence and correspondence by correlation.29 
Correspondence as congruence 
The first broad strategy for reference fixation is that of congruence, an approach which argues that 
what relates a sign to a state of affairs is a structural relation between the two, i.e. that there exists 
an equivalence of structure between sign and signified causing the former to relate to the latter. Or, 
as Kirkham (1997, p119) avouches, this approach: 
                                                          
29 It should be noted, however, that although this typology of correspondence by congruence and correspondence by correlation is useful, 
it does gloss over much detail found within the individual theories of correspondence following either broad strategy. 
75 
 
claim[s] that there is a structural isomorphism between truth [or semantic] bearers and the facts to which 
they correspond when the truth[/semantic] bearer is true[/meaningful]. Like the two halves of a torn 
piece of paper, the parts of the truth[/semantic] bearer fit with the parts of the fact.  
As such, this strategy explains reliable and consistent reference through a sign possessing the same 
structure to a state of affairs. Examples of this approach include Wittgenstein’s use of logical form 
within the Ineffable interpretation of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (see Hacker 1997) and 
Johnson-Laird and Peirce’s use of iconicity. 
 
However, before we continue, it should be noted that there are a number of issues unique to holding 
such a view of reference fixation. For, as Daitz (1953) and Wittgenstein (again in his Tractatus) identify, 
such a form of reference is limited by, what are respectively termed, the referee’s ‘genre’ or ‘pictorial 
form’. A property of a sign respectively explained as follows: 
As icons signify by being like what they signify, their range of signification is limited. The special restriction 
of a reflection to what is in spatial proximity to it is unconnected with its iconicity, and due solely to the 
fact that it is a causal phenomenon. Both reflections and pictures, however, can show only spatial and 
coloured relations, i.e. they can show only what is in (what I earlier called) the same genre as themselves. 
A song or a taste can be neither reflected nor pictured. (Daitz 1953, p195) 
And: 
2.161 There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture 
of the other at all. 
2.17 What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it —correctly or 
incorrectly — in the way that it does, is its pictorial form.30  
That is to say, the genre or pictorial form of a sign determines which aspects of a state of affairs it can 
mirror and delimits to what it can refer. For example, a picture’s genre/pictorial form is that of the 
visual (i.e. size, shape and physical relations). As such, as a picture can only show the visual attributes 
of a state of affairs and nothing else, it can only show us what a duck, for example, looks like, but not 
what it sounds or tastes like. However, given this restriction, this is a limitation that does not seem to 
apply to language and thought, as both systems are able to meaningfully represent a seemingly 
limitless variety of properties, e.g. they can both not only refer to what a duck looks like, but also what 
it tastes and sounds like. Therefore, those who hold a congruent or structural account of reference 
fixation within a correspondence theory of meaning are tasked with explaining this apparent lack of 
limitation to the genre/pictorial form of language and mental representation. That is, with identifying 
the special genre/pictorial form of language/mental representation that allows it to effectively denote 
                                                          
30 Again, this is taking an Ineffable reading of Wittgenstein. 
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a state of affair’s differing attributes and qualities (e.g. its visual, structural, audible, emotional etc. 
states) at the same time.  
 
Finally, there is a further issue with such approaches in explaining why, if both sign and signified share 
the same structure, the former refers to the latter but not vice versa. That is to say, congruent 
correspondence theorists have to account for the one-way nature of reference within a strategy that 
seems to rely on the two-way phenomena of equivalence for correspondence. As such, congruent 
correspondence theorists need to explain this asymmetrical relation, i.e. why a sign refers to a state 
of affairs whilst a state of affairs does not refer to a sign.31 
Correspondence as correlation 
The other broad approach to reference fixation is to deny that correspondence is due to any innate 
property of the sign and the relevant fact, but is due to some form of societal, cultural or biological 
convention that correlates a sign to a state of affairs. There exists a vast number of these posited 
conventions to explain this correlation, however the difficulty with each approach is in ensuring the 
method is strict enough to account for the apparent consistency of a sign’s meaning. Examples of 
posited conventions that are said to meet this difficulty include brute biological correlation (see Fodor 
1975); the knowledge of experts (see Putnam 1988); initial baptism and ‘causal chains’ (see Kripke 
1972); functional teleological/Darwinist explanations (see McGinn 1989); experience of facts causing 
the correlation, or the ‘locking on’, of representation to represented (see Fodor 1990; 2010); and 
Wittgensteinian enculturation/Learning (see Hutchinson 2008). 
 
However, both the positions detailed above (i.e., correspondence by congruence and correlation) 
entail a raft of assumptions, both broad and specific, apart from those already clarified or alluded to 
(i.e. a mechanism of reference fixation, an antithesis to internalism and a realist ontology concerning 
states of affairs/facts (see McGinn 1989, pp10-14)). As such, for the purposes of this thesis (i.e., to 
demonstrate why the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into an hypothesis is not 
an insubstantial addition), it is necessary to enumerate and detail a number of the most pressing of 
these assumptions. To complete this, the following section will be broken down into a number of 
subheadings, each of which will analyse an assumption in turn. Consequently, this section will 
continue with a discussion of a raft of issues along the proceeding order:  
1) Brentano’s problem.  
2) Epistemic scepticism of meaning.  
                                                          
31 This asymmetrical relation between sign and signified has also been labelled, following Strawson’s “On referring”, as ‘individuation-
dependence’ by McGinn (1989, p6). 
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3) Metaphysical issues.  
4) Twin Earth cases.  
5) Substitutivity/Frege cases. 
6) The implementation problem.  
7) Slingshot arguments.32 
Brentano’s problem 
Further to the question of reliable and consistent reference fixation, another query arises if a 
correspondence theorist also holds a physicalist ontology (i.e. if they state that all there is, is the 
physical). If these two positions are simultaneously held, such a theorist is charged with explaining 
how this referential mechanism scientifically reduces to matter. That is, they are faced with answering 
‘Brentano’s thesis’ or ‘Brentano’s problem’ (see Putnam 1988 pp1-3). This is a thesis derived from 
certain readings of the German psychologist and philosopher Franz Brentano’s work on intentionality 
in Psychology from an empirical standpoint. Within this work, it is averred that: 
Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in 
the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in 
love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. This intentional in-existence is characteristic 
exclusively of mental phenomena. No physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. We could, therefore, 
define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena which contain an object 
intentionally within themselves [emphasis mine]. (Brentano 2009, pp88-89) 
Some, such as Chisholm (1955), take this to be arguing that intentionality could not be a physical 
process, that no mere collection of matter is capable of reference or of being about another state of 
affairs on its own.33 Instead, it is only the mind, or mentality, that is capable of creating such a 
phenomena as reference, just as an ant’s track marks are only a picture of a state of affairs once a 
conscious observer recognises it as such (see Putnam 1981, p1). Consequently, if a physicalist stance 
is simultaneously occupied along with a correspondence based theory of meaning, as is done so within 
the forms of RTM investigated here, then this apparent irreducible nature of 
intentionality/correspondence needs to be rejected and Brentano’s challenge met. (See also Putnam 
1988, pp73-89.) 
Scepticism 
Next, there is an issue in that referentialism seems to conclude in an epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
For, as our terms are now Russellian and as we do not have idealised epistemic access to the world, 
                                                          
32 Although this catalogue of issues faced by correspondence theories of meaning has attempted to be as exhaustive as possible, it is 
inevitable that projects of this nature fall short of completeness. As such, it should be clarified that this discussion makes no claims of 
definitiveness. 
33 It should be highlighted that the ascription to Brentano of this thesis is not universally accepted (cf. Moran 1996). 
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we must conclude that we cannot be certain about the meaning of any of our terms. That is, a clear 
issue is now raised: If the possibility exists that what we believe to be meaningful utterances are 
nothing more than Russellian singular terms which possess no referent (or which possess a different 
referent than we suppose), how can we differentiate between when our expressions are significant 
and when they are not (or when we are mistaken in their meaning)? In the literature, one response to 
this query is the introduction of an accurately informed third-party, an individual capable of correctly 
discerning between expressions which have a referent – and therefore semantic value – and those 
which do not (see McDowell 1977, pp172-175). However, there is a problem with this concept, third-
parties are necessarily themselves first-parties, and as such their thoughts, including those about 
others expressions, are equally as fallible as those which they are adjudicating. Ergo, we are led to the 
question: What provides these-third parties with such a privileged position, such an Archimedean 
point, that enables them to accurately determine significant expressions from insignificant ones? The 
answer to this question cannot simply be their belief that they are making accurate ascriptions, as that 
is the very thing under suspicion. As such, there seems there can be no ‘accurately informed third-
party’, no Archimedean point from which utterances can be determined to be meaningful. If this is 
the case, however, there now seems no way to know with any certainty whether anything we express 
is actually meaningful (or actually means what we suppose). That is, we can expand the uncertainty 
we have the meaning of a few of our Russellian terms, to all of our Russellian terms.34 For example, it 
is now a serious possibility that, at some future date, it may be ascertained that the supposed referent 
of ‘Queen Elizabeth II’ may actually be nothing more than the result of some group hallucination or 
dream and no such person actually exists. Consequently, it is only at that point of discovery that we 
find that all our talk of the current Queen is, and has always been, meaningless. Therefore, some 
serious level of scepticism of meaning must ensue from the abandonment of narrow content and the 
adoption of pure referentialism, a level of scepticism that deserves investigation.  
 
Within Philosophy of Language the two most prominent arguments for scepticism of meaning are 
found in the work of Kripke (1982) and Quine (1988). Although these authors derive their scepticism 
from different angles (the former from the problem of induction in rule following, the latter through 
the indeterminacy of translation), both are in agreement that no known fact can justify, or determine, 
our meaning one thing rather than another by any specific symbol. They then strengthen this purely 
epistemic claim, converting it into a metaphysical one, through the argument that even if idealised 
epistemic access to all the possible objective facts where given, there would still be no information 
that could determine our meaning one thing rather than another. Miller (2007, p145) identifies this 
                                                          
34 This move is obviously founded on the validity of the Cartesian method: That if we know parts of a system are false, we must then doubt 
the whole.  
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form of scepticism as being what he terms constitutive scepticism. That is, “scepticism about the 
existence of a certain sort of fact”, i.e., scepticism about meaning’s very existence. However, this is 
not where our argument concerning correspondence theories has concluded. For, we did not, and 
cannot, make the move from the epistemic claim over the knowledge of meaning to a metaphysical 
one about meaning’s existence. We concluded that there are no known facts that can provide 
certainty over a term’s meaning, but still asserts that such facts do exist (i.e., the referents 
themselves). Under referentialism, if idealised epistemic access to the facts about the world were 
given, it would instantly become known which expressions contain semantic value and which do not. 
Consequently, correspondence theories of meaning stop short of constitutive scepticism, but still lead 
to, what Miller (Ibid.) terms, epistemological scepticism, “which concedes that the sort of fact in 
question exists, [but…] questions our right to claim knowledge of that sort of fact”.35 As such, to hold 
externalism is to allow for the possibility that individuals can be mistaken about their own thoughts, 
i.e., that they can be wrong about the thoughts they believe they possess. That is, as McDowell (1984, 
p288) has it, “a sort of de re sense may determine a de re sense[…] or it may determine nothing. And 
in the latter case[…] there can only be a gap – an absence”. Or as Evans (1982, p44) articulates this 
point: 
[T]here does not seem to me to be anything incoherent in the idea that it may be, for a subject, exactly 
as though he were thinking about a physical object (say) which he can see, and yet that, precisely because 
there is no physical object he is seeing, he may fail to have a thought of the kind he supposes himself to 
have. It is not part of this proposal that his mind is wholly vacant[…] The claim is simply that there is a 
kind of thought we sometimes have[…] when, in virtue of the absence of any appropriate object, there is 
no such thought to be had[…] it does not appear to me that [this] proposal can be faulted on grounds of 
coherence alone.36 
 
To summarise the preceding: A de re conception of content requires that, for many expressions to be 
meaningful, the object to which they refer exist, and if those objects are not veridical, then any atomic 
sentence in which those expressions are a constituent expresses no thought, and is without meaning. 
(Alternately, if the object to which a term refers is different to that which is supposed, then any 
proposition that contains the relevant expression will express a different thought than that which is 
assumed.) The speaker, mistakenly believing it to be otherwise, is simply uttering a false second-order 
belief about the supposed thought. It is only an accurately informed third-party, therefore, who, 
knowing the true conditions of the world, can differentiate between the meaningful and the 
                                                          
35 In this regard, this argument can be seen as being somewhat akin to Putnam’s permutation argument, which does not say that the 
expression “the cat is on the mat” has no meaning at the metalinguistic level, just that we have no knowledge of what it means (see Putnam 
1981).   
36 See also McGinn (1989, p28). 
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meaningless expressions. But, as I have argued above, there can be no accurately informed third-party 
in reality; any ascription one purports to make is equally under suspicion of merely being a false 
second-order belief as the utterances they judge. Therefore, as there are no known facts which can 
determine whether our expressions are meaningful or not, accepting a de re conception of content 
requires accepting an epistemological scepticism of meaning. 
Metaphysical assumptions 
Thirdly, correspondence, eo ipso, necessitates certain metaphysical assumptions. Such as:  
1) Eternalism: If it is both assumed that future and past tensed propositions are meaningful and 
that propositions only contain semantic content if they refer to concrete states of affairs found 
in the world, then it must be concluded that even historical and future events, and not just 
present ones, have some form of metaphysically concrete existence. As such, for tensed 
propositions to maintain their semantic content as supposed, correspondence theories of 
meaning entails an eternalist view of time (i.e. that the past and the future have an existence 
equal to the present) and is inherently opposed to both presentism (i.e. that only the present 
has any form of concrete existence) and, because of future tenses, the growing universe 
theory (i.e. that only the present and the past have concrete existence). Furthermore, this 
position, eo ipso, leads to determinism, as future tensed propositions such as “Tomorrow I 
will question the control I have over my own actions” now entails a predetermined future 
state of affairs to which to correspond, true or false to be meaningful. Therefore, this seems 
to imply that to adopt a correspondence theory of meaning and the view that future tensed 
propositions as meaningful, is to take the view that our actions are predetermined and we 
have no freedom of the will. Nevertheless, it may be remarked, as is done by Aristotle in On 
Interpretation (§9), that: 
Everything must either be or not be, whether in the present or in the future, but it is not always 
possible to distinguish and state determinately which of these alternatives must necessarily 
come about[...] One of the two propositions in such instances [the original and its negation] must 
be true and the other false, but we cannot say determinately that this or that is false, but must 
leave the alternative undecided. 
That is to say, that although a proposition now requires a future to denote, it is not necessary 
that the truth or falsehood of that future be known. However, this does not solve the problem, 
for although it is not necessary for the truth or falsehood to be known for a future-tensed 
proposition to be meaningful, it is still necessary for the truth or falsehood of that future to 
exist and, consequently, that that future still be set, i.e. externalist meaning necessitates that 




2) Realism of properties and relations: Moreover, for a correspondence theory of meaning to 
accept that propositions such as “The yellow ball is bigger than the blue cube” are meaningful, 
properties (e.g. “yellow”) and relations (e.g. “bigger than”) need to be external to 
interlocutors (i.e., need to denote a fact or state of affairs in the world) and therefore have 
some form of ontological existence. Consequently, to hold a correspondence theory of 
meaning also entails an expansion of a theorist’s ontology, so as to accommodate relations 
and properties (see McGinn 1989, pp40-41).37, 38  
 
3) Counterfactuals and false propositions: Finally, there is a question of how Russellian singular 
terms and thoughts can still refer when they are false and if, eo ipso, they do not correspond 
to any concrete state of affairs? Such false propositions and counterfactuals are a question 
we have already encountered and detailed in a previous chapter (see the discussion of 
Peircean negation), however it should be highlighted that such a question is here being taken 
to also concern related issues with signs for such things as negation (e.g. “I am not sat at a 
desk”), disjunctives (e.g. “either I am sat at a desk or I am not”), modal statements (e.g. “I 
could be sat at another desk”) and empty names (e.g. “Sherlock Homes was sat at a desk”). 
These myriad difficulties are all here being included under the umbrella of ‘counterfactuals 
and false propositions’ as all seem to centre on the issue of reference to a states of affairs, or 
a fact, that does not pertain. Therefore, so it appears at first blush, if a solution is presented 
for counterfactual and false propositions (e.g., if a concrete or abstract form of referent is 
identified) then a large portion of the difficulties raised by these related issues will also be 
abated, if not removed. However, it should be made apparent that this conflation of forms of 
statement is a simplification of the individual arguments involved and glosses over much 
nuance found within and between them.  
 
                                                          
37 This is making use of the distinction between internal and external properties and relations, where: 
Internal relations/properties: What provides an object's properties or relates object a to object b, in any way, is a property, or are 
properties, held by the objects themselves, i.e. any relationship/property is ultimately reducible to the concerned objects 
themselves. That is, what it is that relates one thing to another etc. is a fundamental, internal property (or properties) present 
within the objects related (e.g. a is a lighter shade of blue than b). Therefore, as a relationship/property is essential to relata/objects, 
and following the identity of indiscernables, if a relationship/property no longer existed, the objects involved would no longer be 
the same.   
External relations:/properties: Any form of relation/property is not caused through the internal properties of the objects involved, 
but rather is imposed upon them from an external position (e.g. c is to the left of d according to p, and only because of p). Therefore, 
if a relationship/property where to change, the item(s) involved would be unaltered and remain exactly the same; they would 
maintain their identity through the change. 
38 However, not all correspondence theories may take this position. For example, see certain metaphysical readings of Wittgenstein’s 




Twin Earth Cases 
Those who hold a correspondence theory and state that meaning is external are, eo ipso, led to the 
conclusion that if two terms, even those that share the same sign, denote different referents, then 
they must have a different meaning. That this is the case can be seen in an argument from Putnam 
(1975, pp222ff.), who gives the following thought experiment: Imagine that along with our world there 
is another, twin, Earth that is identical in every way with our own, except for one difference, water is 
not composed from H2O but a unique chemical structure that we will, for the purposes of exposition, 
label as XYZ. Now, given this gedankenexperiment, it seems intuitive that, in 2014 and with a common 
knowledge of the hidden structure of the two Earths’ respective waters (H2O and XYZ), that our (as a 
resident of Earth) use of ‘water’ does not refer to, does not mean, that substance on Twin Earth that 
has the same surface structure and is locally called ‘water’ but which is composed from XYZ.39 Given 
this, we can conclude that: 
there is no problem about the extension of the term ‘water’. The word simply has two different meanings 
(as we say): in the sense in which it is used on Twin Earth, the sense of waterTE, what we call ‘water’ simply 
isn’t water; while in the sense in which it is used on Earth, the sense of waterTE, what the Twin Earthians 
call ‘water’ simply isn’t water. (Ibid. p224) 
As such, if it is taken that meaning is determined by referent, that meaning ‘ain’t in the head’, it must 
be concluded that if two terms have different referents, they possess different meanings, even if the 
signs for the terms are the same. 
 
Although this all seems intuitive and is a fact to which many would freely assent, there are day-to-day 
cases where such an analysis seemingly leads us to unintuitive consequences. For example, my 
knowledge of trees is very limited, I could not tell a beech from an elm; I possess only the most 
superficial knowledge concerning the structure of beeches and elms, which leads me to consistently 
confuse the one for the other. However, even though I do not possess the conscious knowledge to 
single out a beech from an elm, it seems, or so some argue, intuitive to say that my propositions 
concerning beech trees are not synonymous with those concerning elms. Furthermore, we would not 
like to say that only an arborist’s, or any other individual otherwise expert in trees’, use of ‘beech’ has 
a different meaning from their use of ‘elm’. Or, as Putnam (Ibid., p226) avers: 
Suppose you are like me and cannot tell an elm from a beech tree. We still say that an extension of ‘elm’ 
in my idiolect is the same as the extension of ‘elm’ in anyone else’s, viz., the set of all elm trees, and that 
the set of all beech trees is the extension of ‘beech’ in both of our idiolects. Thus ‘elm’ in my idiolect has 
                                                          
39 However, the reliance on intuitions here may be disputed by some. For example, Devitt (2014, pp270-271) rejects any use of intuitions as 
evidence and instead recommends we should instead gather empirical evidence concerning actual language use. That is, rather than merely 
assert intuition as evidence, we should engage in some experimental philosophy if our argument is to remain valid (see Ibid., p288). However, 
compare this position on the value of intuitions with that of Gendler (2010) or Papineau (2014, pp186-189). 
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a different extension from ‘beech’ in your idiolect (as it should). Is it really credible that this difference in 
extension is brought about by some difference in our concepts? My concept of an elm tree is exactly the 
same as my concept of a beech tree (I blush to confess). (See also Ibid. 1988, pp24ff.) 
However, it seems that certain correspondence theories go against these intuitions and seem to lead 
to “meaning incommensurability” (Papineau 2014, p171). For example, where congruence is used for 
reference fixation, if the logical form of our mental representation ‘beech’ is identical to the logical 
form of our representation for ‘elm’ then the two terms are identical in our idiolect, i.e. the two 
representations must denote the same state of affairs (e.g. the set of all elm and beech trees, or even 
the set of all trees) and mean the same thing. Consequently, by holding that terms with different 
referents have different meanings we are led to the conclusion that within any discussion I undertake 
with an expert concerning beech and elms (or any other discussion between experts and the laity), we 
will not mean the same things by our terms and communication, as generally conceived, cannot be 
said to be taking place.40 
  
Moreover, such an externalism as is produced from the above reasoning may lead such theorists as 
Johnson-Laird, Fodor etc. into still further difficulties. For Putnam (Ibid.) continues his Twin Earth 
argument quoted above as follows: 
Let us roll the time back to about 1750. At that time chemistry was not developed on either Earth or Twin 
Earth. The typical Earthian speaker of English did not know water consisted of hydrogen and oxygen, and 
the typical Twin Earthian speaker of English did not know ‘water’ consisted of XYZ. (Ibid. p224) 
Consequently, in 1750 residents of both Earth and Twin Earth have only a knowledge of the, identical, 
surface structure of their respective ‘water’, not their hidden microstructure. This then raises the 
question: Does the use of ‘water’ by Earthians in 1750, and previously, refer to (i.e., mean) just Earth’s 
H2O, as in our use in 2014, or both H2O and XYZ? Putnam (Ibid.) concludes that the correct answer to 
this question is firmly the former, that “the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H2O on 
Earth in 1750 as in [2014]; and the extension of the term ‘water’ was as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 
1750 as in [2014]” and, therefore, the terms’ meaning haven’t changed. To state otherwise, argues 
Putnam (Ibid. pp235-238), is to conclude that the meaning of our terms are affected by, and subject 
to, scientific discoveries and, therefore, that, for example, Archimedes’ notion of ‘gold’ (or most other 
natural kind terms) is different to ours. However, this leads us to the conclusion that two people with 
the same mental state (or mental representation) may not mean the same thing by that mental 
                                                          
40 Additionally, a similar case is found for ambiguous or vague propositions, for these are also everyday locutions to which we would 
intuitively, so it is argued, attach a meaning but whose referent may not be static between interlocutors. For example, and following the 
same line of reasoning as presented in the main text, the purposely vague and ambiguous statements of a politician, say, must have some 
meaning even though there is not one state of affairs they denote. As such, it seems that to rely on a solely de re concept of meaning also 
goes contra to our intuitive ascriptions of meaning to such terms. For further examples of this kind, see Kripke (1971, pp118-128). 
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state(/mental representation), which is obviously problematic for externalists such as Fodor and 
Johnson-Laird et al. For, such theorists state that if person1 possesses the same mental representation 
(mental state) as person2, their mental representations, eo ipso, share a referent. Consequently, if 
person1 and person2 have the same mental representation they must refer to the same state of affairs 
and mean the same thing. Furthermore, mutatis mutandis, this means that if Archimedes and Putnam 
have different mental representations, both of which they express using the sign ‘gold’, those 
representations must refer to a different state of affairs and mean different things. As such, to hold 
certain forms of the correspondence theory of meaning necessitates further holding the, to some, 
unintuitive notion that scientific discoveries into the hidden nature of referents change the meaning 
of those state of affairs’ corresponding mental representations. 
Substitutivity cases 
As well as Twin Earth cases, where one symbol shares two referents, there are related, obverse cases, 
where two symbols share one referent, which also give light to certain implicit assumptions for an 
externalist semantics to operate consistently. The importance of such obverse cases was first 
highlighted by Gottlob Frege (1948, p209) during his analysis of meaning, wherein he affirms: 
a=a and a=b are obviously statements of differing cognitive value; a=a holds a priori and, according to 
Kant, is to be labelled analytic, while statements of the form a=b often contain very valuable extensions 
of our knowledge and cannot always be established a priori[…]If the sign ‘a’ is distinguished from the sign 
‘b’ only as object (here, by means of its shape), not as sign (i.e. not by the manner in which it designates 
something), the cognitive value of a=a becomes essentially equal to that of a=b, provided a=b is true. 
Meaning, that there are certain cases where two names can have differing cognitive meanings whilst, 
without our knowledge, denoting the same state of affairs. For example, Charles Dodgson and Lewis 
Carroll have the same referent (they are the same person), but to inform someone that (a) ‘Charles 
Dodgson is Lewis Carroll’ is not the same as telling them that (b) ‘Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll’, as (a) 
has the possibility of being informative (if you did not know that Lewis Carroll was the pen name of 
Charles Dodgson, for example), while (b) is merely a tedious tautology.41 Nevertheless, If the meaning 
of a proposition were exhausted by its referents (as de re thinkers suppose) then both (a) and (b) 
should play an equivalent role within language and (b) would be as informative as (a). However, if they 
are not, as it in fact appears, then it seems reference cannot be enough for the provision of semantic 
content. Ergo, so it is argued, reference alone is not a sufficient explanation for the provision of 
meaning. This is a line of reasoning exemplified by the Hesperus/Phosphorus problem (wherein 
Hesperus refers to Venus in its mode of appearance in the evening and Phosphorus denotes Venus in 
                                                          
41 Even though both ‘Charles Dodgson’ and ‘Lewis Carroll’ consist of two separate words, that does not limit the fact that they are the one 
name, point to the one referent and function as the one elementary component within a proposition. This is also true in many other, not so 
obvious, instances. For, “The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs. For brevity, let every such 
designation be called a proper name” (Frege 1948, p210). 
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the morning) and are known as substitutivity cases for their stress on cases that break the principle of 
substitution (i.e. the intuitive notion that co-referring expressions can be substituted for one another 
without changing the meaning of the proposition in which the substitution is rendered). These 
substitutivity/Frege cases led Frege (Ibid.) to abandon a purely de re account of language and include 
sense (i.e. Sinn or ‘the usual mode of presentation’) into his philosophy. Such cases are equally as 
problematic for correspondence theorists as they were for Frege, for if they are correct, they 
demonstrate that our intuitive ascriptions of meaning and externalist theoretical accounts of semantic 
content are not aligned. Or, as Fodor (2010, p51) has it, “the moral [of substitutivity/Frege cases] is 
that reference can’t be the same thing as content”. Consequently, correspondence theorists must 
tacitly take the assumption that the informativeness of these sorts of cases are explainable within their 
hypotheses (as is done by Frege’s inclusion of sense), or that the apparent informativeness of such 
Frege cases are both mistaken and explainable.  
The implementation problem 
However, Putnam’s Twin Earth and Fregean substitutivity cases raise one further question other than 
those concerning the relationship between reference and meaning, the mutability of meaning and 
informativeness. It should be remembered, from our literature review, that a key theory underpinning 
RTM was that intelligence is a computational process, i.e., that the mind is a result of the ordered 
manipulation of symbols. These processes are defined by Fodor (1994, p8) as follows: 
Computational processes are ones defined over syntactically structured objects; viewed in extension, 
computations are mappings from symbols to symbols; viewed in intension, they are mappings from 
symbols under syntactic description to symbols under syntactic description. 
However, the Twin and substitutivity cases highlight a conflict such a theory has with a referentialist 
account of meaning like correspondence. For, computation relies upon relations between symbols 
while correspondence relies upon relations between symbols and the world, raising the question ‘How 
can internal relations (computation) produce external relations (reference)?’ This conflict boils down 
to question of how a referentialist semantics, how a mind/world relationship, can be implemented in 
a syntactic theory and, as such, has been labelled as ‘the implementation problem’ (Ibid., p24). 
However, it may be observed that this is an issue addressed by our earlier discussion of the need for a 
reliable mode of reference fixation. Nevertheless, the importance of this implementation problem 
within our discussion at this point is that, as Fodor (Ibid., p24) observes, Twin and substitutivity cases 
may make any such account moot, for “Frege cases and Twin cases show that content could come 
unstuck from computation”. Meaning, that even if there is a mechanism that reliably fixes reference 
and seemingly solves the implementation problem, such a mechanism will not be able to account for 
cases where the posited connection between mental representations and the world break down. That 
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is to say, Twin Earth and Frege cases “lead to predictive/explanatory failures of broad content 
psychological theories” (Ibid., p39). For, as we have seen, such cases show that the internal 
computations posited by RTM (i.e. mental representations) and external referent do not seem to 
always be aligned as expected; Twin Earth and Frege cases seem to show that, contra to any reliable 
mechanism of reference fixation, one mental symbol may be aligned with two different parts of the 
world (Twin cases) or, conversely, that two separate mental symbols can be aligned with one state of 
affairs (substitutivity cases) and the content of such signs are not as predicted. Consequently, those 
who hold a referentialist semantics while simultaneously adhering to a computationalist account of 
mind (such as Fodor, Johnson-Laird et al), must have a response to the implementation problem along 
with the problems Twin Earth and Frege cases pose. 
Slingshot arguments 
Finally, along with the raft of commitments listed above, slingshot arguments should also be included 
in our catalogue of assumptions entailed by correspondence theories of meaning. These being 
“argument[s] (or more precisely, a family of arguments) that [are] designed to provide a formally strict 
proof of the claim that all true sentences designate (denote, refer to) one and the same thing, as well 
as all false sentences do” (Shramko and Wansing 2009, p430) and need to be included here for 
“slingshot arguments, originally are not tailored against the analysis of token-level causes and effects 
as facts, but against philosophical recourse to facts in general.” (Baumgartner 2010, p112). That this 
form of argument should be analysed in these pages can be seen in the paradigmatic version of the 
slingshot argument found in Church (1943), which, like the other instantiations of the slingshot (e.g. 
Davidson 1969), moves step-by-step from one sentence through other propositions that have the 
same truth value, to a completely different proposition than the original, but which shares the same 
truth values. For example (an example taken from Church 1956), given the proposition: 
1) Sir Walter Scott is the author of Waverley. 
We can use the principle of substitutivity (i.e. that logically equivalent terms can be substituted 
without loss of meaning), to generate the synonymous proposition: 
2) Sir Walter Scott is the man who wrote the twenty-nine Waverley novels altogether. 
From which, using redistribution (i.e. that the clauses in certain propositions can be redistribution 
without loss of meaning), we get the synonymous proposition: 
3) The number, such that Sir Walter Scott is the man that wrote that many Waverley novels 
altogether, is twenty-nine. 
However, if we are concerned with truth values, this is logically equivalent to: 
4) The number of counties in Utah is twenty-nine. 
Which can be used to generate the logically, truth value, equivalent: 
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5) Twenty-nine is the number of counties in Utah. 
From which we can produce: 
6) Salt lake is a county in Utah 
7) … 
And so on and so forth. Leading to the conclusion that: 
Hence we have a means of showing any two true sentences to be synonymous. By a similar method any 
two false sentences can be shown to be synonymous. (Church 1943, p300) 
That is, that all true/false propositions refer to the same state of affairs and the reduction ad absurdum 
that within a correspondence theory of meaning all true/false propositions have the same semantic 
content. 
Summary 
As such, this investigation has determined that introducing a correspondence theory of meaning into 
a philosophy is not an insubstantial addition, for such a theory necessitates accepting the following 
assumptions: 
1) A commitment to externalist semantics and a rejection of internalist hypotheses and 
arguments 
2) An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts. 
3) That a reliable and consistent mode of reference fixation is possible. This is an assumption 
that itself entails a number of sub-assumptions: 
a. If a congruence or structural reference is held, it is also necessary to explain away 
the apparent limitations of genre or pictorial form where language/mental 
representations are concerned.  
b. Also, the one-way nature of reference needs to be explained within a congruent 
system, which appears to employ a two-way relation of structural equivalence.  
c. Finally, if the bearer of the (congruent or correlational) correspondence theory is 
also a physicalist, they also require that Brentano’s question/problem can be 
answered and reference can be explained in a scientifically reducible, i.e., 
empirical, manner. 
4) An epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
5) A number of metaphysical entailments: 
a. An eternalist stance on the metaphysical status of time (leading to determinism).  
b. That counterfactuals can refer to something and therefore remain meaningful 
even while singular terms are Russellian. (N.B. This also includes those 
propositions that entail negation, disjunctives, empty names and modality.) 
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c. That certain properties and relations have some form of ontological reality. 
6) That if two terms have different referents, they must have different meanings, no matter 
their surface level similarity and vice versa. 
7) That meaning is malleable. 
8) That the informativeness of Frege cases can be explained. 
9) That the challenges posed to any solution of the implementation problem by Twin and 
Frege cases are avoidable. 
10) That slingshot arguments can be answered.42 
§iv Correspondence theories of meaning and cognitive science 
Now that we have fully investigated correspondence theories of meaning, it should be apparent that 
their adherence necessitates a large number of substantial assumptions. This should clarify our earlier 
assertion that a concern with the adoption of such a theory exists and its acceptance should not be 
given before such a referentialist move’s logical consistency has been essayed. As such, it would seem 
to be prudent for those involved within cognitive science and the RTM who have adopted this 
referentialist semantics to engage in a full critical analysis of their position and fully justify its adoption. 
Nevertheless, and although some critical analysis has been performed on certain instantiations of the 
representational paradigm (see Putnam 1988; McGinn 1989; Edwards 2014), there exists certain areas 
of the literature where this state of affairs is not currently found, with some relying only on those 
arguments we have seen (i.e., the CRA and SGP) to justify this substantial update to their theory of 
mind (see Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Johnson-Laird 1980; 2002; 2013; Waskan 2006; Rapaport 
2011; Schweizer 2012). That is to say, considering the significance and substance of a move toward 
correspondence, there currently exists a paucity of critical analysis concerning the success of its 
addition into the RTM within certain areas of the literature.  
 
However, as the issue currently stands, this accusation is purely a groundless, unsupported assertion. 
Consequently, this thesis will progress by undertaking a small scale study to attempt to validate this 
claim. 
 
                                                          
42 It should also be clarified that a correspondence theory of meaning also presupposes the legitimacy of the concept of ground. However, 
this legitimacy is a contemporaneous discussion and is beyond the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it should be established that 
referentialists, including those discussed in these pages, are committed to the validity of the concept and the “intelligibility, unity, the 
instantiation [and] the epistemic accessibility” (Correia and Schnieder 2012, p30) of their own theories is dependent upon that of ground’s. 
For further insight into this contemporaneous debate, see also Kit (2012) and Audi (2012). 
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Study: The presence of critical analysis of correspondence theories of meaning and the 
RTM found within the literature 
Aim of study 
The purpose of this investigation will be to support our contention that there currently exists a dearth 
of critical analysis concerning the success, or otherwise, of the addition of a correspondence theory 
of meaning into the hypotheses of certain theorists currently operating within the RTM paradigm (N.B. 
‘Critical analysis’ is herein being defined as ‘serious engagement with the arguments of such 
referentialists and/or the implications of such arguments’). That is, this study will attempt to 
corroborate our assertion that certain theorists (e.g., Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Johnson-Laird 
1980; 2002; 2013; Waskan 2006; Rapaport 2011; Schweizer 2012 etc.) do not sufficiently analyse the 
implications the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning entails and, further, that this 
deficiency is not rectified in the secondary literature. 
Method of study 
To discover the accuracy of this claim and to determine the level of critical analysis present in certain 
debates around the RTM, this study will identify all those works which cite the relevant pieces of 
literature and investigate the title and, where available, the abstract and individual references to 
determine the level of analysis within that paper concerning the point of interest. These citations will 
be identified via three different sources: 
1) Web of Knowledge (http://wok.mimas.ac.uk/) 
2) Scopus (http://www.scopus.com) 
and, where necessary (i.e. where the first two, academic, sources fail), 
3) Google scholar (http://scholar.google.co.uk/) 
Multiple sources are being used so as to maximise the number of citations identified whilst 
simultaneously counteracting any bias present in any one source. Once the citations have been 
obtained, they will constitute the source data for a quantitative investigation into the presence of 
critical analysis found within them, with the number of works from the source data that engage in 
critical analysis being counted so as to quantify its presence. There will be considered a deficient 
number of publications analysing the theory if the literature is found to contain an unusually small or 
unusually univocal number of articles (‘unusual’ here being defined in relation to similar debates found 
elsewhere). As such, this study will endeavour to meet its aim and quantitatively establish the 
accuracy, or otherwise, of our earlier claim (i.e. that there currently exist a dearth of critical 




Sample and generalizability 
Of course, the full scope of the relevant literature (e.g. all the works of Johnson-Laird, Rapaport, 
Schweizer, Waskan etc.) cannot be canvassed in a small study of this nature. As such, this preliminary 
study (and, subsequently, this thesis as a whole) will limit its attention to just the hypotheses of Philip 
Johnson-Laird and no other. (This limitation to the works of Johnson-Laird, over any of the other 
referentialist representational theory of mind, has been selected as he is both a vocal (producing 
scores of publications arguing for its adoption) and long-term advocate of this move (arguing for its 
adoption as early as 1980).43) Again, not all of Johnson-Laird’s works can be essayed, for many of his 
publications focus on matters beyond just his Peircean correspondence theory. Therefore, 
investigating the citation data for all his works would generate much surplus data that will bloat our 
study, consume much of the available resources and potentially obscure informative results. 
Consequently, so as to minimise surplus data while maximising the number of relevant citations found, 
only articles and monographs by Johnson-Laird that are specifically focused on his correspondence 
theory of meaning, or are central to its theoretical development, will be included within our sample. 
After reviewing Johnson-Lairds body of work, it was assessed that the publications that meet this 
criteria and that, therefore, will be included in this investigation, are: 
1) Johnson-Laird, P., 1980, “Mental models in cognitive science” in Cognitive science 4, pp71-115 
2) Johnson-Laird, P., 2002, “Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning” 
in Thinking and Reasoning, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp69-95. 
3) Barres P.E., Johnson-Laird P.N. 2003, “On imagining what is true (and what is false)” in 
Thinking and Reasoning, 9 (1), pp. 1-42. 
4) Khemlani S., Orenes I., Johnson-Laird P.N., 2012, “Negation: A theory of its meaning, 
representation, and use” in Journal of Cognitive Psychology, 24 (5), pp. 541-559. 
 
Therefore, and to summarise, this study will aim to identify the quantity of critical literature 
concerning Johnson-Laird’s Peircean correspondence theory of meaning, by using the citations of the 
most relevant of his works as data to quantitatively determine the number of critical works currently 
published. As such, any findings this investigation produces will be generalisable to the work of Philip 
Johnson-Laird only and not to any other theorist employing similar strategies (e.g., Harnard, Fodor, 
McGinn, Rapaport, Schweizer, Waskan etc.).44  
                                                          
43 Additionally, and as we will see, Johnson-Laird’s particular position is one which has received a noticeable lack of critical engagement with 
its theory of meaning. 
44 For a critical discussion of referentialism within the language of thought, see Putnam (1988) and Edwards (2014). Furthermore, as Edwards 
(Ibid., p363) construes the LoT hypothesis as “the claim that thoughts[…] have a compositional structure”, his arguments would be equally 
applicable to analogical models of a compositional nature (e.g., Fodor 2010, pp173-175). However, this does preclude Johnson-Laird’s mental 




As of Wednesday 4th June 2014, Philip Johnson-Laird’s four articles “Mental models in cognitive 
science”, “Peirce, logic diagrams, and the elementary operations of reasoning”, “On imagining what is 
true (and what is false)” and “Negation: A theory of its meaning, representation, and use” have been 
cited by a combined 265 unique publications (see Appendix, Table 2).45 From these 265 titles, we were 
able to access 171 distinct abstracts (see Appendix, Table 3) and 56 citation quotes (see Appendix, 
Table 4). A study of this available information, indicated that, for one reason or another (i.e. their title, 
abstract or citation suggested that they may engage in some critical analysis of Johnson-Laird’s 
Peircean correspondence theory of meaning), the following 17 publications were found to be of 
potential relevance to our research interests: 
1) Baggio, G.; van Lambalgen, M.; Hagoort, P., 2012, “Language, linguistics and cognition” in R. 
Kempson, N. Asher and T. Fernando (eds.) Handbook of the philosophy of science: Philosophy 
of linguistics, Oxford: Elsevier, pp325-355. 
2) Cadinu, M.R., Kiesner, J., 2000, “Children's development of a theory of mind” in European 
Journal of Psychology of Education, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp93-111. 
3) Du, P.; Liu, D.; Zhang, L.; Hitchma, G.; Lin, C., 2014, “The processing of contradictory and non-
contradictory negative sentences” in Journal of Cognitive Psychology, Vol.26, No.4, pp461-
472. 
4) Elqayam, S., 2005, “Mental models, model-theoretic semantics, and the psychosomatic 
conception of truth” in Philosophia Scientiae, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp259-278. 
5) Ford, M., 1995, “Two modes of mental representation and problem solution in syllogistic 
reasoning” in Cognition, Vol. 54, No. 1, pp1-71. 
6) Goodwin, J.W.; Hein, U., 1982, “Artificial-intelligence and the study of language” in Journal of 
Pragmatics, vol. 6, no. 3-4, pp241-280. 
7) Macbeth, G. et al, “Models for the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions” in Europe’s 
journal of psychology, Vol.10, No.1, pp135-149. 
8) Marmolejo-Ramos, F., 2007, “New advances in the scientific study of text comprehension” in 
Universitas Psychologica, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp331-343. 
9) Orenes, I.; Beltran, D.; Santamaria, C., 2014, “How negation is understood: Evidence from the 
visual world paradigm” in Journal of memory and language, Vol.74, pp36-45. 
10) Oversteegen, E; Schilperoord, J., 2014, “Can pictures say no or not? Negation and denial in the 
visual mode” in Journal of pragmatics, Vol.67, pp89-106. 
                                                          
45 These 265 unique publications excludes those written by Johnson-Laird himself. This exclusion was made, as these publications by 




11) Pietarinen, A.-V., 2010, “Challenges and opportunities for existential graphs” in B.M. Paavola 
P.-V. Pietarinen and H. Rydenfelt (eds.) Ideas in action: Proceedings of the Applying Peirce 
conference, Helsinki: Nordic pragmatism network, pp288-303. 
12) Rapp, D.N.; Kurby, C.A., 2008, “The 'Ins' and 'Outs' of Learning: Internal Representations and 
External Visualizations” in J.K. Gilbert, M. Reiner and M. Nakhleh (eds.) Visualization: theory 
and practice in science education, Springer, pp29-52. 
13) Schmidt, J.R.; Thompson, VA, 2008, ““At least one” problem with “some” formal reasoning 
paradigms” in Memory & Cognition, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp217-229. 
14) Schroyens, W., 2010, “Mistaking the instance for the rule: A critical analysis of the truth-table 
evaluation paradigm” in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp246-
259. 
15) Sowa, J.F., 2011, “Cognitive architectures for conceptual structures” in S. Andrews, S. 
Polovina, R. Hill and B. Akhgar (eds.) Proc. 19th International Conference on Conceptual 
Structures, Heidelberg: Springer, pp. 35-49. 
16) Verdonik, D., 2010, “Between understanding and misunderstanding” in Journal of Pragmatics, 
Vol. 42, No. 5, pp1364-1379. 
17) Vosgerau, G., 2006, “The perceptual nature of mental models” in C. Held, M. Knauff and G. 
Vosgerau (eds.) Mental Models & the Mind: Current developments in Cognitive Psychology, 
neuroscience, and philosophy of mind, Oxford: Elsevier, pp255-276. 
 
However, a closer scrutiny of the content of these 17 titles revealed that only four of these articles are 
pertinent to the question that concerns this study.46 Furthermore, only one of these publications, 
Vosgerau’s “The perceptual nature of mental models”, engaged critically with the arguments that 
concerns this study. This relevance can be seen in the following quotes:  
1) “If a mental model directly corresponds to the modeled situation, the relations in the model 
have to correspond directly to the modeled relations as well. This leads to the even more 
central requirement that the relations between elements of a mental model have to be 
natural as well[… For] example, it is quite clear that the relation `to the right of' is represented 
not by an arbitrary symbol or another “abstract notation” but in the natural way by itself[...] 
On the contrary, Johnson-Laird introduces several abstract notations. Indeed, the notations 
he applies vary across his writings. For example, he introduces a symbol for negation, which 
is clearly a highly sophisticated notation”. (Vosgerau 2006, p258) 
                                                          
46 The other titles were found to be irrelevant for a number of reasons. For example, the apparent relevance of certain publications was 
found to be misleading (e.g. Baggio et al 2012; Cadinu and Kiesner 2000; Elqayam 2005; Goodwin and Hein 1982; Marmolejo-Ramos 2000; 
Pietarinen 2010; Rapp and Kurby 2008; Schmidt and Thompson 2008; Schroyens 2010; Soea 2011; Verdonik 2010), while the critical analysis 




2) “Negation is a sophisticated logical notion, and hence every theory of reasoning that 
introduces the notion of negation “should offer some account of how such an apparatus is 
acquired” (Johnson-Laird 1983, 66). Johnson-Laird does not offer such an account and 
therefore does not meet his criteria for theories of reasoning”. (Ibid. p270) 
 
3) “Taken together, introducing symbols for negation into mental models contradicts both the 
constraint of structure preservation and the constraint of naturalness”. (Ibid. p272)47 
The final three pertinent articles (Du et al's “The processing of contradictory and non-contradictory 
negative sentences”; Macbeth et al's “Models for the negation of conjunctions and disjunctions”; and 
Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria's “How negation is understood: Evidence from the visual world 
paradigm”) are very recent studies that engage with the implications of Johnson-Laird’s arguments. 
All three papers present empirical evidence consistent with Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses. This can be 
seen in the following quotes: 
1) “Regarding representation, our results support the ideas that (1) the negative operator plays 
a role in the mental representation, and consequently a symbolic representation of negation 
is possible, and (2) it is not necessary to use a two-step process to represent and understand 
negation”. (Orenes, Beltran and Santamaria 2014, p36)  
 
2) “Experimental comparisons and a complimentary descriptive study yielded evidence 
consistent with the theory-driven predictions derived from the Mental Models Theory”. 
(Macbeth et al 2014, p135) 
 
3) “types of negation, rather than time delays, had a significant influence on the processing of 




From this analysis, it has been found that only four articles, or 1.5% of the literature canvassed, 
engaged in the critical analysis of the success, or otherwise, of the addition of a Peircean 
correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s theory of mind in any way. Furthermore, it 
must be highlighted that 1) three of these studies are empirical investigations whose findings are 
consistent with one aspect of Johnson-Laird’s updated theory of mind and 2) all four articles did not 
                                                          
47 Vosgerau’s paper, in turn and as of 04/06/2014, only has nine citations, which are either authored by Vosgerau or not published in English. 
48 These papers, in turn and as of 04/06/2014, have not yet been referenced. 
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engage with the whole of Johnson-Laird’s theory and its implications, focusing instead merely on one 
of the suite of hypotheses that make up his philosophy of mind in isolation (i.e., his introduction of 
mental symbols for such things as negation). This is a finding that must surely meet our earlier 
definition as an unusually small and an unusually univocal number of publications. As such, this study 
has attained its aim and confirmed our assertion that there currently exists a paucity of publications 
that critically analyse the addition of a correspondence theory of meaning into the hypotheses of 
Johnson-Laird. Although this small-scale study should in no way be considered an exhaustive analysis, 
its findings should, due to its method and focus on core articles, be indicative of the general make-up 
of the wider literature surrounding Johnson-Laird’s adoption of a Peircean correspondence theory of 
meaning. (Additionally, this is a finding that has been supported by other, non-structured, 
investigations into the literature performed by this thesis’ author.) 
 
As such, and in conclusion, it can be seen that there is, according to the preceding study, a lack of 
focused critical investigation into the success, or otherwise, of Johnson-Laird’s inclusion of a Peircean 
correspondence theory of meaning into his philosophy of mind – a conclusion that confirms the 
assertion that initiated this study. Furthermore, it must be concluded that any further study that does 
so, would constitute a contribution to the existent published knowledge in that field.  
§v Thesis aim 
In light of the above investigation and discussion, this thesis will attempt to contribute to the published 
knowledge and task itself with filling this gap in the literature. Consequently, this research will 
undertake an investigation the aim of which will be as follows: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 
semantics into such a representational theory of mind. 
 
Now that this aim has been established, it is necessary to determine how it will be met, i.e. to define 
an appropriate methodology and method capable of attaining such a goal. Consequently, the 












During the process of the preceding literature review, it was established that, according to the 
psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird (and other referentialists, such as Fodor 2010, Rapaport 2011 and 
Schweizer 2012), for cognitive science and the RTM to successfully account for meaning and remain a 
valid hypothesis, it must introduce a correspondence theory of meaning into its philosophy. 
Specifically, Johnson-Laird argues that for the RTM to successfully and completely explain cognition, 
then the mental representations that are central to the theory must be composed from atomic 
elements that correspond with physical objects in the real world and, further, that these atomic 
elements must then be combined in the exact same relationship as the state of affairs that is being 
represented. However, the preceding literature review also identified that there exists a dearth of 
detailed study into the success or failure of the introduction of such a Peircean referentialist semantics 
and its attended assumptions into Johnson-Laird’s RTM. An observation that generated the following 
research aim: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 
semantics into such a representational theory of mind. 
 
Consequently, due to the novelty of a thorough study in to the addition of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s RTM, this investigation will be experimental in nature: It will 
focus its attention on testing for the success/failure of the semantic updates made by Philip Johnson-
Laird. Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is to clearly put forward how this will be validly and 
reliably achieved. This goal will be realised by identifying, reviewing and justifying a successful 
research methodology (post-positivism) and strategy (critical philosophical analysis), which will 
generate and answer the relevant research questions needed to appropriately achieve our research 
aim. Accordingly, the proceeding analysis will keep to the following structure:  
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i) A review of the research methodology the proposed study will adhere to and a 
clarification of the philosophical (i.e. ontological and epistemological) assumptions 
that will underlay the framing of the research and the lens through which any results 
will be perceived.  
ii) The identification of the specific research method and design that will be applied in 
this instance.  
iii) A clarification of the specific research design this method will implement to achieve 
the aim of our study.  
iv) An analysis of the validity of this research design. 
v) A defence of the appropriateness of this research design.  
vi) A clarification of the entire group from which the study’s sample will be drawn and 
the entire group to which its findings will be generalisable (i.e. the work this study will 
draw upon and the theses to which it will be applicable). 
§1 Research methodology 
Before we proceed, it is first necessary to clarify that every investigation and field of research is 
constrained by a number of philosophic assumptions; assumptions that provide the framework for 
any conducted study and determines the lens through which any data is interpreted. These 
philosophic suppositions are comprised of commitments that are of both an ontological and an 
epistemological nature, and operate in unison to constitute a research paradigm or methodology. For, 
as Kuhn (1970, pp4-5) observes, no group: 
could practice its trade without some set of received beliefs[...] Effective research scarcely begins before 
a[…] community thinks it has acquired firm answers to questions like the following: What are the 
fundamental entities of which the universe is composed? How do these interact with each other and with 
sense? What questions may legitimately be asked about such entities and what techniques employed in 
seeking solutions? 
That is to say, researchers must unavoidably view a research problem through a certain prism; they 
necessarily have axiomatic – sometimes unquestioned – philosophical judgements on the nature of 
the world (i.e. ontological suppositions) and on how knowledge of that world is obtained (i.e. 
epistemological suppositions). To clarify and codify these axiomatic suppositions: Ontological research 
assumptions are ones which concern “what one works with” (Sharrock and Read 2002, p166), while 




Nevertheless, an important point that merits special attention at this juncture is that, as Kuhn (1970) 
and Maxwell (2013, p36) highlight, ontological and epistemological traditions and paradigms not only 
inform an individual’s research practice, but are also “shared by researchers working in a specific field 
or tradition”. Therefore, anyone working within a standardised (or “coherent” (Kuhn 1970, p10)) field 
of research – such as cognitive science – needs to hold similar paradigmatic or methodological views 
if they are to produce cumulative findings (that is, “findings which build upon each other within 
frameworks which are more or less settled” (Hughes and Sharrock 1997, p5)). For, if results are 
produced using methodologies based on divergent ontological and epistemic foundations, then they 
will be fundamentally unable to engage with one another; they can only ever perceive their findings 
through divergent lenses and, as such, operate at cross purposes (Sharrock and Read 2002, p167). 
 
However, although a research tradition’s methodological assumptions can be both philosophically and 
logically dubious, the point of this research is not to dispute Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses at this level; 
the aim of this study is to produce results that tackle his theories at face value, not at this lower, 
paradigmatic, methodological or philosophical position. That is to say, as the objective of this study is 
to produce data and findings that are acceptable to those working within the RTM (i.e. according to 
their own lights), the study this research will undertake to validate or falsify a referentialist semantics 
will operate from within Johnson-Laird’s and cognitive science’s own paradigm. Consequently, the 
epistemological and ontological philosophical assumptions of Johnson-Laird and the referentialists 
(i.e. their paradigm and research methodology) will be, for the purposes of this research, accepted 
and adhered to throughout. As such, before this chapter can proceed, it is necessary to identify the 
paradigm/methodology to which Philip Johnson-Laird specifically, and cognitive science generally, 
adheres, as well as a clear statement of the ontological and epistemological assumptions this 
commitment entails. Finally, how these assumptions will prejudice or constrain the assessment of 
method design appropriateness and validity, as well as the interpretation of any data, must also be 
made explicit. 
Methodology, cognitive science and Philip Johnson-Laird 
Although it would be largely uncontroversial to identify the field of cognitive science and the work of 
Johnson-Laird as located within the post-positivist paradigm, evidence for such an attribution, if 
needed, can readily be found in the literature. For example, post-positivism (as defined by this study) 
is a methodology in which researchers hold a number of assumptions: 




ii) A critical epistemology that recommends that theories can only be accepted if: a) It fits into 
the nexus of a larger network of beliefs without causing large scale disruption (i.e. on 
Quinean grounds); or if b) it has passed the test of a varied methodological approach, to 
triangulate between falsifiable results, without resulting in falsification (i.e. on Popperian 
grounds).1 
These foundational commitments for an adherence to a (realist) post-positivist methodology can 
easily be identified as operating behind the work of Johnson-Laird and many other cognitive scientists. 
For example, it is common for cognitive scientists to express a realist position on the world and the 
objects under their study, with those such as Harré (2002, p2) stating: 
The program for cognitive science presented here will be realist[…] pass[ing] beyond what can be 
perceived by the senses, into the deeper realms of material reality.  
Additionally, all of the referentialists’ myriad correspondence theories of meaning are predicated on 
there being an independent reality ‘out there’, to which mental representations can refer – a realist 
ontological position that is made explicit when Johnson-Laird (1993, p387) states that he “assumes 
that there is a physical world in space and time”. Additionally, those working within cognitive science 
commonly assume the validity of their findings is measured by Quinean and Popperian standards. For 
example, Waskan (2006, p57) states of an hypothesis: 
Our endorsement of the theory[…] is thus not warranted on Popperian grounds (i.e., by the fact that the 
theory has passed a series of severe tests), but is warranted for reasons that are for more Quinean (i.e., 
the theory lies at the nexus of a larger network of beliefs, and abandoning it up would cause a large-scale 
disruption to the coherence and simplicity of this network). 
 
Moreover, cognitive science has inherited its views on the world and knowledge acquisition from 
modern scientific practices and, further, sees itself as operating within the purview of these practices; 
tacitly assuming that any findings produced will be cumulative, or coheres, with that of these 
‘traditional’ sciences (see Pylyshyn 1984; Harré 2002; Friedenberg and Silverman 2006; Waskan 2006; 
Bermúdez 2010). Consequently, cognitive science must be committed to the same methodology and 
post-positivist paradigm (i.e. a realist ontology and a Quinean/Popperian epistemology) adopted by 
the traditional sciences since their abandonment of positivism.2  
 
Taking these findings into account, then, for this research to be applicable to the field it intends (i.e., 
cognitive science generally and the work of the Johnson-Laird specifically) it must employ a method 
                                                          
1 However, the focus on Quine and Popper here gives only a highly restricted view of the post-positivist paradigm. Others, such as Kuhn 
(1970), Lakatos (1984) and Feyerabend (2011) would reject this definition. However, throughout this research, 'post-positivism' will be taken 
to be a realist position as defined by Quine (1960) and Popper (1968). 
2 Again, this claim glosses over much of the debate surrounding ‘the method’ of science and is a simplification of the true state of affairs.  
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that is conducive with the post-positivist paradigm and acceptable to its methodology, i.e. it must be 
conducive to a realist ontology and a Popperian/Quinean epistemology. What needs to be made 
explicit, however, is what a commitment to these positions entails and the affect that they have on 
the assessment of design appropriateness. 
Methodological entailments 
Although a clear statement of a realist ontological commitment should be rather intuitive (i.e. a belief 
in a real world ‘out there’ that is both independent from an observer and are the causes of the relevant 
sensations within an observer’s consciousness), a well-defined account of the post-positivist 
Popperian/Quinean epistemology and its influence is required before we advance. Consequently, and 
to clarify: The epistemology of post-positivism arose from criticisms, most notably by Quine (1953; 
1960; 1987; 1999; 2008) and Popper (1957; 1968; 1974; 1994), levelled against the positivist paradigm 
prevalent in the natural sciences in the first half of the last century; criticisms that rejected the classical 
positivist epistemological position of knowledge as justified true belief, while replacing them with 
others (see Popper and Miller 1983; Quine 1987).3, 4 What needs to be clarified, however, is that post-
positivists’ critique of positivism’s epistemology comes from two separate directions and leads to a 
sophisticated, critical conception of knowledge. As such, post-positivism relies on a complex 
epistemology that draws on both Quinean and Popperian theories.5 
Quinean epistemology 
During Quine's critique of the positivist epistemology, he argues that such a view of knowledge as 
justified true belief falls victim to a vagueness of boundary (akin to the Sorites paradox) due to its 
reliance on certainty. For, although this view of understanding necessitates absolute certainty over 
one’s knowledge, the concept of certainty (like the concept ‘heap’) comes in degrees: We can be more 
certain of some facts than we are of others, and to limit what is considered knowledge as to be those 
ideas that are absolute would “do violence to both the usage and utility of the word [knowledge]” 
(Quine 1987, p110). Furthermore, Quine strengthens his case here with an argument he terms the 
‘doctrine of empirical under-determination’. This is the argument that:  
Scientists invent hypotheses that talk of things beyond the reach of observation. The hypotheses are 
related to observation only by a kind of one-way implication; namely, the events we observe are what a 
                                                          
3 The view of knowledge as justified true belief is also – pejoratively – referred to by Popper and Miller (1983, pp105-107) as the ‘common 
sense’ or ‘bucket’ theory of knowledge. 
4 See also Gettier (1963) and the extended literature concerning ‘Gettier cases’ for similar arguments against the concept of knowledge as 
justified true belief. 
5 The divergence between these two post-positivist epistemologies arose from their author’s rejection, or acceptance, of reductionism, i.e. 
“the supposition that each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all” (Quine 1953, p41) 
– that is, Quine’s second dogma of empiricism. Popper’s epistemology accepts reduction and, as such, relies on the falsification of the 
statements of science individually (see Popper 1968, p57ff.). Alternatively, Quine (1953, p41) rejects reductionism and offers the “counter 




belief in the hypothesis would have led us to expect. These observable consequences of the hypotheses 
do not, conversely, imply the hypotheses. Surely there are alternative hypothetical substructures that 
would surface in the same observable ways (Quine 2008, p228).  
That is to say, as long as the argument exists that the suite of hypotheses that make up the body of 
science could, theoretically, be replaced by a logically distinct, coherent suite of competing 
hypotheses, which still match the available data, then the sciences’ claim to indisputable, justified 
knowledge is undermined. Interestingly, this analysis of Quine’s leads him to a position reminiscent of 
that of the French physicist, historian and philosopher of science Pierre Duhem (1861-1916), who put 
forward the thesis, expressed by Ariew (1984, p313) “that there are in principle an indefinite number 
of theories that fit the observed facts more or less adequately”. 
 
Following this analysis, Quine (1987, p110) concludes that for “scientific or philosophical purposes the 
best we can do is give up the notion of knowledge as a bad job” and, as such, replaces the traditional 
positivist epistemology with one he terms holism. This is the view that, as we cannot be certain of any 
individual hypothesis, what we are concerned with is the suite or nexus of hypotheses we hold and 
the accordance between them. What now determines the acceptance of an hypothesis as knowledge, 
therefore, is its acceptance into this nexus of existing beliefs without disturbance. Quine (Ibid., p228) 
articulates this epistemology as follows: 
It is holism that has rightly been called the Duhem thesis and also, rather generously, the Duhem-Quine 
thesis. It says that scientific statements are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because 
it is only jointly as a theory that they imply their observable consequences. 
This new view of knowledge can be further clarified by an analogy that comes from Otto Neurath: 
Neurath has likened science to a boat which, if we are to rebuild it, we must rebuild plank by plank while 
staying afloat in it[…] If we improve our understanding of ordinary talk of physical things, it will not be by 
reducing that talk of physical things, it will be by clarifying connections, causal or otherwise, between 
ordinary talk of physical things and various further matters which in turn we grasp with help of ordinary 
talk of physical things. (Quine 1960, p3) 
 
Before this exposition of Quine’s holism concludes, however, we first need to acknowledge how 
nuanced the theory actually is. For, there exists a development of Quine’s position over the course of 
his writings: In his earliest articulations of holism (e.g. in “Two dogmas of empiricism”) Quine 
expresses an extreme, or strong, variation of holism, stating that no hypothesis can be accepted in 
isolation from every other (i.e. certainty only comes when an hypothesis fits with all of a culture’s 
existing knowledge). In later writings Quine was to moderate this extreme view (e.g. in Theories and 
things), positing a weaker version of holism, wherein certainty of an hypothesis rests in its acceptance 
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with many other hypotheses or with modules, or ‘chunks’, of knowledge (i.e. “It is an uninteresting 
legalism[…] to think of our scientific system of the world as involved en bloc in every prediction. More 
modest chunks suffice, and so may be ascribed their independent empirical meaning, nearly enough, 
since some vagueness in meaning must be allowed for in any event” (Quine 1999, p71)). 
Popperian epistemology 
In contrast to Quine, Popper’s rejection of the positivist’s conception of knowledge rests on his 
argument that, although knowledge is true (i.e., it corresponds to the independent facts as they are), 
it can be neither justified (as this leads to an infinite regress of justification – what justifies an 
individual’s justification? (Popper 1974, pp21-24)) nor based on belief (as knowledge can be stored in 
such things as books, which are incapable of belief (Ibid., p24)). After abandoning this view of 
knowledge, Popper (1968, p18) draws on Hume’s problem of induction to determine a new ‘criterion 
of demarcation’ for the empirical sciences (i.e., criteria for delimiting science from pseudo-science), 
concluding that knowledge of the world is not only difficult to attain but must always remain 
uncertain, i.e. that we can only ever be certain that knowledge is wrong, not that it is right. Popper 
argues, therefore, that research is not in the business of confirming hypotheses, but of refuting, or 
falsifying, them (Popper 1957; 1968; 1974; 1994; Popper and Miller 1983).6 This new criterion of 
demarcation is a standard Popper (1968, p18) terms ‘falsifiability’ and defines thus: 
I shall not require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a 
positive sense; but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of 
empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted by 
experience. Consequently, only methods capable of being repeated and of generating reproducible data 
will be deemed valid. 
Accordingly, armed with this standard of falsifiability, Popper (Ibid., p20) posits that only the ‘fittest’ 
of theories, i.e. those which have survived “the fiercest struggle for survival”, should be accepted as 
knowledge (or, more accurately, as no theory can be confirmed, still remains as a “provisional 
conjecture” (Ibid., p264)) and, therefore, recommends the application of as multifaceted and a 
variegated a test as possible to any thesis (see Popper and Miller 1983, p15). That is to say, to remain 
as valid, as a ‘provisional conjecture’, under a Popperian epistemology, a theory must be rigorously 
tested by not just the classic quantitative methods but also, where appropriate (i.e., where results are 
repeatable and falsifiable (Ibid., p150)), by other approaches such as qualitative ones. 
                                                          
6 To clarify, this is a naïve methodological falsificationist reading of Popper, rather than the sophisticated methodological falsificationism 
some, such as Lakatos (1984, p31), sometimes ascribe to him. The reading found here is ‘naïve’ in that it holds theories can in fact be falsified, 
that is: 
For the naïve falsificationist any theory which can be interpreted as experimentally falsifiable, is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’. For the 
sophisticated falsificationist a theory is ‘acceptable’ or ‘scientific’ only if it has corroborated excess empirical content over its predecessor 
(or rival), that is, only if it leads to the discovery of novel facts. (Ibid., pp31-32) 
As such, this thesis’ use of ‘falsification’, ‘falsify’ and ‘Popperian epistemology’ will refer to naïve methodological falsificationism and will 




Now that the above exposition has led us to an appreciation of what an adherence to the post-
positivist paradigm of Johnson-Laird and cognitive science entails (i.e. the adoption of a realist view of 
the entities under our scrutiny and an adherence to Popper’s criterion of demarcation and Quine’s 
holism), what needs to be established is how these positions constrain our method design and 
determine method appropriateness.  
 
Therefore, it first needs to be made explicit that, due to the constraints of a realist ontology, any 
entities scrutinised by this research must be deemed to be objectively real, i.e. must not be considered 
wholly dependent on any one observer or group of observers. Secondly, when reviewing the validity 
of a potential research method design under the lights of a Popperian epistemology, it is fundamental 
to ensure, if it is to be considered valid, that the method meets that epistemology’s methodological 
rules and criterion of demarcation, i.e. is repeatable and produces results that are themselves 
falsifiable or testable. Finally, from the perspective of a Quinean epistemology, for a prospective 
method to be valid within cognitive science and the work of Johnson-Laird it must operate within the 
same conceptual scheme, the same suite or nexus of hypotheses; i.e. it must be ‘naturalised’. 
However, for a method to be naturalised in this manner, it must adhere to two theses: 1) The no first 
philosophy thesis and 2) the continuum thesis (see Colyvan 2001; Roland 2014). That is to say, for a 
method to be applicable in this instance it must not hold a “body of truths which are prior to and 
firmer than those which science has to offer” (Siegel 1984, p671) and must be continuous with 
cognitive science, not separate to and from it, i.e. its relationship with the existing work must be such 
that it “share[s] various methods and principles, and that the problems that they each pursue differ 
only in degree of generality” (Daly 2010, p187). 
 
To summarise this discussion, then, to produce findings that are cumulative to and with those of 
Johnson-Laird and cognitive science, the method this study implements must concern itself with non-
relative, objective entities, be both repeatable and naturalised and produce findings susceptible to 
falsification. 
§2 Research method 
Taking the above methodological discussion into account, the standard repeatable, naturalised 
research approaches to apply in such instances are either quantitative or ‘traditional’ qualitative 
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methods.7 These methods will be, following Straus and Corbin (2008, p11), defined and delineated by 
this research as follows: 
Quantitative methods: Any type of research that produces findings arrived at by statistical 
procedures or other means of quantification  
Qualitative methods: “[A]ny type of research that produces findings not arrived at by 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification”.  
 
In practice this, generally, means the implementation of such methods as experimentation, 
observation and surveys (quantitative methods) or interviews, ethnography, case studies and 
phenomenology (qualitative methods) (see Davies 2007; Gray 2009; Denscombe 2010). Nevertheless, 
although this may be the case, it needs to be highlighted that method appropriateness and method 
selection are not dependent only upon the paradigm and methodology by which one is constrained, 
it is also determined by the individual characteristics of the specific study and entities of interest (see 
Kumar 1996; Vogt et al 2012; Maxwell 2013) – in this instance that means semantic content and the 
correspondence between mental representations and an ontologically real world. However, once this 
extra facet is taken into account, it is found that these ‘traditional’ methodological approaches will 
not be valid in this instance. For the purposes of transparency, this is a conclusion that merits 
justification. 
Suitability of quantitative methods 
As mentioned, when considering the suitability of quantitative methods for studying the entities that 
concern this research, issues arise. This is because such entities and concepts as meaning and a mental 
representation’s correspondence with the world cannot be directly empirically tested; all that can be 
measured is behaviour which has been inferred from the entities and concepts we are positing. As 
such, we can never be certain if the mental entities we are putting forward are, in fact, the actual 
causes of the actions we are studying, or whether some other fundamental and unknown source or 
variable is the origin of the measured behaviour. The primary difficulty identified here can be stated 
as follows: In our case, there is no way we can be certain that the independent and dependent 
variables we isolate within any experiment are in fact the variables we suppose them to be.  
 
                                                          
7 Although quantitative and qualitative methods are here being said to be distinct, clearly defined categorisations of research types, it needs 
to be highlighted that the two may not necessarily be mutually exclusive (see Patton 2002). In recent years many theorists have eschewed 
the ‘paradigm wars’ and have instead expounded the validity of approaches that combine both method types within the one piece of 
research (see Slater 1988; Straus; Patton 2002; Corbin 2008). This is a research strategy known as mixed methods research and is an 
approach whose inception and application is, essentially, motivated by the concept of triangulation. This is the idea that, as it can never be 
known for certain that any individual method or method type is infallible, it is prudent to exploit a number of differing approaches so as to 
zero in on those results that crop up again and again and are, therefore, likely to be accurate, i.e., to identify those results that are likely to 
be uninfluenced by any one method. 
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This is deserving of clarification: Although it is perfectly valid for psychology to measure mental 
phenomena by their physical manifestations, in our case this cannot be made certain. An example 
experiment should better delineate this issue – if we were to state one formally: 
Method: Independent measures experimental design. 
Dependent Variable: Correlation between a mental model and a corresponding state of affairs. 
Independent Variable: The meaning of the mental model. 
Data: Count of normative responses concerning participants’ meaning of their mental models (i.e., 
number of meanings that do and do not match the state of affairs). 
The above – very rough – description for an experiment would potentially generate highly informative 
data and possibly even meet our research aim were it able to be scrupulously put into practice. 
However, the variables in question, and which it necessitates, are, unfortunately, ones that concern 
entities that are currently too far removed from our current scientific and technical knowledge to be 
numerically measurable in both a confident and unerring fashion. That is, an experiment of the type 
in the above proposal cannot be valid while we simply do not know enough about the operation of 
reference, of the correspondence between mental elements and the world, for it to be unfailingly 
recreated. Therefore, while we are unable to ensure that we have experimentally established a direct 
link between a participant’s particular mental model and a particular state of affairs and, ergo, that 
our experiment is well founded, we will not be able to state that our results pertain to our research 
aim. In other words, if we do not know how the correspondence we are concerned with physically 
operates (a question that exceeds the concerns of this research), we cannot be certain that we can, 
or have, synthesised it. This question (how the link between our minds and the world operates) is one 
for future psychological or scientific research to attempt, and only once it has been answered can we 
conduct any quantitative experiment in the knowledge that it is legitimate. This issue still stands even 
if we follow James (1982, p151) and limit the purview of psychology and our research to only “the 
correlation of mental states with brain-states”; i.e. neuroscience. For, in this instance, the relation 
between mental states and part of the world could feasibly be measured via some form of scan 
(providing an accurate measure for one of our variables is granted), but how meaning could be 
measured via this process is something that still needs to be answered. 
 
Consequently, and in summary, where quantitative methods are concerned, this is our problem: We 
can only investigate what concerns this study via their physical effects, yet if we do not know enough 
about these effects (as is the case in this instance) we cannot be certain that what we are measuring 
is accurate, that our experiment is valid and that the data we gathering bears any relation to the aim 




Suitability of qualitative methods 
In the case of qualitative methods, it is important to note that the combination of cognitive science's, 
and, therefore, this research's, post-positivist epistemology and the type of entities here investigated, 
results in the conclusion that many ‘traditional’ qualitative methods (e.g. ethnography, interviews, 
case studies etc.), would, in this instance, not be able to produce valid results. Any study that relied 
upon qualitative anecdotal evidence from interviews or case studies, would involve the 
implementation of methods that are neither repeatable nor falsifiable, which is, therefore, invalid 
according to a Popperian epistemology (Popper and Miller 1983, p150). Furthermore, naturalising 
qualitative data concerning individuals’ experience of meaning within the nexus of the referentialists’ 
hypotheses may be problematic, if not impossible. For example, Johnson-Laird (1983, p6) has declared 
that “If the long promised Newtonian revolution in the study of cognition is to occur, then qualitative 
explanations will have to be abandoned”. Moreover, Johnson-Laird (Ibid., p2) has also stated that the 
processes of cognition are inaccessible via reflection or introspection and, therefore, cannot be 
unerringly described by interview, case study etc. Consequently, as this thesis sees no way of aligning 
‘traditional’ qualitative data concerning reference and semantic content into the suite of Johnson-
Laird’s and cognitive science’s hypotheses, ‘traditional’ qualitative methods will also have to be 
considered an invalid approach to this research on Quinean, as well as Popperian, grounds. As such, 
any form of ‘traditional’ qualitative method would be neither valid nor appropriate in this instance.8  
Suitability of alternative methods 
Although the above is the case, a potential ‘non-traditional’ qualitative method does present itself as 
being both a valid and fruitful alternative: That of the philosophic method of critical analysis. Although 
this method of philosophy is not considered a ‘traditional’ qualitative method, that should not 
discount it as a possible approach in this instance. For, critical analysis both coheres with our earlier 
definition of qualitative research (i.e. it is a “type of research that produces findings not arrived at by 
statistical procedures or other means of quantification” (Straus and Corbin 2008, p11)) and is 
considered an acceptable method under both Quinean and Popperian epistemologies (this latter point 
is one that will be examined in detail later in this chapter). Furthermore, the application of critical 
philosophic analysis stands as a potentially appropriate method in this instance as it has the capability 
                                                          
8 As alluded to in a previous note, the exclusion of both quantitative and qualitative methods still leaves the possibility that a mixed methods 
approach could feasibly allow us to identify valid and reliable data via triangulation. However, it should be noted that by combining methods 
designed to produce potentially incompatible data (i.e. numbers and words), there is no guarantee that what is produced from mixed 
methods research is in any way harmonious. Indeed, as Patton (2002, pp465-466) avers, when dealing with mixed methods, a researcher 
“should not expect that the findings[…] will automatically come together to produce some nicely integrated whole”. Additionally, the 
constraints of available resources (time, equipment etc.) mean that the application of both a quantitative method – if one were feasible – 
and a qualitative method – if one were valid – would not be possible in this instance, for sufficient resources only exist for the undertaking 
of the one method. Ergo, only the application of the one method, the most potentially fruitful, could be undertaken given the circumstances. 
Consequently, even if a valid yet unproductive quantitative experiment were possible to support invalid though fruitful qualitative findings, 
the application of such a mixed method would not be practicable. 
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to determine both the logical accuracy of a correspondence theory of meaning as well as determining 
the effect of the introduction of such a theory into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory as a whole 
(i.e. determine the hypothesis’ internal and external logical consistency). Consequently, it appears 
that the successful application of such a method could be capable of achieving our aim by establishing 
the logical consistency of Johnson-Laird’s thesis. As such, it would be prudent at this juncture to 
proceed with a detailed enquiry into this putative method of critical philosophical analysis.9 
Analysis and synthesis  
An important point to highlight whilst introducing the philosophical method of critical analysis is the 
fact that it is an approach more accurately labelled as ‘analysis and synthesis’. Furthermore, it needs 
to be noted that there are actually multiple conceptions of analysis that have variously been practiced 
throughout the history of philosophy; beginning with the ancient Greeks and continuing up through 
to the modern period (where, despite its name, ‘Analytic philosophy’ is not the sole reserve for the 
method of analysis today). These analytic approaches range from the ‘regressive’ analysis of the 
ancient Greeks, such as Plato and Socrates (where an individual works backwards from what is being 
sought (i.e. the nature of a concept) so as to better understand it, e.g. we can regress backward from 
‘knowledge’ to identify it as ‘justified true belief’), to the ‘transformative’ analysis seen in the works 
of such modern philosophers as Frege (1952) (where a problem, statement or thesis, such as language, 
is translated into a more transparent format (i.e. predicative logic) so as to make its operation more 
perspicuous). However, though these differing conceptions of analysis exist, it should be clarified that 
they are not competitive, not mutually exclusive, approaches and can be applied in unison so as to 
achieve a united goal. Although this is the case, this section will focus upon the more general approach 
of analysis, an approach that can be seen as ‘decompositional’ and has been favoured by thinkers such 
as Russell (2010, pp147-148). Consequently, this section will be of a more inclusive nature and will 
exclude much of the details concerning the nuanced positions that exist in the subset of analytical 
methods. 
  
With these initial points clarified, we can begin to develop an understanding of our putative method 
of analysis and synthesis by first looking at these terms’ etymologies: The derivation of ‘analysis’ 
comes from the ancient Greek ‘Analusis’, meaning ‘an unravelling’ or ‘a loosening’, while ‘synthesis’ 
comes from the Greek ‘syntithenai’, or ‘put together, combine’. As such, when applied to a problem, 
                                                          
9 We defend this focus on logical consistency as its presence would show that a suite of hypotheses/facts/beliefs etc. can all be true, at the 
same time, in some possible world (although not necessarily ours), i.e., it would identify that a set of hypotheses etc. do not contradict each 
other (regardless of whether they are currently true or not in this world).  This is important as the corollary of this is that if a suite of 
hypotheses etc. are not logically consistent, those hypotheses etc. must contain some falsity in all possible worlds (including this one).  
Therefore, although establishing consistency of a theory is insufficient to determine its accuracy, the identification of any dissonance gives 
an a priori method of showing that a theory contains falsity. 
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the aim of analysis and synthesis is to first unravel the issue, to decompose it into its component parts, 
before recombining these components back into a whole. Although this process may seem self-
defeating, merely disassembling and reassembling a problem, the power of such an approach can be 
seen in the following quote (originally found in the 1662 work by Antoine Arnauld, Port-Royal Logic 
(or, Logique de Port-Royal), but here quoted from Finocchiaro (2005, pp255-256)): 
The art of arranging a series of thoughts properly, either for discovering the truth when we do not know 
it, or for proving to others what we already know, can generally be called method. 
 
Hence there are two kinds of method, one for discovering the truth, which is known as analysis, or the 
method of resolution, and which can also be called the method of discovery. The other is for making the 
truth understood by others once it is found. This is known as synthesis, or the method of composition, 
and can also be called the method of instruction. 
 
As such, analysis is used as a method of discovery; logically unravelling a problem so as to clarify the 
facts that compose it and making them, the problem itself and the whole’s logical operation more 
perspicuous. Whereas synthesis is a method of instruction, a way to concurrently demonstrate the 
logical operation of the problem whilst also functioning as a proof of the complex hypothesis, i.e. as 
an explanation, a demonstration of the ‘why’, of the original statement. Furthermore, this project of 
analysis and synthesis is one that also tests whilst it discovers and demonstrates. For, the method of 
analysis will automatically uncover the logical consistency of an hypothesis’ operation once its 
workings are unravelled and synthesis demonstrates, proves, whether and why that hypothesis’ 
operation is, or is not, logical.  
 
What needs to be clarified at this juncture, however, is that critical philosophic analysis, or the method 
of analysis and synthesis, is, like any other research method, not guaranteed to produce accurate data. 
For, as Russell (1918, p498) observes: 
When you pass from the vague to the precise by the method of analysis and reflection that I am speaking 
of, you always run a certain risk of error. If I start with the statement that there are so and so many people 
in this room, and then set to work to make that statement precise, I shall run a great many risks and it 
will be extremely likely that any precise statement I make will be something not true at all. 
As such, philosophers have developed a rigorous and systematic set of analytic ‘tools’, such as rules 
of inference (e.g. modus ponens, biconditionals, disjunctives etc.), logical fallacies (e.g. ad hominem, 
appeal to authority, straw man etc.) and even thought (or, gedenken-) experiments to enable 
hypotheses and arguments to be analysed and synthesised in an orderly, perspicuous and, most 
importantly, a repeatable manner (see Morton 2004; Baggini and Fosl 2010; Daly 2010; Papineau 
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2012; Haug 2014).10 This systematic use of philosophic tools throughout the process of analysis and 
synthesis is most clearly seen in transformational analysis, where propositions are translated into 
formal logic and then formally analysed and synthesised. However, the same process is followed 
where normal (i.e. non-transformed) discourse is concerned. Ergo, akin to scientists employ Bunsen 
burners, microscopes, petri dishes etc. to execute the method of experiment in an orderly, repeatable 
fashion, so philosophers employ rules of inference, logical fallacies and thought experiments to 
execute the method of analysis and synthesis.  
§3 Research design 
Now that we have established which method will be applied to meet our research aim, it is necessary 
to elucidate the particular research strategy this study intends to follow, i.e. to clarify the specific 
design in which the method of analysis and synthesis will be implemented. As such, to assess the 
validity of the hypothesis that concerns this research (that the introduction of a Peircean 
correspondence theory of meaning into the RTM, saves the latter from the critiques of its 
commentators), Johnson-Laird’s arguments and theories will be analysed so as to discover if they can 
answer in the affirmative to the following research questions: 
1) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of the 
RTM’s commentators (i.e. the CRA, the SGP, holism and the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies)? 
2) Is Peirce’s iconic correspondence theory of meaning internally and externally consistent? 
3) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning, generally, into Johnson-Laird’s 
broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
 
These particular three questions have been identified as they exploit critical philosophical analysis’ 
ability to derive and examine an hypothesis’ logic in such a manner that we will be able to interrogate 
Johnson-Laird’s arguments from all relevant angles and meet our aim. The specific rational for each 
question is as follows: 
- Question 1) addresses the success of Johnson-Laird’s argument that a correspondence theory 
of meaning can avoid the critiques of certain commentators (see Johnson-Laird 1993, p34). It 
is necessary to ensure that Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses are able to answer in the affirmative 
to this question as these arguments were a motivating factor in his rejection of syntactic 
semantics (see Ibid. 1988, p115; 1993, p348). Therefore, if these challenges remain successful 
                                                          
10 Thought experiments are, following Daly (2010), being classified as a philosophical ‘tool’ and not a method here, as gedankenexperiments 
are being taken as a form of conceptual analysis. That is, as a tool to be employed in the service of a method. 
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even after Johnson-Laird’s amendments, then his referentialist semantics will be labelled as 
being redundant.  
 
- Question 2) concerns itself with the accuracy of a Peircean correspondence theory of meaning 
in its own right as well as the eligibility of its introduction into Johnson-Laird’s pre-existing 
suite of hypotheses. That is, it will establish if the theses that comprise Peirce’s semantics 
logically cohere in their own right, as well as whether there is any dissonance between the 
constituent theses of Johnson-Laird’s updated semantics and those of his wider philosophy of 
mind. As such, question 2) determines whether Johnson-Laird’s strategy is an appropriate 
inclusion into any account of cognition generally, and Johnson-Laird’s specifically. 
 
- Question 3) attempts to uncover whether the assumptions implicitly operating within any 
correspondence theory of meaning (i.e., those we uncovered during our literature review and 
that are necessary for any referentialist hypothesis’ successful operation) are logically 
consistent with the existing theoretical positions held by Johnson-Laird. That is, it establishes 
if there is any dissonance between Johnson-Laird’s RTM and correspondence theories 
broadly. 
 
Consequently, and in summary, the method design this study will implement will be to apply critical 
philosophic analysis (i.e. decompositional analysis and synthesis) to Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses, 
thereby uncovering their logical accuracy and success; the rules of inference, logical fallacies and 
thought experiments will be applied to these hypotheses so as to analyse them, breaking them down 
into their constituent logical parts and thereby perspicuously demonstrating their workings. This 
process will be implemented so as to establish the logical operation of Johnson-Laird’s updated 
semantics: Establishing both the rational process of his referentialism in its own right, as well as that 
of the full suite of beliefs that constitute Johnson-Laird’s contemporary philosophy of cognition. Once 
this process has been achieved, and the logical operation of Johnson-Laird’s arguments have been 
made perspicuous, the success of these arguments will be judged on three metrics: 
1) The relation they bear to the CRA, the SGP, holism and the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies.  
 
2) The logical coherence of their specific correspondence theory of meaning in its own right, 
i.e. on the internal consistency of Johnson-Laird’s semantics, and the logical coherence 
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between their iconism and the full suite of Johnson-Laird’s account of cognition, i.e. on 
the external consistency of Johnson-Laird’s semantics. 
 
3) On the logical consistency with Johnson-Laird’s existing philosophy of mind with the 
positions necessary for a correspondence theory of meaning generally.11 
 
Therefore, if analysis and synthesis shows that Johnson-Laird’s semantics is still susceptible to such 
criticisms as those advanced by Searle (1980) and Lewis (1970), or if it is found that the hypotheses 
that make up Johnson-Laird’s account of semantic content is either internally or externally 
inconsistent, then the theory has been falsified. If, however, Johnson-Laird’s proposal is found to stand 
up to the CRA, the SGP, holism and the homunculus and symbolic fallacies, as well as being both 
internally and externally consistent, and is demonstrably so be synthesis of the proposals’ analysed 
parts, the theory will be said, following Popper (1968, p264) to stand as a “provisional conjecture”.  
 
Now that this research design has been proffered, it is a prerequisite of this chapter to demonstrate 
its validity in this instance, i.e., to establish that the application of philosophical analysis to the work 
of Johnson-Laird meets the standards of the post-positivist paradigm. (N.B., as we were originally led 
to the acceptance of post-positivism from Johnson-Laird, there will unavoidably be some repetition 
from §1 of this chapter. However, it is incumbent upon any investigation to clarify that its method 
accords with its methodology, so this reiteration is unavoidable.) 
§4 Design validity 
Before commencing this discussion proper, it is interesting to note that, historically, analysis and 
synthesis has proved itself as both a valid and fruitful research approach when applied to cognitive 
science research. For, critical philosophic analysis has consistently played a central role in cognitive 
science since the field’s inception in the latter half of the 20th century. That is, throughout cognitive 
science’s lifetime, philosophers have validly worked alongside psychologists, linguists, computer 
scientists and others to develop and refine hypotheses central to the field. While doing so, 
philosophers have made significant contributions in a variety of areas: From work on the theory of 
functionalism during the discipline’s nascent stages (see Putnam 1980), through to tackling today’s 
cognitive issues (see Fodor 2010). Furthermore, as Brook (2009), Dennett (2009) and Thagard (2009) 
                                                          
11 The success, or otherwise, of Johnson-Laird’s theory could also be judged via an examination of the internal consistency of his existing 
mental model theory of mind. However, this analysis is beyond the scope of this research, where only Johnson-Laird’s arguments concerning 
the accuracy and necessity of a correspondence theory of meaning is being considered. As such, this research will be taking these 
hypotheses, like it did with those that make up Johnson-Laird’s methodology, as given. 
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observe, this use of philosophy within cognitive science rests on sound methodological foundations. 
For example, as Brook (2009, p221) argues: 
The results of [philosophic] activities are theories and models offered by philosophers similar to theories 
and models offered by others in cognitive science[…] The main difference is that philosophers tend to go 
after bigger and sometimes more abstract objects than researchers with other backgrounds[… E]xcept 
for level of generality and abstraction, there is nothing distinctive to this methodology [of philosophy]. 
Moreover, and as Papineau (2014, p177) observes, the philosophical method has also historically 
played a valid role in the ‘traditional’ sciences in the form of thought experiments: Archimedes’ 
analytical questioning of buoyancy, Galileo’s thought on falling bodies and motion and Einstein’s 
analysis of the behaviour of light are just a few of the examples where scientists have applied analysis 
and synthesis to problems, unpacking the consistency of concepts and thereby producing valid and 
acceptable findings (see also Gendler 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, it is incumbent upon this investigation to demonstrate why such an approach is, 
according to post-positivist lights, both ontologically and epistemologically valid in this instance, 
rather than merely stating historical precedence. That is, and as we have already seen during our 
discussion concerning the post-positivist paradigm, for the philosophic method of analysis and 
synthesis to remain valid in this application, our study must be shown to meet the standards of the 
Popperian and Quinean epistemologies and must be shown to view the entities under its scrutiny as 
being objectively real. 
Ontological validity 
It should be remembered, from our introduction to the RTM, that a foundational tenet of Johnson-
Laird’s approach is Marr’s tri-level hypothesis (see Marr 1982; Pylyshyn 1984; 1999). This is a theory 
that states that the one process of cognition can be described at three distinct levels of abstraction. 
That is, it posits an ontological monism but a conceptual ternary and argues that the processes of the 
mind can be detailed at either: 1) The computational, 2) the representational or 3) the physical level. 
As such, although Johnson-Laird, and therefore this research, is concerned with such entities as 
propositional attitudes and mental representations (i.e. with entities at the first and second level of 
abstraction), it should be remembered that although these entities may appear to lack ontological 
substance on first inspection, they are, in reality, conceptual abstractions from Marr’s third level, and 
are, as such, subsequently founded upon a physical substance – i.e. the brain or the whole person (see 
Waskan 2006, pp36-76). That Johnson-Laird adheres to Marr’s tri-level hypothesis is implicit in his 




[I]f you want to understand how the mind works then you had better first ask what it is doing. This 
distinction has become familiar in cognitive science as one that Marr (1982) drew. (Johnson-Laird and 
Byrne 1991, p17) 
And: 
To solve any such problem [as computation], we must bear in mind a lesson from computation: we need 
at least three different levels of explanation. (Johnson-Laird 1993, p58. See also Ibid., p390). 
Moreover, there are a number of further instances in which a commitment to an ontologically real 
physical world ‘out there’ can be seen in Johnson-Laird’s writings. For such instances we can look to 
his approval of Craik’s ‘relation structure’ and ‘physical models’ (Johnson-Laird, 1980, p73; 1983, p9), 
as well as his use of terms like ‘the world’, ‘concrete objects’ and ‘entities’ as examples of things 
modelled by his mental representations (Ibid., 1980, p89; 1983, pp.410-415; 2002, p80; 2013, p3; 
Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi 1972). 
 
Consequently, this study, following cognitive science generally, will take an ontologically realist view 
upon the entities under its scrutiny (i.e. semantic content), in that it takes them to be ultimately 
derived from the physical structure and operation of the brain. Consequently, and to clarify, this study 
will be adhering to a realist ontology commensurate with that of the post-positivist paradigm.  
 
Nevertheless, now that we have established this study’s ontological suitability, it is incumbent upon 
us to now investigate whether this method is cumulative to and with the post-positivist epistemology 
and, therefore, is falsifiable and repeatable (in accordance with Popper) and naturalised (in 
accordance with Quine).  
Epistemological validity 
As we have seen, to be valid under the lights of a Quinean epistemology, our method must adhere to 
the ‘no first philosophy’ and the continuum theses and operate within the bounds of cognitive science 
and work within that field’s existing nexus of hypotheses, i.e. it must be naturalised and constrained 
by the currently standing theses and empirical findings of the field. That critical philosophical analysis 
is, in this instance, a naturalised process is best seen in relation to the information mined throughout 
our literature review, as well as the discussions found in this chapter, all of which will constitute the 
foundation and framework that determines and delimits what “body of truths” is to be analysed and 
synthesised (Siegel 1984, p671).12 Consequently, this study attempts to position itself within both the 
                                                          
12 To clarify, this thesis is therefore taking a naturalist metaphilosophical stance and is stating that philosophy is continuous with the sciences. 
Further, this thesis is taking a ‘constructive naturalist’ position, where: 
constructive materialists” take the sciences to be trying to discover facts about the world and take philosophy to also be involved in this 
endeavour[…] Faced with the task of placing prima facie non-natural phenomena – such as mentality, mathematics, or mentality – in the 
natural world, these naturalists think that we should start with our best understanding of these phenomena themselves and determine if 
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suite of hypotheses held by cognitive science and that field’s methodology, so as to share various 
methods and principles and to pursue problems that differ only in degree of generality (see Daly 2010, 
p187).13 
 
However, and as we have also seen, for a method to be valid under the methodology of cognitive 
science, it must be commensurate to not only a Quinean epistemology but also a Popperian one. To 
establish method validity under this latter epistemology, it is required to demonstrate that the design 
is repeatable and its results falsifiable. As such, it should be remembered from our previous discussion 
of philosophic analysis and synthesis that the method follows a standard, repeatable progression to 
attain its conclusions. This is a standardised progression most clearly apparent in the practice of 
transformational analysis (e.g. Frege 1952) and is founded on the rigorous and systematic application 
of analytic ‘tools’, such as rules of inference (e.g. modus ponens, bi-conditionals, disjunctives etc.), 
logical fallacies (e.g. ad hominem, appeal to authority, straw man etc.) and thought experiments to 
enable hypotheses and arguments to be analysed and synthesised in an orderly, perspicuous and, 
most importantly, repeatable manner. This orderly process, which makes our proposed research 
design reliable (i.e. determines to what extent other researchers will arrive at similar results if they 
studied the same case using exactly the same procedures) also provides the method with the ability 
to be falsifiable, making it subject to Popper’s criterion of demarcation and, therefore, valid (see 
Popper 1968, p18). For, the derivation of results via any rigorous, systematic and repeatable 
procedure, including critical philosophic analysis, can be reapplied by other researchers and, in that 
way, tested for accuracy and precision. This is a fact acknowledged by Popper himself, when it is 
stated: 
There is only one way to make sure of the validity of a chain of logical reasoning. This is to put it in the 
form in which it is most testable: we break it up into many small steps, each easy to check by anybody 
                                                          
(and if so, how) this understanding finds a coherent place within a scientific conception of the world. On this view, philosophy is in the 
business of making straightforward factual claims, only one of which can be true regarding any given issue or phenomenon. (Haug 2014, 
p10)  
As such, this investigation is innately opposed to any non-naturalist (i.e., any denial that philosophy is continuous with science) or 
deflationary (i.e., holds that philosophical questions should be explained away) metaphilosophical positions and arguments (e.g., Siegel 
1984; McDowell 2009; Williamson 2014a; Williamson 2014b; McGinn 2014). However, akin to our position on the post-positivist paradigm, 
this thesis will not be engaging with these metaphilosophical debates and the accuracy of constructive naturalism will be merely taken as 
given by this investigation. 
13 Nevertheless, there may be some conflict here. For, within the necessary list of principles, which must be held to adhere to Quinean 
naturalism identified by Roland (2014), semantic, as well as theoretical, holism is included (i.e. that “only sufficiently rich collections of 
statements, as opposed to individual statements, have empirical content” (Ibid. pp45)). However, this investigation and its correspondence 
based semantics is opposed to this position on content. As such, if it is taken that Quiniean naturalism necessarily entails theoretical and 
semantic holism, the naturalist metaphilosophical position of the paper is challenged. Additionally, this thesis’ metaphilosophical position 
will be that only theoretical, and not semantic, holism is a necessary position for a Quinean naturalism. For further clarification of this point, 
see §1 of this thesis’ Findings chapter. 
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who has learnt the mathematical or logical technique of transforming sentences.14 (Popper and Miller 
1983, p155) 
Furthermore, that the application of such a method to establish inconsistency is an epistemologically 
valid method when attempting to refute a theory, can be seen in the importance Popper (1968, p72) 
places on a system being consistent, and his recommendation that self-contradictory hypotheses 
should be rejected: 
The requirement of consistency plays a special role among the various requirements which a theoretical 
system, or an axiomatic system, must satisfy. It can be regarded as the first of the requirements to be 
satisfied by every theoretical system, be it empirical or non-empirical[...] it is not enough to mention the 
obvious fact that a self-contradictory system must be rejected because it is ‘false’[...] the requirement of 
consistency will be appreciated if one realizes that a self-contradictory system is uninformative. It is so 
because any conclusion we please can be derived from it. Thus no statement is singled out, either as 
incompatible or as derivable, since all are derivable. A consistent system, on the other hand, divides the 
set of all possible statements into two: those which it contradicts and those with which it is compatible. 
(Among the latter are the conclusions which can be derived from it.) This is why consistency is the most 
general requirement for a system, whether empirical or non-empirical, if it is to be of any use at all. (See 
also Ibid., p264) 
 
Additionally, certain comments made by Johnson-Laird imply a tacit acceptance of the validity of 
critical philosophical analysis. For he states that: 
Reasoned argument alone is seldom responsible for a permanent change in behaviour, even in the 
methodological habits of scientists. Example is more powerful than precept[.] (Johnson-Laird 1983, 
pxiii) 
Demonstrating that reasoned argument, or philosophic analysis, is an acceptable approach to research 
within Johnson-Laird’s methodology – even if it is not sufficient on its own to alter the behaviour of 
scientists. This, along with Johnson-Laird’s application and approving discussion of philosophical works 
that employ the method of analysis and synthesis (e.g. Johnson-Laird 1988; 1993; 2002; 2006), 
demonstrates an implicit acceptance of the validity of our proposed method.  
 
Finally, it should be highlighted that the method of analysis and synthesis is employed by both Quine 
(1969) and Popper (1968) to establish their respective epistemologies (as both deriving their 
conclusions through the application of critical philosophic analysis to the concept of knowledge). 
Therefore, if the field of cognitive science, or Johnson-Laird, were to deny this method as a valid 
                                                          
14 However, it should be noted that, as Lakatos (1984, 164) identifies, the rejection by Popper (1968) of induction also includes the validity 




approach toward generating true hypotheses, their epistemology would be self-refuting. That is to 
say, as both Popper and Quine use philosophic analysis to produce their epistemologies, any field or 
individual which employs them must accept the validity of analysis and synthesis. 
 
Consequently, any results produced by this study are considered to concern ontologically real entities, 
is naturalised within the field of cognitive science, is repeatable and subject to possible falsification by 
other researchers. Consequently, the method of analysis and synthesis is a valid approach when 
attempting to meet our research aim. 
 
Now that philosophic analysis’ validity has been demonstrated, its appropriateness now needs to be 
established. That is, it needs to be clarified why analysis and synthesis is the correct method to employ 
to meet our research aim.  
§5 Design appropriateness 
Firstly, the productivity of analysis and synthesis can be seen in an observation made by Brook (2009, 
p217), who discerns the considerable contributions the method has already made to the field of 
cognitive science, when it is stated: 
Philosophers have been a part of cognitive science since the activity was merely a twinkle in the eyes of 
a small but hardy group of pioneers in the 1960s. Hilary Putnam and Jerry Fodor come immediately to 
mind. In the 1960s, those two did much to articulate the view that came to be known as functionalism[...] 
Functionalism is something like the official philosophy of mind of cognitive science and has been from 
the beginning. 
Moreover, when establishing whether this putative research strategy is the correct method to employ 
in meeting our research aim, it is informative to again look to that method’s capability of establishing 
the logical success, or failure, of hypotheses by exposing and determining their logical validity. That is, 
as critical philosophical analysis will be able to uncover the claims and corollary assumptions that make 
up Johnson-Laird’s referentialist semantics, as well as the interrelations between the two, the 
proposed method is capable of making the internal and external logical consistency of the hypothesis 
more perspicuous and, therefore, determining success. For, as we have seen above, critical 
philosophic analysis is able to ascertain the internal and external consistency of a theory, and as, under 
a Popperian epistemology, “[w]e regard incompatibility as falsification of the theory” (Popper 1968, 
p264), this is an appropriate method to follow when attempting to disprove an hypothesis.15 As such, 
                                                          
15 However, there is a caveat here, for “compatibility alone must not make us attribute to the theory a positive degree of corroboration: the 
mere fact that a theory has not yet been falsified can obviously not be regarded as sufficient” (Popper 1968, p264). Ergo, implementation 
of this method will not be able to confirm Johnson-Laird’s hypothesis, only refute it. However, this is an inevitable conclusion of a Popperian 
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in regards to the appropriateness of this method design in this instance, it is interesting to note the 
historical successes of the method of philosophy within cognitive science and observe its similar 
potential in this instance. 
  
Furthermore, it is important to note that Johnson-Laird’s adoption of a correspondence theory of 
meaning was motivated by the need to save the RTM from the philosophical arguments of Searle 
(1980) and Lewis (1972); thereby saving the theory, and much of cognitive science, by providing it with 
a successful account of semantics that sidesteps the arguments of these philosophers (see Johnson-
Laird 1988, p115; 1993, p34). As this study has tasked itself with testing the success of Johnson-Laird’s 
move in this regard, it seems only appropriate that the same method employed by Searle and Lewis – 
i.e. the philosophical method of analysis and synthesis – be once more employed. This is a line of 
reasoning that Thagard (2009, p238) follows when demarcating the role of philosophy in cognitive 
science, when he contends that: 
Philosophy can be useful to cognitive science in providing defences against philosophical arguments 
challenging the core assumptions of cognitive science concerning representation and computation. In 
this way, philosophy can provide self-defence methods for cognitive scientists against philosophers 
critical of the whole field. 
 
Finally, as we have already seen, the ‘traditional’ post-positivist methods (i.e. quantitative and 
qualitative approaches) can neither validly nor successfully answer the question with which this 
research concerns itself. As such, this state of affairs would suggest, via inference to the best 
explanation, that the critical philosophic analysis would be the most appropriate approach when 
investigating the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into mental model theory.  
 
Consequently, it appears that for a number of reasons, the method of analysis and synthesis, if 
implemented correctly, is appropriate, i.e. is capable of generating data germane to the research aim 
of this research.  
§6 Generalisability 
Before this chapter reaches its conclusion, it is first necessary to define clearly the scope of its findings. 
As such, it is incumbent to highlight that although a number of referentialist semantics have been 
advanced within the RTM (e.g. Johnson-Laird 2002; Fodor 2010; Schweizer 2012 etc.), the nuance that 
                                                          




exists between these positions means this study will not be able to generalise any of its findings to 
them all. As this research concerns itself only with the hypotheses and arguments of Johnson-Laird, it 
will be only to that work that any findings can be applied. Consequently, if this study finds the 
arguments of Johnson-Laird to be either consistent, or inconsistent, it will not be possible to generalise 
this result to any other hypothesis that posits a correspondence theory of meaning within the RTM.16 
Conclusion 
To thoroughly answer how this study intends to meet its research aim in the best possible manner, 
this chapter has posed and answered the following questions: 
 
Q1. What will be done to answer the research aim?  
A1. Critical philosophical analysis, i.e. decompositional analysis and synthesis, will be applied to the 
logic of the arguments and theories of Philip Johnson-Laird to establish the logical consistency of the 
inclusion of a Peircean structural correspondence theory of meaning, and its corollary assumptions, 
into the RTM. 
 
Q2. How will this method be implemented?  
A2. To identify the logical consistency of Johnson-Laird’s arguments via critical philosophical analysis, 
his referentialist hypothesis will be analysed in regard to the following research questions:  
i) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic 
objections of the RTM’s commentators (i.e. the CRA, the SGP, holism and the 
homunculus and symbolic fallacies)? 
ii) Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent? 
iii) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s 
broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
 
If Johnson-Laird’s theories cannot answer in the affirmative to all three of the above questions, then 
they are not to be considered logically consistent and, following Popper and Quine, thereby falsified. 
 
Q3. What justifies the implementation of this research design? 
                                                          
16 This focus on the work of Johnson-Laird alone raises another issue with the validity of a quantitative research design from our discussion 
earlier in the chapter: A quantitative experiment would tell us only that semantic content operates via reference and, therefore, that some 
form of correspondence theory of meaning is accurate, it tells us nothing about Johnson-Laird’s particular Peircean correspondence theory 
nor his theory of mental representation as a whole. Therefore, if we want to investigate the success of Johnson-Laird’s arguments 
specifically, as we intend, quantitative methods will not give us the information we require. 
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A3. As this study will be attempting to establish the success, or otherwise, of Johnson-Laird’s 
arguments under their own lights (i.e. is determined to produce results that tackle Johnson-Laird’s 
updated semantics at face value, not at the lower, paradigmatic, philosophical level), it will be 
accepting their methodological framework (i.e. their epistemological and ontological assumptions) as 
given. Consequently, method design 1) validity and 2) appropriateness will, in this instance, be judged 
according to the standards of the post-positivist paradigm. Therefore: 
1) As analysis and synthesis is deemed to be valid under the post-positivist paradigm, it, and this 
research, is therefore capable of producing results cumulative with cognitive science and 
Johnson-Laird’s work. That the philosophical method is conducive to the post-positivist 
paradigm in this manner is seen as: 
a. It is a method with an historical precedence as a valid method in cognitive science 
research (see Putnam 1980; Brook 2009; Dennett 2009; Thagard 2009; Papineau 2014). 
b. It will be concerning itself with entities (mental representations and propositional 
attitudes) deemed to be, ultimately, objectively real (see Johnson-Laird 1993, p58; 
Waskan 2006, pp36-76). 
c. It is naturalised within the existing suite of hypotheses held by Johnson-Laird and 
adheres to both the continuum and ‘no first philosophy’ theses and is, therefore, 
continuous with cognitive science, i.e. it produces findings that adhere to a Quinean 
epistemology (see Quine 1960, p3; Colyvan 2001). 
d. It is a method that produces results that are both falsifiable and repeatable, i.e. analysis 
and synthesis adheres to a Popperian epistemology (see Popper 1968, p264; Popper 
and Miller 1983, p155; Finocchiaro 2005, pp255-256). 
e. Comments made by Johnson-Laird (1983, pxiii) seem to implicitly accept analysis and 
synthesis as a valid method. 
f. If post-positivism did not allow for analysis and synthesis, then its foundational theories 
would have to be abandoned. For, the arguments that established post-positivism (see 
Quine 1953; 1960; 1987; 1999; 2008; Popper 1957; 1968; 1974; 1994) employ critical 
philosophic analysis. Therefore, if the methodology were to reject analysis and 
synthesis as a valid research approach, the position would be self-refuting. 
2) It was also found that analysis and synthesis would be the best method to apply in this 
instance. This was found to be the case as: 
a. Analysis and synthesis has previously produced results that have made a number of 
contributions to the field of cognitive science and, therefore, has the capability of doing 
so again (see Putnam 1980; Brook 2009; Fodor 2010). 
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b. The method of analysis and synthesis is capable of interrogating an hypothesis to 
uncover its composite theses and establish those theses’ compatibility (Finocchiaro 
2005, pp255-256). As such, and as “[w]e regard incompatibility as falsification of [a] 
theory” (Popper 1968, p264), the method can successfully achieve our research aim 
(see also Ibid., p72). 
c. The work that motivated Johnson-Laird’s move to referentialist semantics (i.e. the CRA, 
the SGP, holism and the symbolic and homunculus fallacies) derive from critical 
philosophical analysis. Therefore, it appears appropriate to apply the same method 
when investigating if these arguments have been subverted and referentialism is a 
successful account of meaning (see Thagard 2009, p238). 
d. The ‘traditional’ post-positivist approaches (i.e. quantitative and qualitative methods, 
such as experimentation, observation and surveys (quantitative methods) or interviews, 
ethnography, case studies and phenomenology (qualitative methods)) are unsuitable 
given the subject matter under consideration here (i.e. meaning and cognition). 
Therefore, inference to the best explanation leads us to the conclusion that critical 













Following on from our Method chapter, we shall now attempt to establish the validity, or otherwise, 
of introducing a Peircean referentialist semantics into Johnson-Laird’s analogical RTM. To recap, we 
shall try to achieve this aim via the use of critical philosophical, i.e. decompositional, analysis and 
synthesis to establish the logical consistency of this theory. Once this process of deconstruction 
(analysis) and reconstruction ( synthesis) has been completed, any logical conflict present in Johnson-
Laird’s thesis should be more readily identifiable. If this process shows the arguments of Johnson-Laird 
to be logically inconsistent, then his referentialist theory will be said to not accord with his philosophy 
of mind as a whole and, consequently, his account of semantics will be claimed to have been falsified 
and its rejection under both the Quinean and the Popperian epistemologies will be recommended. If, 
however, no dissonance is found by this investigation, it will be said that the hypothesis remains valid 
and will, therefore, be labelled a “provisional conjecture” (Popper 1968, p264). From our Method 
chapter, it was determined that the best way to complete this proposed critical analysis and synthesis 
was by subjecting Johnson-Laird’s theory to the following three research questions: 
i) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic 
objections of the RTM’s commentators (i.e., the CRA, the SGP, holism and the 
homunculus and symbolic fallacies)? 
ii) Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent? 
iii) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s 
broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
 
Consequently, this chapter will follow this division and will be structured into three parts, each focused 





§1 Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic 
objections of the RTM’s commentators? 
The first of our research questions was chosen as, as outlined within our literature review, a major 
motivating factor in Johnson-Laird’s adoption of a correspondence theory of meaning were the 
semantic arguments encapsulated by the CRA and the SGB (see, for example, Johnson-Laird 1988, 
p107; 1993, p34). Consequently, if such a referentialist account of meaning fails to circumvent these 
semantic arguments, as Johnson-Laird postulates (see also Harnard 1990b; Fodor 2010; Rapaport 
2011; Schweizer 2012), then this philosophy of mind will have failed at the first hurdle and, as such, 
must not be considered a valid hypothesis. To determine an answer to this question, this section will:  
1) Identify a strategy that may circumvent these arguments. 
2) Determine if Johnson-Laird’s referentialist semantics adheres to this strategy.  
3) Measure Johnson-Laird’s account of meaning against a standard set by Searle (1980, p417). 
Language entry and exit rules 
From the discussion of the CRA and the SGP found within our literature review, it should be 
remembered that the main import of those arguments was that language is not self-supporting, i.e. 
that relating language only to itself cannot provide a successful account of meaning. Thus, it can be 
inferred that what is needed to avoid such criticisms are rules for supporting language, for connecting 
it to some other, non-linguistic, phenomena and that (in the language of Harnard (1990b, p339)) are 
able to get us off of the language “roundabout”. Such proposed procedures as these are labelled by 
Putnam (1981, p11) as “language entry” and “language exit” rules, rules Putnam (1988, p47) defines 
as follows: 
Language [has…] “language-entry rules” (think of these as rules saying that when the speaker has certain 
experiences, he is to put certain sentences in the “belief box)[…] and “language-exit rules” (rules saying 
that when the speaker has certain sentences in the belief and desire boxes, he is to perform certain bodily 
movements, or saying certain words, etc.).1 
This means that, without the procedures and sensory input needed to communicate the real, i.e. non-
linguistic, world to the mental world of an individual, and vice versa, language is unsupported and 
must collapse in on itself: Without language entry and language exit rules, linguistic signs can only 
remain empty. Therefore, for such arguments as the CRA and SGP to be circumvented, these language 
entry and language exit rules must be present within a theory and it is exactly their absence that led 
RTM into difficulties (see also Dennett 1980, p429, who similarly identifies the lack of such rules 
operating in the CRA). 
 
                                                          
1 See also Sellers (1963, p314) and Schweizer (2012, p195). 
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Peircean iconism and language entry and exit rules 
With Putnam’s rules in mind, it seems that, for Johnson-Laird’s referentialist strategy to counter the 
criticisms of the CRA and the SGP effectively, it must be shown that the introduction of Peircean icons 
into his philosophy of mind successfully produces language entry and language exit rules. That iconic 
mental representations achieve this goal can be seen from the earlier explication of Johnson-Laird’s 
updated mental models found in our literature review. From that discussion it was discovered that 
mental models are now derived from the translation of sensory, non-linguistic, stimuli. That is to say, 
“that linguistic representations of the meaning of propositions are used to construct mental models 
of the situation under description” (Johnson-Laird 2002, p80).2 Furthermore, once a model has been 
derived from an individual’s interaction with the world, “this representation of the world is used by 
[an individual] as a guide to action” (Ibid. 1993, p275).3 Consequently, it can be seen that, within 
Johnson-Laird’s Peircean mental model theory of cognition, there exist effective procedures that 
simulate language entry rules (i.e. that are capable of converting perceptual experiences of the world 
into mental entities within a mental ‘belief box’) and language exit rules (i.e. for converting mental 
entities within a mental ‘belief and desire box’ into action). As such, it follows from this discussion that 
Johnson-Laird is able to circumvent the semantic arguments from certain commentators. That this 
latter point is accurate can be seen in the fact that mental models, under Peircean iconism, avoid: (i) 
The symbolic fallacy; (ii) the homunculus fallacy; and (iii) semantic holism. This is the case because: 
(i) Mental models now derive their semantic content from the world, not from other mental 
signs. Consequently, meaning is no longer merely a process of replacing one set of symbols 
with another and, therefore, does not commit the symbolic fallacy. That is, for semantics, 
Johnson-Laird uses icons to successfully introduce language entry and language exit rules into 
his philosophy and to get off of the ‘language roundabout’.  
 
(ii) As meaning is now said to derive from the world, it is, in the language of Harnard (1990b, 
p338), “extrinsic” to mental representations and “intrinsic” to a state of affairs. As such, for 
Johnson-Laird, semantic content is now no longer parasitic upon conscious agents, semantic 
content has instead been grounded and, as such, requires no interpretation by any 
homunculus.4  
 
(iii) The fact that a mental model is now related to a physical state of affairs and derives its 
meaning from that part of the world, indicates that the semantic content of Johnson-Laird’s 
                                                          
2 See also Johnson-Laird (1980, p100; 1988, p15; 1993, p275; 2011, p479.) 
3 See also Johnson-Laird (1977, pp206-207; 2005, p185). 
4 Interestingly, it seems that the positing of an homunculus into syntactical accounts of meaning, from objections such as the CRA and SGP, 
is an intuitive method of accounting for language entry and exit rules within a system that is missing them. 
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mental models are no longer dependent upon their relations to other mental representations. 
As such, the language rules Johnson-Laird inherits from Peirce’s iconic theory of signs abolish 
the need for the interdependence of mental representations and, therefore, he avoids the 
difficulties of semantic holism.5 This last argument can be better seen with reference to the 
definition of semantic holism from Roland (2014. pp45), i.e.: 
Typically only sufficiently rich collections of statements, as opposed to individual statements, 
have empirical content. 
However, with iconism, it can be seen that this is not the position in which we find ourselves. 
That is, with a congruent form of correspondence, a statement can have empirical content on 
its own, divorced from any collection of other statements. Where iconism is concerned, if the 
mental representation of a statement shares the relation structure of a state of affairs, the 
empirical content of that mental representation is that state of affairs, regardless of the 
connections between the world and any other mental representation. Consequently, 
semantic content under correspondence by congruence is atomistic: Only the relation 
between a mental representation and the world determines content and the suite of other 
representations within which the mental representation is positioned plays no role.6 
 
Nevertheless, although the above analysis seems to vindicate the referentialist approach of Johnson-
Laird (and others), there is a deficiency with this solution. Searle states that the issue with the RTM is 
that, “Instantiating a computer program is never by itself a sufficient condition of intentionality” 
(Searle 1980, p417) and Searle-in-the-room, within the CRA, fails to achieve understanding as “he 
doesn't know that the story refers to restaurants and hamburgers, etc.” (Searle Ibid., p419). This is an 
issue Johnson-Laird attempts to resolve via the stipulation of mental signs having reference to the 
world. However, the question of how this mental reference itself refers may be raised. This objection 
is best seen in a point made by Putnam (1977, pp486-487) concerning the causal account of reference 
fixation: 
how 'causes' can uniquely refer is as much of a puzzle as how 'cat' can […] The problem, in a way, is 
traceable back to Ockham. Ockham introduced the idea that concepts are (mental) particulars. If 
concepts are particulars (“signs”), then any concept we may have of the relation between a sign and its 
object is another sign. But it is unintelligible, from my point of view, how the sort of relation the 
                                                          
5 It is interesting to speculate whether all successful forms of language entry and exit rules, eo ipso, circumvent semantic holism, or just the 
referentialist type employed by Johnson-Laird. However, the interdependence between the meaning of mental entities that is the hallmark 
of semantic holism, does, at first blush, appear to be a further symptom of language trying to support itself. Suggesting that successful 
language entry and language exit rules, eo ipso, avoid the homunculus and symbolic fallacies and semantic holism. 
6 Again, some may argue that this leads us into certain metaphilosophical problems. For, certain readings of Quine, e.g., Roland (2014, pp56-
57), identify that semantic holism is a necessary hypothesis for Quinean naturalism. Consequently, if such a stance is taken, this investigation 
may be found to contain an inconsistent methodology. However, it should be repeated that this thesis is taking the position that only 
theoretical, not semantic, holism is necessary under Quinean naturalism. 
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metaphysical realist envisages as holding between a sign and its object can be singled out either by 
holding up the sign itself, thus 
 
           COW 
 
-- or by holding up yet another sign, thus 
 
          REFERS 
 
-- or perhaps -- 
 
         CAUSES 
 
 
That is to say, if Johnson-Laird is solving the CRA by merely positing ‘reference’ and ‘refers’ or 
‘correspondence’ and ‘corresponds’ as some sort of mental particular that is relating a mental sign to 
its referent, then we are either led into some variation of Bradley’s regress (cf. Bradley 1916), or 
‘refers’ and ‘corresponds’ are as much syntactical signs as mental representations themselves and the 
CRA holds. Or, as Putnam (Ibid., p488) concludes: 
The point is that[...] you can't treat understanding a sentence (in general) as knowing its truth conditions; 
because it then becomes unintelligible what that knowledge in turn consists in. 
 
However, this analysis fails when applied to the hypotheses of Johnson-Laird, for within that account 
of reference, the question ‘what does the knowledge of knowing an object’s truth conditions consist 
in?’ is answered. Since Johnson-Laird follows Peirce and employs a congruent correspondence theory 
of meaning, knowing an object’s truth conditions consists in an awareness of that state of affair’s 
logical form or, using the language of Craik (1967), its ‘relation-structure’. Consequently, reference 
occurs through the accurate representation of that logical form or relation-structure. Therefore, 
Johnson-Laird’s positing of ‘reference’, ‘refers’, ‘correspondence’ and ‘corresponds’ is not akin to 
Ockham’s mental particulars and Putnam’s objection misses the mark.7 Furthermore, this approach 
also avoids Putnam’s other ‘problem of reference’, i.e.: 
reference may be metaphysically singled out without being totally determinate (the metaphysically 
singled-out R may allow for a plurality of admissible interpretations)[.] (Putnam 1981, p48) 
                                                          
7 Interestingly, Putnam’s analysis is only appropriate for correspondence theories of meaning that are correlational (such as is found within 
Fodor 2010 and Rapaport 2007; 2011), a type of correspondence Putnam’s argument seems to presuppose. 
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That is, it could be argued that reference may be stipulated by non-determinate definitions, making it 
unknown to what our mental representations actually refer, i.e. reference may be indeterminate. For 
example, we may have an interpretation of ‘A cat is on a mat’ such that: 
(a) A cat* is on a mat* 
The definition of the property of being a cat* (respectively, a mat*) is given by cases, the three cases 
being: 
(a) Some cat is on some mat; and some cherry is on some tree. 
(b) Some cat is on some mat, and no cherry is on any tree. 
(c) Neither of the foregoing 
Here is the definition of the two properties: 
DEFINITION OF ‘CAT*’  
x is a cat* if and only if case (a) holds and x is a cherry; or case (b) holds and x ix a cat; or case (c) 
holds and x ix a cherry. 
DEFINITION OF ‘MAT*’ 
x is a mat* if and only if case (a) holds and x is a tree; or case (b) holds and x ix a mat; or case (c) 
holds and x ix a quark. (Ibid., p34) 
In other words, as it is not determinate whether a particular speech act is an instance of ‘A cat is on a 
mat’ or ‘A cat* is on a mat*’, we cannot be certain that our talk of cats and mats, and mental 
representations of these states of affairs, is about cats and mats or about cat*s and mat*s (i.e. cherries 
and trees). Moreover, as Putnam (Ibid., pp217-218) shows, this account of reference leads to 
indeterminacy of whether ‘cats’ and ‘mats’ refer to anything in the universe. However, this argument 
again presupposes a correlational and not a structural theory of correspondence, for it is only under 
this view that such definitions can be stipulated. Under the iconic (i.e., congruent) view, it is logical 
form that determines reference, so such logical connectives as ‘or’ cannot be included and the grounds 
for Putnam’s argument falls away when considering Johnson-Laird’s hypothesis. 
 
Consequently, if we follow the above analysis, we must conclude that the thrust of the CRA is 
circumvented by Johnson-laird’s referentialist move. Moreover, we are capable of using this analysis 
to diagnose why it is circumvented: From following the arguments of Johnson-Laird, it can be seen 
that the CRA’s objections to the RTM are not successful as they are not an accurate representation of 
how language comprehension and production is said to operate.8 As Johnson-Laird (among others) 
shows, Searle’s thought experiment is lacking a way to structurally ground the Chinese symbols 
manipulated within his room, i.e. the Chinese Searle-in-the-room operates corresponds only with the 
symbols in his book, not with the world. Nevertheless, as Searle (1980, p417) observes, “one way to 
                                                          
8 This is a standard rebuttal to Searle’s argument and can be found in the likes of Dennett (1980), Block (2002) and Schweizer (2012). 
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test any theory of the mind is to ask oneself what it would be like if my mind actually worked on the 
principles that the theory says all minds work on”. Therefore, before we can conclude that Johnson-
Laird’s RTM avoids such semantic criticisms with any confidence, it seems incumbent upon us to take 
up Searle’s challenge here and apply his test to Johnson-Laird’s account of cognition and generate our 
own Chinese Room-style thought experiment, a thought experiment that is produced through our 
doctoring of the original CRA (cf. Ibid., pp417-418). 
CRA 2.0 
Suppose that Searle is locked in a room and given a large batch of Chinese writing. Suppose 
furthermore (as is indeed the case) that he knows no Chinese, either written or spoken, and that he is 
not even confident that he could recognise Chinese writing as Chinese writing distinct from, say, 
Japanese writing or meaningless squiggles. To Searle, Chinese writing is just so many meaningless 
squiggles. Now suppose further that after this first batch of Chinese writing, Searle is given a second 
batch of Chinese script together with a set of rules for translating both batches into a recognisable (to 
Searle) representation of a worldly state of affairs, as well as instructions to correlate the second 
batch’s representation with the first batch’s.9 The rules are in English, and Searle understands these 
rules as well as any other native speaker of English. Now suppose also that he is given a third batch of 
Chinese symbols together with some instructions, again in English, that enable him to translate these 
signs into a further recognisable representation and correlate elements of this third batch’s 
representation with those of the first two batches’. Also, these rules instruct Searle how to translate 
the representations back into certain Chinese symbols. Unknown to Searle, the people who are giving 
him all of these symbols call the first batch “a script”, they call the second batch a “story” and they 
call the third batch “questions”. Furthermore, they call the symbols he gives them back in response to 
the third batch “answers to the questions” and the set of rules in English that they give him, they call 
“the program”. Now, just to complicate the story a little, imagine that these people also give him 
stories in English, which Searle understands without any translation, and they then ask him questions 
in English about these stories, and he gives them back answers in English. Suppose also that after a 
while he gets so good at following the instructions for translating the Chinese symbols and 
manipulating the representations, and the programmers get so good at writing the programs, that 
from the external point of view – that is, from the point of view of somebody outside the room in 
which Searle is locked – his answers to the questions are absolutely indistinguishable from those of 
native Chinese speakers. Nobody just looking at his answers can tell that he did not speak a word of 
Chinese before entering the room. Let us also suppose that his answers to the English questions are, 
                                                          
9 For this experiment’s purposes, the representations’ exact pictorial form does not matter, just so long as the pictorial form accurately 
portrays the logical form of the batches to Searle-in-the room (i.e. are in a manner he can interpret from his existing experience of the world 
(e.g. a picture or 3D model, say)), then any pictorial form will suffice. 
129 
 
as they no doubt would be, indistinguishable from those of other native English speakers, for the 
simple reason that Searle is a native English speaker. From the external point of view – from the point 
of view of someone reading Searle’s answers – the answers to the Chinese questions and the English 
questions are equally good. But in the Chinese case, unlike the English case, he produces the answers 
by externally/physically manipulating representations whose logical form he can identify and that 
have been formally translated from Chinese symbols. As far as the Chinese is concerned, Searle simply 
behaves like a successfully grounded computer; he performs computational operations on grounded 
elements. For the purposes of the Chinese, Searle is simply an instantiation of the computer program. 
 
Now, the claims made by strong AI, the RTM and Johnson-Laird are that such a grounded computer 
understands the stories and that the program in some sense explains human understanding. But we 
are now in a position to examine these claims in light of our thought experiment: 
1. As regards the first claim, it seems to us quite obvious in the example that Searle-in-the-room 
only understands the Chinese stories once they have been translated into a representation 
whose logical form he can discern and that refers to a state of affairs with which Searle-in-
the-room is familiar. From these representations, and the updates made upon them, Searle-
in-the-room is made aware of the content of the stories, how the procedures from the script 
are updating their content and the outcomes of the investigation commands from the 
questions. Consequently, it can be said that Searle-in-the-room, in some manner, is 
understanding the Chinese he is given and which he is producing. For the same reasons, if a 
story interpreting computer were grounded in the same manner, it would also understand the 
stories, whether in Chinese, English, or whatever, since in the Chinese case the computer is 
Searle-in-the-room, and in cases where the computer is not Searle-in-the-room, the computer 
still has access to the grounded representations. 
 
2. As regards the second claim, that the program explains human understanding, we can see that 
the computer and its program provide sufficient conditions for understanding, since the 
computer and the program are functioning, and there is understanding. 
 
However, there is an issue here, for, in the above thought experiment, Searle-in-the-room’s ability to 
ground the representations he translates and produces are predicated upon his prior experience with 
the world, i.e. his own mental models produced prior to his entry into the room. Therefore, it is not 
an accurate account of cognition as is found in humans and as it would be implemented in a machine 
to achieve strong AI. If we were to imagine instead an individual to be born within the room, then any 
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representations produced by the program will not be grounded to that person and the conclusions 
found within Searle’s original article will be recreated. For, as Dennett (1980, p429) argues:  
it has long been a familiar theme within Al circles that [some] programs – I call them bedridden programs 
since their only modes of perception and action are linguistic – tackle at best a severe truncation of the 
interesting task of modeling real understanding. Such programs exhibit no “language-entry” and 
“language-exit” transitions, to use Wilfrid Sellars's terms, and have no capacity for non--linguistic 
perception or bodily action. The shortcomings of such models have been widely recognized for years in 
Al […] A computer whose only input and output was verbal would always be blind to the meaning of what 
was written. 
As such, what is required here is a further adaptation of this thought experiment, so as to capture the 
language and exit rules whose importance were discussed earlier, thereby preventing ‘bedridden’ AI 
and providing the appropriate input necessary for those born in the room to autonomously ground 
the symbols present in the room’s books. That is, to enable an individual born into the room to create, 
in the language of McGinn (1989, p155), “original” content. Consequently, the updated thought 
experiment will look something as follows (this thought experiment is again based on an adulteration 
of Searle’s own words (cf. Ibid., p420)).  
CRA 2.1 
Suppose we wrote a different kind of program from the above ‘bed-ridden’ program. Suppose an 
individual were to be born inside a robot, and this person would not just take in formal symbols as 
input and give out formal symbols as output, but would rather actually operate the robot in such a 
way that the robot does something very much like perceiving, walking, moving about, hammering 
nails, eating, drinking – anything you like. The robot would, for example, have a television camera 
attached to it that enabled it to ‘see’, it would have arms and legs that enabled it to ‘act’, and all of 
this would be controlled by its human ‘brain’. Such a robot would, akin to the above computer, have 
genuine understanding and other mental states in that it could autonomously generate and ground 
its own representations.10 The input from the robot’s sensors (whatever its format) would constitute 
the base data that the rule book will translate into representations. However, an update needs to be 
made here, in the beginning all that would be present in the robot would be a largely empty rule book 
that simulates the innate capacity of the brain, and which translates sensory input into some 
standardised representational format, retranslate representations into commands for behaviour and 
that simulate the language learning processes of an infant (how these complex language learning 
processes operate, beyond it being some form of reference fixation, are far beyond the scope of this 
                                                          
10 An interesting point of discussion is the effect the nature of the input (i.e. binary, script, electrical impulses etc.) has on the pictorial form 
of the representations produced and the role this nature has on determining the qualitative worldview of the person-in-the-robot. This 
raises the question: What is it like to be a robot? (cf. Nagel 1974).  
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argument and this thesis, therefore that it can be accurately simulated must be charitably assumed 
for the sake of the argument). Now, given that the person-born-in-the-robot is somehow able to 
understand and employ the rule book, it can be used so as to produce representations from the 
sensory data as well as to correlate those representations with the Chinese symbols from the language 
input (using the simulated language learning process rules from the rule book), thereby autonomously 
populating the rulebook with the information provided to Searle in the above thought experiment. 
Once this has been completed, the state of affairs found between Searle-in-the-room and person-in-
the-robot are equivalent and the conclusions found from the earlier example follow.11 
Summary 
The above philosophical analysis has shown that the root issue operating behind the CRA and the SGP 
was the concept of language ‘entry and exit rules’. That is, the semantic arguments levied against the 
RTM by its detractors demonstrated that semantic content without intentionality, or bedridden AI, 
(i.e., any system that only relates symbols with other symbols) fails to provide these entry and exit 
rules and are therefore inextricably led into a series of difficulties (e.g. the symbolic and homunculus 
fallacies). Furthermore, it was found that the language entry and language exit rules employed by 
Johnson-Laird’s use of Peirce were of such a manner (i.e. a one-to-one relationship between mental 
representation and worldly state of affairs and sets of state of affairs) that they circumvent semantic 
holism and the issues that it engenders. As such, the above analysis and syntheses demonstrated that 
via an iconic, i.e. congruent, correspondence theory of meaning, these language entry and exit rules 
are now accounted for within Johnson-Laird’s philosophy of mind and these semantic arguments are 
successfully avoided. As such, Johnson-Laird’s analysis appears to be correct; his theory of cognition 
remains a valid supposition when scrutinised from this perspective; and the answer to the research 
question that concerns this section is a ‘yes’. 
§2 Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and 
externally consistent? 
To achieve our stated goal, this chapter will continue by applying the ‘tools’ of philosophy to Johnson-
Laird’s Peircean correspondence theory of meaning and attempt to demonstrate the internal and 
external consistency of such a theory. To that end, this section will investigate the logic of the iconic 
theory in its own right as well as the eligibility of its introduction into Johnson-Laird’s pre-existing suite 
                                                          
11 Nevertheless, there is one final note here. In the above example, person-born-in-the-robot is still a homunculus operating the switches 
and simulating the processor of the computer, not the computer itself. As such, a combination of this version of the robot reply and that 
known as the systems reply – i.e., a CRA 2.2 – needs to be created, so as to provide an accurate picture of the true state of affairs found in 
fully embodied human language learning, understanding and production and which would be instantiated in a machine to produce strong 
AI.   
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of hypotheses. Consequently, we shall proceed by attempting to establish whether there exists any 
dissonance between the theses that comprise Peirce’s semantics, as well as exploring whether there 
are any inconsistencies between any of the hypotheses that constitute Peirce’s referentialist 
semantics and those of Johnson-Laird’s wider account of cognition. As such, this section will be divided 
into two sections: One that looks at the external consistency of Peircean iconicity in regard to Johnson-
Laird’s philosophy of mind and another that surveys its internal consistency, independent from the 
work of Johnson-Laird. 
External consistency 
The first point to make when engaged in the task of establishing the external validity of the inclusion 
of a Peircean correspondence theory of meaning within Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory, is that 
the foundational theses of analogue representations within the RTM are unaffected, i.e. Johnson-
Laird’s adherence to the RTM coheres equally with iconic Peircean mental representations as with 
analogous Craikean ones. This is the case as the operation of iconic representations still relies on a 
finite set of representations that are processed by a finite number of computational operations to 
produce such things as cognition, perception, reasoning, language, action etc. That is to say, a Peircean 
correspondence theory of meaning is consistent with the following central hypotheses of Johnson-
Laird’s account of cognition: 
Folk psychology: Since iconic models allow that propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and 
desires, are both ontologically real and are sufficient explanations for the causes of action, 
their inclusion creates no tension in Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses.  
Computation: Since iconic models are as capable of being processed by computational 
operations as any other analogical representation, they cohere with a computational 
explanation of cognition.    
Functionalism: Since iconic models can be instantiated by any number of physical systems and 
materials that are capable of functioning in such a manner (e.g. from paintings, sculptures and 
patterns of neuron firings), they are consistent with the functionalist position.  
Marr’s tri-level hypothesis: As iconic representations occupy as valid a position at the second 
– representational – level of Marr’s hypothesis as any other analogous representation, the 
inclusion of a Peircean correspondence theory creates no tension.  
 
Nevertheless, although the above is the case and the inclusion of a Peircean correspondence theory 
of meaning is consistent with the foundations of Johnson-Laird’s RTM, there is one area that the 
inclusion of such a theory may create tension: Johnson-Laird’s adherence to the strong AI hypothesis 
(see Johnson-Laird 1983; 1993). For, if the strong AI hypothesis is taken to be defined as the position 
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that computational programs are sufficient for (machine) intelligence (as is expressed in Searle 2002, 
p51, and seems to be expressed in Searle 1980, p417), then Peircean mental models cannot be 
considered as a form of such an AI as it dictates that iconic representations of worldly states of affairs 
are also necessary for mentality (i.e. he states that only a computational program plus the iconic 
grounding of signs is sufficient for (machine) intelligence) and there may be some tension in Johnson-
Laird’s position on AI. However, for tension to be created here, Johnson-Laird will have had to not only 
have made an explicit commitment to this reading of strong AI, but also to have explicitly stated his 
continued commitment to it, neither of which he has done. Furthermore, this reading of strong AI is 
one that has been rejected within cognitive science and many working in AI since the concept’s 
inception (see Fodor 1980, p431), bringing into question Johnson-Laird ever being committed to such 
a position. Finally, if the strong AI hypothesis is defined as the position that programs alone are 
necessary for (machine) intelligence (as is taken up by Rey 2002, p202, and which seems to be 
expressed in Searle 1980, p418) then Johnson-Laird’s position on AI can still be defined as a strong 
one and no possibility of a conflict arises. 
 
However, there do appear to be a number of genuine inconsistencies between the theories of 
cognition put forward by Johnson-Laird and by Peirce. For example, Johnson-Laird (1980; 2008; 2010) 
is unequivocal in his view that mental images do not constitute the base level of cognition and 
reasoning, whereas Peirce argues that this is, in fact, the case (see §3.363; §3.556; §3.560; §3.613; 
§5.148; §5.162) – a view of Peirce’s not touched upon by Johnson-Laird. This dissonance is problematic 
as a tension is now present between the theories of the two authors, and, with it, confusion over what 
is and what is not taken from Peirce’s works – state of affairs that, at best, renders Johnson-Laird’s 
own adopted theory nebulous and ill defined. Additionally, and as Vosgerau (2006) observes, Peirce’s 
icons rely on a “logical algebra[…] contain[ing] signs [including…] indices[…] used for expressing 
negation” (cf. Peirce §§3.385-3.386), an hypothesis Johnson-Laird (2002, p85) explicitly accepts, 
averring that “Like graphs, mental models therefore use a symbol to designate negation” (see also 
Barres and Johnson-Laird 2003; Johnson-Laird 2006; Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013). However, and 
as seen in our literature review, Johnson-Laird (1980, p125) has previously defended an important 
property of mental models that: 
models have an important structural property deriving from a constraint on the set of possible mental 
models: a natural mental model of discourse has a structure that corresponds directly to the structure of 
the state of affairs that the discourse describe. 
This naturalism constraint, labelled by Vosgerau (2006, p255) as “structural preservation and 
naturalness”, has historically limited the scope of mental models to include only those things found in 
the world, generally, and those things in the state of affairs a model denotes, specifically. As such, it 
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can easily be seen that the adoption of Peirce’s mental signs and indices for such things as negation 
(and “other abstract concepts” (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p11)) create conflict with Johnson-
Lairds naturalism constraint.12 
 
Internal consistency 
As Peirce’s iconic theory of signs is comprised from many individual hypotheses, all of which interact 
with many of its others in numerous, nuanced ways, this subsection will not attempt to list all these 
interactions and demonstrate their consistency or otherwise. For our purposes, only those areas 
where inconsistency is determined to have been found will be explored. As such, we will continue with 
a presentation of a number of posited internal inconsistencies in Peircean iconism, along with a 
defence of this criticism.  
Interpretant 
The first internal inconsistency of a Peircean semantics has to do with its application of a concept 
Peirce labels ‘Interpretant’. As we have seen (from our literature review), Peirce (§§274-284) 
identified icons as a mode of signs, but what has not been clarified is that, according to Peirce (Ibid.), 
something can only be considered a sign if it (the symbol, that which Peirce terms a ‘First’) is in such a 
relationship to a worldly state of affairs (referred to as a ‘Second’) that it causes an interpreter (known 
as a ‘Third’ or ‘Interpretant’) to view the symbol as they do the state of affairs.13 This is what is meant 
when Peirce (Ibid.) states: 
A sign[…] is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be 
capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object 
in which it stands itself to the same Object. 
This reliance upon an Interpretant within a Peircean correspondence theory is where issues start to 
arise for Johnson-Laird, issues that remain no matter your reading of ‘Interpretant’.14 Classically there 
are two readings of Peirce in this regard (see Eco, 1976): 1) A mental interpretation; and 2) a non-
mental reading. Unfortunately for Johnson-Laird, both positions result in difficulties: 
                                                          
12 In fact, some, such as McGinn (1989, pp197-198), argue that for mental models to validly solve Brentano’s problem, they need to adhere 
to the naturalism constraint. Therefore, Johnson-Laird’s introduction of mental signs into his mental models may not only be externally 
inconsistent, it may also be internally inconsistent in that it leads him into difficulties explaining intentionality. 
13 This dependence upon a First, Second and Third is true in all cases of Peirce’s analysis of signs. As previously mentioned, Peirce (1906, 
pp496-497) has a number of different analysis of signs and their instances, but in all cases “three things are concerned in the functioning of 
a Sign; the Sign itself, its Object, and its Interpretant". 
14 It should be remembered that the main source for our understanding of Peirce comes from his unpublished notebooks, which do not 
provide a consistent, unified theory. This is a state of affairs that results in the ambiguity over the term ‘Interpretant’ alluded to here and 
that has led Eco (1976, p1457) to aver “it is rather difficult to find two separate passages on a same topic in which he [Peirce] does not 
contradict and re-propose what he has said previously[…] A Peircean student is more entitled to say “Peirce said X on the day Y” than “Peirce 
said that…””.  
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(i) If you hold a necessarily mental reading of ‘Interpretant’, such as can be found in §1.339 and 
that is taken up by the likes of Burks (1949), where an Interpretant must be capable of 
consciousness and the possession of ideas, then Peirce’s (and, by implication, Johnson-Laird’s) 
icons can only be considered as such in the presence of a conscious Interpretant, i.e. to an 
homunculus. To clarify, under this reading of Peirce, he (and Johnson-Laird) is explaining the 
meaning of language by converting it into mental icons, but these mental icons can then only 
be meaningful in the presence of another mind, a mental Interpretant, leading to the 
homunculus fallacy and, therefore, an infinite regress.  
 
(ii) If you take a non-mental view of Interpretant, i.e. one that relies only on a ‘Quasi-Mind’ (see 
Peirce 1906, p523), such as can be found in §2.228 and that is taken up by the likes of Mounce 
(1997), wherein an Interpretant may be another sign, then problems also arise.15 For, this is 
an account of meaning that is based solely on replacing one symbol for another and, 
therefore, introduces the symbolic fallacy (a fallacy that was, it should be remembered, a 
motivating factor in Johnson-Laird’s adoption of iconic mental models (see Johnson-Laird 
1988)). Additionally, this leads to a further external inconsistency for Johnson-Laird when he 
imports Peirce’s theory, for, as Mounce (Ibid., p27) forcefully argues, this non-mental 
Interpretant leads to a public view of language (as a “private language is precisely one in which 
there is no first sign”), a view of language that is fundamentally opposed to the RTM’s 
necessarily private view.16 
 
Consequently, Johnson-Laird’s employment of Peirce’s theory of signs and icons necessitates an 
employment of Peirce’s corollary concept of an Interpretant, but this leads him into certain 
problematic conclusions, some of which Johnson-Laird explicitly states are fallacious and need to be 
avoided. 
 
                                                          
15 A ‘quasi-mind’ is clarified by Peirce (1906, p523) thus: 
Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world; and 
one can no more deny that it is really there, than that the colors, the shapes, etc. of objects are really there. Consistently adhere to that 
unwarrantable denial, and you will be driven to some form of idealistic nominalism akin to Fichte's. Not only is thought in the organic world, 
but it develops there. But as there cannot be a General without Instances embodying it, so there cannot be thought without Signs. We must 
here give "Sign" a very wide sense, no doubt, but not too wide a sense to come within our definition. Admitting that connected Signs must 
have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-
utterer and a Quasi-interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e. are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. 
In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical 
evolution of thought should be dialogic. You may say that all this is loose talk; and I admit that, as it stands, it has a large infusion of 
arbitrariness. It might be filled out with argument so as to remove the greater part of this fault; but in the first place, such an expansion 
would require a volume, --- and an uninviting one; and in the second place, what I have been saying is only to be applied to a slight 
determination of our system of diagrammatization, which it will only slightly affect; so that, should it be incorrect, the utmost certain effect 
will be a danger that our system may not represent every variety of non-human thought. 
16 Recall that within any form of RTM, semantics is necessarily founded upon private correlations between mental elements and language; 




Another inconsistency within Johnson-Laird’s Peircean correspondence theory of meaning is the 
latter’s argument that certain concepts can only be signified through mental mathematical indices, 
i.e. through mental signs (see §§3.385-3.386). This is a view that has led Johnson-Laird (2002, pp84-
85) to aver that: 
mental models[…] use a symbol to designate negation.17  
 
There are a number of issues with this move (further to its flouting of the naturalism constraint). 
Firstly, if it is said that meaning is only derived when a sign stands in an iconic relationship with a state 
of affairs, the following question is raised: How can a mental symbol be meaningful and yet not be 
grounded, i.e., even though it bears no connection to any part of the world? Furthermore, such 
ungrounded, un-iconic symbols seem to introduce both the homunculus and symbolic fallacies. This 
is the case as the inclusion of a purely mental ‘sign’ only explains one set of symbols by replacing them 
with another, i.e. replaces the words ‘not the case’ with a mental ‘¬’. This can be seen when comparing 
comments made by Peirce with Johnson-Laird’s own: At §4.127, Peirce asserts that “the conception 
of a “meaning”, which is, in its primary acceptation, the translation of a sign into another system of 
signs”, which is a view that aligns remarkably well with the accusation, levelled by Johnson-Laird 
(1993, pp333-334), that certain theories of meaning “can tell you that two words are related, or that 
one sentence is a paraphrase of another, but they are as circular as dictionaries” (see also Ibid. 1988). 
Alternatively, this argument can be interpreted as a failure of Peircean iconism to provide language 
entry and language exit rules for the mental symbol of negation (and certain ‘other abstract 
concepts’). That is to say, Peirce’s use of purely mental symbols leads him (and, by extension, Johnson-
Laird) into the – now familiar – symbolic and homunculus fallacies, as it reintroduces the very 
properties Johnson-Laird diagnosed as the cause of the RTM’s difficulties concerning semantic 
content. 
 
Finally, the use of this account of negation to explain the meaning of counterfactuals (as is done by 
Barres and Johnson-Laird 2003, p2. see also Johnson-Laird 2002; Khemlani, Orenes & Johnson-Laird 
2012) seems insufficient. For in such counter-factual cases as ‘there is a car in this room’, negation of 
the true state of affairs (i.e. this room without a car) does not fully capture the meaning of the 
proposition, as the resulting model will be identical to the, equally false, proposition, ‘there is a 
dinosaur in this room’, or many other, similar expressions. This leads, by reductio ad absurdum, to 
                                                          
17 It needs to be clarified that this tactic of the inclusion of mental symbols to iconic representations is also applied in the case of “other 
abstract concepts” (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, p11), not just negation as discussed here (e.g., “The [model] theory allows that 
models can be tagged with numerals denoting their probabilities” (Ibid, p23)). In the case of these other ‘abstract concepts’ the following 
arguments, here concerning negation, are equally applicable. 
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many sentences which seemingly possess differing meanings being, in fact, the same proposition. 
Moreover, the negative, yet true, statement, ‘there is no car in this room’, can only be modelled by 
the mental representation of the affirmative, yet false, proposition of there being a car in the room 
with the attachment of the symbol for negation (see Ibid.). Therefore, it seems Johnson-Laird’s 
account of negation is dependent on the meaningful representation of counterfactuals and his 
account of the meaningful representation of counterfactuals seems dependent on his account of 
negation. As such, his account of counterfactuals and negation is circular. However, counterfactuals 
and negation cannot be left to do each other’s wash without inevitable difficulties arising (e.g., 
accusations of begging the question). As such, the hypothesis that the meaning of counterfactuals can 
be explained via negation fails and we are no longer left with any explicit account for the semantics of 
false propositions.18, 19 
Canonical decomposition 
Finally, during our discussion of Peircean mental models, we saw that a major boon to its adoption 
was that it seemed to explain such things as the productivity and the systematicity of language. 
However, as Fodor (2010, p17) avers: 
The content of a thought is entirely determined by its structure together with the content of its 
constituent concepts. 
That is, productivity and systematicity are only provided if representations are shown to have 
constituents, to be compositional in nature. Nevertheless, although this compositionality is crucial for 
accounting for the above characteristics of language and, therefore, the continued success of Johnson-
Laird’s referential theory of mental models (or any other – i.e. discursive and non-discursive – RTM), 
Fodor (Ibid., pp173-175) identifies a potential problem with Johnson-Laird’s theory in this instance: 
Icons don’t have canonical decompositions into parts; all parts of an icon are ipso facto constituents. Take 
a picture of a person, cut it into parts whichever way you like; still, each picture part pictures a person 
part[…] which is to say, however they are sliced, there’s no distinction between their canonical parts and 
their mere parts[… But this is not] true of a discursive representations. Only a specifiable subset of the 
parts of a discursive symbol (namely, its canonical parts) are syntactic or semantic constituents[…] 
Because they decompose into syntactically and semantically heterogeneous constituents, discursive 
representations can have logical forms (maybe all discursive representations do that can express truths). 
                                                          
18 However, it should be recalled that a number of recent empirical studies (e.g., Du et al 2014; Macbeth et al 2014; Orenes, Beltran and 
Santamaria 2014) goes contrary to these findings, concluding instead that “a symbolic representation of negation is possible” (Orenes, 
Beltran and Santamaria 2014, p36). However, the present thesis highlights the fact that these findings are only consistent with Johnson-
Laird’s account of negation, and are not conclusive of its veracity. As such, we are taking these empirical findings to be measures of some 
other phenomena, rather than that of a mental sign for negation.  
19 As previously highlighted, McGinn (1989, pp197-198) argues that for mental models to validly solve Brentano’s problem, they need to 
adhere to the naturalism constraint. Therefore, Johnson-Laird’s introduction of mental signs into his mental models may lead him into 
difficulties explaining intentionality. 
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By contrast, because they decompose into syntactically and semantically homogenous parts, iconic 
representations don’t have logical forms.  
That is to say, as models, or any other iconic representation, have no definitive composition, no 
decompositional ‘ground floor’ upon which objective observers can agree, there is no distinction in 
their parts that determine the contribution they make to the icon as a whole. This means that there 
are no individual discrete ‘atoms’ that make up an icon; such atoms are said to be unable to exist since 
each segregation of parts of an icon is equally valid. As such, because icons do not have what Fodor 
terms a canonical decomposition, icons, so it is argued, cannot be compositional in nature and cannot 
account for the productivity and systematicity of language. 
Summary 
To summarise the results of this investigation, the analysis and synthesis of Peirce’s correspondence 
theory of meaning found a number of inconsistencies: 
1) Johnson-Laird and Peirce differ on the role of mental images: The latter states that they are 
the basis of cognition while the former repudiates this. This is problematic as it demonstrates 
a clash between the philosophies of the two thinkers and makes those specific aspects 
Johnson-Laird has adopted from the iconic theory of signs, and those he has not, unknown. 
2) Peirce relies on an Interpretant for his signs and symbols to be meaningful. This reliance leads 
him (and, by extension, Johnson-Laird) into the homunculus and symbolic fallacies, fallacies 
Johnson-Laird was trying to avoid by adopting such a theory of semantics in the first instance. 
3) Although Johnson-Laird is vociferous in his rejection of mental signs through their violation of 
the symbolic fallacy and homunculus fallacies, his iconic correspondence theory of meaning 
inherits from Peirce mental signs for such things as negation. Therefore, this inclusion not only 
creates conflict within Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses – specifically, it leads to a conflict with the 
model theory’s existing naturalism constraint – it also concludes in a transgression of the very 
fallacies he is attempting to avoid. 
4) Peircean mental models are led into an explanation of counterfactual propositions via the 
mental sign for negation. This explanation is both insufficient (as it leads to false 
counterfactuals with different cognitive meaning being analysed into the same proposition) 
and circular (as counterfactuals are required to analyse certain negative propositions and vice 
versa). 
5) As Fodor (2010, pp173-175) demonstrates, Peircean icons cannot have canonical 
decompositions and, therefore, cannot be compositional in nature. This is a deficiency that 
results in such mental models being unable to account for the productivity and systematicity 
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of language, aspects of language that are, seemingly, only explainable through compositional 
representations.  
 
Consequently, this analysis has found that we must respond in the negative to our second research 
question and state that: No, Peirce’s congruent correspondence theory of meaning is both internally 
and externally inconsistent. 
§3 Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s 
broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
Finally, our methodology determined that the last measure against which the success of Johnson-
Laird’s updated semantics is to be held, is the external consistency of such an approach to meaning’s 
implicit theoretical positions within his wider philosophy. Our literature review identified a number of 
such suppositions required for the consistent application of a congruent correspondence theory of 
meaning and, following from this, this section will investigate these assumptions in regard to Johnson-
Laird’s iconic mental models. This investigation will be conducted in an attempt to determine the 
logical consistency and completeness of such a proposed externalist theory of cognition. As such, this 
chapter will survey Johnson-Laird’s works so as to identify whether the identified raft of assumptions 
are commensurate within his philosophy as a whole, or whether any inconsistency is created by their 
inclusion. Unfortunately, Johnson-Laird is not explicit on his position concerning a number of these 
listed assumptions. Consequently, in such instances where these positions are not made clear, this 
thesis will of necessity engage in some speculative analysis in order to deduce an answer to the 
question of consistency within Johnson-Laird’s complete philosophy from his explicit writings.  
 
To recap, our literature review uncovered that, in order for a correspondence theory of meaning to 
be consistent, it must assume the following positions: 
1) A commitment to externalist semantics and a rejection of internalist hypotheses and 
arguments. 
2) An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts. 
3) That a reliable and consistent mode of reference fixation is possible. This is an assumption 
that itself entails a number of sub-assumptions: 
a. It is necessary to explain away the apparent limitations of genre or pictorial form 
where language or mental representations are concerned.  
b. The one-way nature of reference needs to be explained within a system that 
appears to employ a two-way relation of structural equivalence.  
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c. Brentano’s question/problem can be answered and reference can be explained in 
a scientifically reducible, empirical way. 
4) An epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
5) A number of metaphysical entailments: 
a. An eternalist stance on the metaphysical status of time (leading to determinism).  
b. That counterfactuals can refer to something, and therefore remain meaningful, 
even while singular terms are Russellian. (N.B. This also includes those 
propositions that entail negation, disjunctives, empty names and modality.) 
c. That properties and relations have some form of ontological reality. 
6) That, if two terms have different referents, they must have different meanings, no matter 
their surface level similarity. 
7) That meaning is malleable. 
8) That the informativeness of Frege cases can be explained. 
9) That the challenges posed to any solution of the implementation problem by Twin and 
Frege cases are avoidable. 
10) That slingshot arguments can be answered.20 
 
Taking this into consideration, this section will take each of these assumptions in turn, clarifying if they 
are, respectively, consistent or otherwise within the philosophy of Johnson-Laird or, where no explicit 
position is found, if it can be inferred that each assumption is consistent or otherwise within the 
philosophy of Johnson-Laird. 
A commitment to externalist semantics and a rejection of internalist hypotheses and 
arguments 
Johnson-Laird’s externalism of meaning is a defining aspect of his contemporary RTM. In fact, Johnson-
Laird (1988, p107) has argued on numerous occasions that if theories “say nothing about how words 
are related to the world” then those theories will fail, for, so he argues, they assume, “that meaning 
is merely a matter of relating one set of symbols to another” rather than being grounded in referents. 
Moreover, Johnson-Laird’s explicit externalism of semantic content can be seen throughout his 
writings, with further examples being seen in Ibid. 1980, p89; 1983, pp182-191; pp230-231; 1988, 
p107; 1993, pp333-334; 2002, p80; 2006, pp21-37; Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991, pp7-11.  
 
                                                          
20 It should also be remembered that the success of Johnson-Laird’s referentialist semantics also presupposes the legitimacy of the concept 
of ground. As such, and as the discussion surrounding ground is beyond the scope of these pages, it should be clarified that this research is 
assuming both the legitimacy of the concept of ground and its coherence with Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy. However, for a full analysis 
of this concept, see Audi (2012), Correia and Schnieder (2012) and Fine (2012). 
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Furthermore, Johnson-Laird not only explicitly holds an externalist semantics, he supports this 
position with arguments against the internalism of those such as McGilvery (1998), Chomsky (2000) 
and Pietroski (2005), saying: 
One decisive objection to all these [internalist] theories[…] is that they say nothing about how words 
relate to the world. They contain no machinery that explains how my warning about [a] table could guide 
your movements[… Such theories] can tell you that two words are related, or that one sentence is a 
paraphrase of another, but they cannot tell you anything about the state of the world. They are as circular 
as dictionaries; they commit the “symbolic fallacy” of assuming meaning is merely a matter of relating 
one set of symbols to another. But when you understand my warning, you grasp its “truth conditions”: 
you know how the world should be if my assertion is true. As the philosopher David Lewis points out, the 
translation of an utterance into a representation such as [internalist semanticists do] provides no more 
of an account of its truth conditions than does a translation into Latin. (Johnson-Laird 1988, p107. See 
also Ibid. 1983, p231; 1993, pp331-334.) 
 
Finally, although evidence of Johnson-Laird’s adherence to externalism and antipathy toward 
internalism can be readily found within his work, an explicit handling of the three arguments we 
canvassed in our literature review, and that are commonly employed by internalists to defend their 
position, is not so redolent. As such, we will have to look to what is expressed so as to infer Johnson-
Laird’s potential position on: 1) Negative facts, 2) tractability and 3) poverty of the stimulus for 
language learning. 
1) Negative facts: As we saw in our literature review, internalists argue that an externalist 
semantics is only capable of explaining the positive facts of language (i.e. the semantic content 
of terms), but not negative ones (e.g., the coreferentiality of some statements but not others). 
However, this argument seems to be avoided by Johnson-Laird’s RTM position. For, such 
arguments from negative facts, as can found in Pietroski (2005), appear to be aimed solely at 
externalism regarding natural language (e.g., Pietroski (Ibid., p255) is concerned only with “a 
theory of meaning for natural language”), but by doing so they miss the externalism of mental 
representations to which Johnson-Laird adheres (as, for Johnson-Laird, it is not language that 
possesses semantic content, it is the mental models to which natural language is translated 
(see Johnson-Laird 1980, pp89-91; 1983, pp248-259; 1988, p107; 1993, pp343-348)). 
Consequently, it appears that Johnson-Laird need not be concerned about negative facts, as 
he sees natural language only becoming meaningful through the mental representations into 
which they are translated.21 Further, Johnson-Laird sees his mental models to be a 
begriffsschrift of sorts, with there being no possibility of hidden meanings where logical form 
                                                          
21 Interestingly, the expression of cognitive science’s position on mental models in Pietroski (2005, p270) is considerably outdated. 
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or relation structure is concerned (see Johnson-Laird 1980; 1993; 2002; 2006; 2013), which 
therefore removes the ambiguities and peculiarities found at the surface level of language and 
which the likes of Pietroski (2005, 266-279) use as their ammunition against externalism. In 
fact, it seems that cognitive scientists, such as Johnson-Laird, could appeal to the same innate 
biological and psychological constraints on the interpretation of natural language to explain 
negative facts in natural language that Pietroski does, without giving up their externalism of 
mental representations. 
 
2) Tractability: Secondly, we saw that some internalists contest that externalism demands “a 
theory of everything” (McGilvery 1998, p237) as, supposedly, it demands computation over 
internal symbols and all the entities found in the world. However, this reasoning is based on 
a confusion over the role of computation in external RTM and completely neglects the role of 
reference fixation within that account. Under Johnson-Laird’s theory of semantic content, 
computations are only needed to be performed over iconic mental representations and any 
change in iconicity resulting from these computations will, eo ipso, change the part of the 
world that the representation denotes. As such, Johnson-Laird does not “insist on relating a 
computational theory’s domain to users of cognitive states and to things outside the head” 
(Ibid., p232): all that is required is a computational domain over an individual’s cognitive states 
(i.e. mental representations) and, due to the iconism of these cognitive states, this will, eo 
ipso, have the effect of computations over things outside the head. Consequently there are 
no tractability issues with Johnson-Laird’s externalism and the implementation of such a 
system is viable. 
 
3) Poverty of the stimulus for language learning: Finally, it has been seen that internalists, such 
as Chomsky (2002), use evidence showing that infants do not receive the requisite stimuli to 
account for the linguistic knowledge that they are able to demonstrate, i.e. some argue that 
there is a poverty of the stimulus for language learning. In response to this charge Johnson-
Laird may be able to refer to his congruence-based correspondence theory of meaning. That 
is, it may be the case that Johnson-Laird relies upon, or could rely upon, the construction of 
appropriate reference fixations by infants to explain language learning, thereby rejecting the 
heart of the poverty of the stimulus argument (i.e., that a child does not receive the level of 
stimuli to explain their level of knowledge). For an example that this may be an available 
strategy for Johnson-Laird against such arguments, we can look to his approving references 
to the work of Bowerman (1977) when highlighting the presence of inductive learning 
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heuristics, as employed by infants, to fix reference. He concludes from this that: 
A baby girl of sixteen months hears the word ‘snow’ used to refer to snow. Over the 
next months, as Melissa Bowerman has observed, the infant uses the word to refer to: 
snow, the white tail of a horse, the white part of a toy boat, a white flannel bed pad, 
and a puddle of milk on the floor. She is forming the impression that ‘snow’ refers to 
things that are white or to horizontal areas of whiteness, and she will gradually refine 
her concept so that it tallies with the adult one. The underlying procedure is[…] 
inductive. (Johnson-Laird 1993, p234. see also Ibid, p243) 
As such, it seems that the apparent presence of learning heuristics to fix reference, deduced 
from Bowerman’s study, is a potential avenue for Johnson-Laird to reject innate knowledge and 
abilities, as they arguably demonstrate that learning is necessary for language and that there is 
no poverty of the stimulus (see also Hutto 2008). 
 
Consequently, it can readily be seen that a commitment to externalist semantics and a rejection of 
internalist hypotheses and arguments is consistent with Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy and no 
dissonance is created with his move to an externalist semantics in this regard. 
An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts 
As was shown within our Method chapter, Johnson-Laird has demonstrated both an implicit and 
explicit commitment to an ontologically real world ‘out there’. This demonstration can be seen 
implicitly in his adherence to Marr’s tri-level hypothesis and its physical level of explanation (see 
Johnson-Laird and Byrne 1991, p17; Johnson-Laird 1993, p58; p390), as well as his approval of Ken 
Craik’s ‘relation structure’ and ‘physical models’ (Ibid. 1980, p73; 1983, p9). Finally, Johnson-Laird has 
explicitly made a commitment to an ontological realism concerning facts and states of affairs through 
his continued reliance on logical items such as ‘the world’, ‘concrete objects’ and ‘entities’ as examples 
for things modelled by his mental representations (Ibid., 1980, p89; 1983, pp.410-415; 2002, p80; 
2013, p3; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi and Legrenzi 1972). As such, no inconsistency, surrounding 
ontological commitments, has been introduced into Johnson-Laird’s work with this theoretical shift 
concerning language. 
Reference fixation 
As we have seen throughout this investigation, Johnson-Laird’s recent writings demonstrate a 
commitment to reference fixation by congruence, or, more accurately, iconicity. This use by Johnson-
Laird of congruence for reference fixation within a correspondence theory of meaning is seen in his 
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early writings through his use of Craik’s ‘relation structure’ (see Johnson-laird 1980; 1983; 1993), but, 
since 2002, this has been updated with his adoption of Peircean iconicity, i.e. that: 
interesting property, which the great nineteenth century philosopher and logician, Charles Sanders 
Peirce, called “iconicity”[...] He meant that the structure of such a diagram is the same as the structure 
of what it represents, and so the parts of the diagram map onto the parts of the scene, and the relations 
among the parts of the diagram are the same as the relations among the parts of the scene. Mental 
models are similarly as iconic as possible. (Ibid., 2008a p208. For further explicit examples of 
Johnson-Laird’s reliance on iconicity for reference fixation, see Ibid. 2002, pp80ff.; 2006, pp21-
37, 2010, p2; 2013, pp9-11.) 
 
However, although the above does answer the question regarding the mode of reference fixation 
within our literature review, it does not appear to provide an answer to the further questions raised 
therein concerning reference fixation within correspondence theories of meaning. That is: 
3a)  How are the apparent limitations of genre or pictorial form, where language and mental 
representations are concerned, explained away? 
3b)  How is the one-way nature of reference explained within a system that appears to employ 
a two-way relation of structural equivalence (i.e., iconicity)? 
3c)  How is Brentano’s question/problem answered? That is, how is reference (i.e. iconicity) 
explained in a scientifically reducible, empirical way? 
Consideration of the published writings of Johnson-Laird does not seem to produce a satisfactory 
answer to any of the above questions. In fact, looking to the literature only produces the following 
questions and queries: 
3a)  If, as Marr’s tri-level hypothesis states, mental representations are just an abstraction 
from physical nature and representations are ultimately biological electro-chemical 
entities, this suggests, following Daitz and – certain readings of – Wittgenstein, that the 
pictorial form or genre of Johnson-Laird’s icons are, similarly, biological, electrical and 
chemical. However, this raises the question: How can biological electro-chemical icons 
represent anything other than electro-chemical biological properties? That is, how can 
biological electro-chemical signs signify the visual, aural, emotional etc. properties with 
which we are all conscious? 
 
3b)  As has been established, Johnson-Laird relies upon iconicity to explain the relation 
between sign and signified. However, this equivalence relation of iconicity does not seem 
to allow for the one-way relationship seen in reference without some form of post-hoc 
stipulation. For example, this stipulation may perhaps be temporal in character, i.e. that 
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any new structure that shares the logical form of an existing state of affairs will refer to 
the earlier structure, and not vice versa, simply by fiat. However, it should be noted that 
although this stipulation may hold in most cases (e.g. a picture and a scene), there are 
non-standard situations that test this possibility (e.g. an architect’s model, a 
draughtsman’s blueprints and a finished building). As such, it seems difficult to identify 
any stipulation limiting the directionality of reference for icons, let alone one that is not 
post-hoc. 
 
3c) Marr’s tri-level hypothesis – which, again, states that the middle, representational, layer 
is instantiated by the physical, electro-chemical, processes of the brain or a whole person 
– may appear to answer Brentano’s question/problem by stating that the intentionality 
of icons is ultimately instantiated in physical nature. Furthermore, Johnson-Laird could 
explain the relationship between a worldly state of affairs and a mental representation 
by a causal (see Fodor 1990; 2010), or even teleological (see McGinn 1989), account of 
content. However, these explanations, in themselves, are unsatisfactory. For Brentano’s 
question to be answered satisfactorily, these accounts need to be cashed out and their 
physical instantiation identified. That is, it needs to be shown how the nervous, electrical, 
chemical etc. structure of the body and the neurology of the brain is capable of producing 
iconic mental models and their causal or teleological relationships with the world. 
However, how this question is answered by Johnson-Laird, or anyone else, is yet to be 
determined.22 
 
Consequently, although the assumption that a mode of reference fixation exists is compatible with 
Johnson-Laird’s philosophy, it appears that the detailed entailments of this fixation, i.e. that: (i) The 
apparent limitations of genre or pictorial form can be explained away; (ii) the apparent one-way 
nature of reference can be answered; and (iii) Brentano’s question/problem can be resolved) - have 
not been accounted for. As such, Johnson-Laird’s theory of cognition seems to be incomplete in this 
respect and an introduction of correspondence must be said to create certain problems in Johnson-
Laird’s philosophy as a whole. 
Epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
                                                          
22 Furthermore, there also exist arguments that functionalist accounts of mind, such as is used by Johnson-Laird, are innately incapable of 
averting Brentano’s question. Such arguments state that functionalist theories cannot reduce synonymy, i.e. equivalence of referent 
between interlocutors, to functionalist explanations, as we all hold differing beliefs about the same terms and untangling this knot is “totally 
utopian” (Putnam 1988, p75). However, it should be noted that such arguments only follow if an holistic view of meaning is taken (see Ibid., 
pp73-89), a view of meaning criticised in our literature review and that is, as we shall see, antithetical to Johnson-Laird’s de re linguistics. 
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In our literature review, it was identified that correspondence theories of meaning lead to an 
epistemic scepticism of meaning. That is, as articulated by Miller (2007, p145), correspondence 
theories of meaning have to “concede[…] that the sort of fact in question [that fixes meaning] exists, 
[but…] questions our right to claim knowledge of that sort of fact”. However, this is a conclusion 
Johnson-Laird (1983 pp193) readily accepts, stating:  
unfortunately, there is no reason to suppose that the chemical tests for [natural kind terms] are 
infallible[…] moreover, even if a “definite” answer has been obtained to the hidden structure of a [natural 
kind term] either through scientific investigation or through the application of some “common sense” 
test, the answer is defeasible[…] An answer is most unlikely to be forthcoming, and, I submit, could never 
be established definitively. 
As such, Johnson-Laird (Ibid. p194) concludes that, “we do not know that we know [a natural kind 
term’s] extension – perhaps we do, perhaps we don’t”. Consequently, the implicit epistemic 
scepticism of meaning entailed in the adoption of a de re semantics is consistent with the rest of 
Johnson-Laird’s philosophy. 
Metaphysical entailments 
Certain of the metaphysical assumptions a correspondence theory entails (i.e., an eternalist stance on 
the metaphysical status of time and that properties and relations have some form of ontological 
reality) are far too complex to be analysed in detail here. As such, this thesis will merely grasp the 
nettle in saying that, in the main, these positions are both consistent within Johnson-Laird’s 
philosophy as there are no explicit statements that reject or are dissonant with the majority of them 
(see Johnson-Laird 1983; 1993; 2002; 2006; 2013) and, consequently, that the implications of such an 
ontology are acceptable to Johnson-Laird. However, it should be noted that Johnson-Laird has made, 
in passing, some remarks that do seem to clash with at least one of these metaphysical positions. He 
has remarked, for example, that, where free will is concerned: 
Even a system that is not deterministic can be completely understood though its specific behaviour 
cannot be predicted. The compatibility of free will with computational explanation reveals the crassness 
of the assumption that psychology is a means for the prediction and control of individual behaviour. No 
science can predict the products of your imagination, or what you will do on every occasion. Cognitive 
science does not threaten your freedom or dignity. (Johnson-Laird 1993, p390) 
Nevertheless, the eternalism of time necessitated by correspondence (a commitment, it should be 
remembered, needed to account for the meaning of tensed propositions) does threaten this freedom. 
As such, Johnson-Laird will have to abandon the above position on free will if his philosophy is to be 
consistent with his congruence theory of meaning. Additionally, there is, as we have seen, an issue for 
icons with a correspondence theory’s entailment that counterfactuals refer to something to remain 
meaningful, with this chapter’s previous section demonstrating that a Peircean sign for negation does 
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not answer this question successfully. In light of this, how Johnson-Laird’s theory answers this 
question is unknown. 
 
Consequently, although a realism concerning properties and relations and temporal eternalism are 
not overtly inconsistent with Johnson-Laird’s other writings, clashes, or questions, concerning free will 
and negation do seemingly exist, or are raised with the introduction of correspondence. (. This also 
includes those propositions that entail negation, disjunctives, empty names and modality.) 
Surface level similarity 
Twin Earth cases show that if, like Johnson-Laird (2002, p84), you hold that the meaning of most, or 
even all, of our terms is iconic, is the correspondence of our natural language (by way of mental 
representations) with the world, then you must conclude that if two symbols (mental or otherwise) 
are the icon of – correspond to – the same state of affairs, then they have the same meaning.23 Though 
this conclusion is a necessary one from the given premise, it is not yet clear if it is one that fits into 
Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy without discord. Although an explicit adherence to this necessary 
conclusion of his philosophy is not common, there are passages that suggest that Johnson-Laird 
adheres to it. For example, he avers: 
Many different scenes can be described by the same words, and many different words can describe the 
same scene. Hence, the relations between words and scenes must depend on elements at a lower level 
than either[…] the relations between words emerge from their relations to models of the world. 
(Johnson-Laird 1993, pp339-342) 
In this regard, therefore, no inconsistency within Johnson-Laird’s philosophy is found. 
That meaning is mutable. 
Although Johnson-Laird assents to the conclusions of the Twin Earth argument (i.e., that if two terms 
have a different referent then they have a different meaning) this may, as we have seen, lead him into 
further inconsistencies. For, our literature review found that Putnam (1975, pp215-271), further, 
purports to show with his Twin Earth argument that two people who share the same mental state (or, 
in the language of cognitive science, the same ‘mental representation’) do not necessarily mean the 
same thing by that state (or representation). From this, it must be concluded that any description of 
semantic content that is based only on mental states (or representations) cannot be sufficient. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that this conclusion is only generated if we accept that: 
the extension of the term ‘water’ was just as much H2O on Earth in 1750 as in [2014]; and the extension 
of the term ‘water’ was as much XYZ on Twin Earth in 1750 as in [2014]. (Ibid., p224) 
                                                          
23 The meaning of ‘most’ of our terms, as Johnson-Laird (2002, p84) argues that such things as negation cannot be represented iconically 
and are therefore represented via mental symbols. 
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That is, Putnam’s argument only stands if we accept that the meanings of our terms are immutable. 
However, if this assumption is denied and Johnson-Laird takes the position that semantic content can 
change over time, then Putnam’s problematic conclusions are avoided. Pace Putnam, such a position 
asserts that both theorists of 1750 share the logical form of the surface structure of ‘water’ and, 
therefore, that the term used to name the substance is synonymous for and between the Earth and 
Twin-Earth scientists of 1750 (i.e. ‘water’ means ‘clear, tasteless liquid’ for both). Moreover, this 
position contends that, once the micro level logical form of the substance is discovered, the denoting 
model is updated and meaning splits between the two Earths. In turn, this leads to the position in 2014 
where ‘water’ has a different meaning on Earth than on Twin-Earth. However, it may be contested that 
this necessitates the acceptance of the unintuitive notion that meaning changes depending on 
scientific discovery, and, therefore, that, for example, Archimedes’ use of ‘gold’ is different to our use 
of the term today (cf. Papineau 2014, p171). Nevertheless, this is a conclusion Johnson-Laird (1983, 
pp194-195) freely accepts, stating: 
Natural kind terms can change their extension over time. For example, the word tree originally designated 
oak trees and the word cattle first meant property, then movable property, then livestock, and only finally 
bovine animals[…] The extensions of natural kind terms are not immutable.24 
 
Consequently, Johnson-Laird responds to Putnam’s argument that there exist situations in which two 
individuals with the same mental representation can mean different things by denying such situations 
can arise and by stating that the meaning of our terms are not static. He asserts that our mental models 
correspond only to those things that share their logical form and as these models are updated with 
further knowledge, so is this logical form and those states of affairs to which the model does and does 
not correspond. As such, for Johnson-Laird, the meaning of ‘water’ splits in Putnam’s Twin-Earth 
scenario; experts and the laity mean different things by their use of expert terms (e.g., ‘beech’ and 
‘elm’ may refer to the set of all trees for the layman); and vague terms, such as a politician’s speech 
acts, refer to a large set of entities (i.e., vague and ambiguous terms and propositions either refer to 
nothing and are meaningless or mean all those states of affairs that share its logical form). 
Furthermore, it should be highlighted that a dynamic concept of meaning is consistent within Johnson-
Laird’s philosophy as a whole, which states that all that is meaningful is mental models. Therefore, if 
the mental model to which a natural language term is translated is updated (e.g., by scientific discovery 
into the hidden structure of entities), the meaning of that term must change, must be malleable across 
both time and individuals. 
                                                          
24It should be noted that this is also the response favoured by many contemporary commentators, with Chomsky (2000, p32) stating: 
If I know nothing about elms and beeches beyond the fact that they are large deciduous trees, nothing beyond this information might be 
represented in my mental lexicon. (See also Fodor 2010 pp16-17.) 
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That the informativeness of Frege cases can be explained 
As we saw, another case that demonstrated nuance in the relationships between terms and referents 
arose through substitutivity/Frege cases. Within such cases, it was found that there are certain terms 
(e.g., ‘Charles Dodgson’ and ‘Lewis Carroll’ or ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’) that play a different role 
in the informativeness of propositions although they share the same referent. In response to such 
cases, we saw that Frege moderates his externalism of meaning by establishing both a psychological 
and an empirical element to meaning (i.e., by including sense as well as reference into his description 
of language). Interestingly, this is a response that Johnson-Laird (1983, p192) has, at one point, also 
adopted in response to such cases. He states: 
Something at least is to be found in the mind, and something that has to do with the meaning of words[…] 
I want to[…] restore the study of meaning to psychology. 
In fact, at certain points, Johnson-Laird (Ibid., p203) has gone as far as to state that meaning can be 
derived purely psychologically (i.e., from sense or narrow content alone), asserting that the “meanings 
of some words are mental constructions that are imposed upon the world in the absence of an 
objective correlate”. As such, Johnson-Laird has once taken a position akin to that held by Jerry Fodor 
during the 1980s and touched upon within our literature review: That of narrow, internalist content 
and a moderate internalism (see Fodor 1987; 1991). Nevertheless, and akin to Fodor (1994), this 
moderate internalist position has subsequently been abandoned by Johnson-Laird (1994, p334), who 
later stated that meaning is explained by “show[ing] how linguistic expressions relate to models[…] 
and then [showing] how models relate to the world” alone. In this conception, content is only 
accounted for on a broad, de re, basis, with no role for any form of psychological, narrow content.25 
Consequently, for Johnson-Laird (1988, p107), any symbol (apart from those regarding abstract 
concepts) that is now not grounded is meaningless or leads to fallacious conclusions. However, due to 
this position, Johnson-Laird, like the contemporary Fodor (2010), is forced to adopt a controversial 
strategy in regard to answering the informativeness of Frege cases. For, if narrow content cannot be 
appealed to and meaning is said to be purely de re, such informativeness of substitutivity cannot be 
answered along Fregean lines (i.e. with a distinction between sense and reference, narrow and broad 
content) on pain of inconsistency. In fact, the informativeness of content of Frege cases cannot be 
answered by such de re accounts of meaning at all. Rather, only the apparent informativeness of 
content in Frege cases can be accounted for. For, if broad content or reference alone determines 
meaning of natural kind terms, 'Hesperus' must be synonymous with 'Phosphorus', or 'Charles 
Dodgson' with 'Lewis Carroll': No matter what our perceptions of them are, 'Hesperus is Phosphorus 
                                                          
25 Excepting, of course, those mental symbols for such things as negation and “other abstract concepts” (Johnson-Laird and Khemlani 2013, 
p11), whose inconsistency were analysed in the previous section. However, even granting these mental symbols for abstract concepts, it is 
difficult to see what role this particular form of narrow content can play in Frege cases, cases that do not concern ‘abstract concepts’. 
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and Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson' is exactly as informative as 'Hesperus is Hesperus and Lewis 
Carroll is Lewis Carroll' (or any other truth preserving variation of the co-referring terms). If the two 
propositions appear to possess different levels of informativeness of content, it is that appearance 
alone that merits analysis. Unfortunately, Johnson-Laird fails to provide an explicit analysis of this kind 
within his work. However, one potential strategy open to him can be found within Fodor (1990, p161-
146; 2010, pp68-100), wherein Frege cases are said to not demonstrate informativeness of 
propositions in regard to content, but the informativeness of propositions in regard to beliefs and/or 
desires.26 This form of an explanation proceeds by positing two or more mental representations for 
the one state of affairs (this can be achieved via mental icons possessing a variation of the one fact’s 
logical form) and identifying differing sets of beliefs and desires concerning or attending those 
representations (see Fodor 1990, p167; 2010, p73). For example, an individual may possess two 
synonymous representations, one that picks out the 19th century academic and theologian Charles 
Dodgson and the other that is the icon of the writer of Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll. Along with 
these two, semantically equal, representations, said individual also possesses (for the sake of 
argument) three beliefs concerning these representations: 
1) ‘That Lewis Carroll is Lewis Carroll’ is true. 
2) ‘That Charles Dodgson is Charles Dodgson’ is true. 
3) ‘That Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson’ is false.27 
Consequently, the informativeness found in the propositions ‘Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson’ to such 
a person is not an informativeness of content, but an informativeness of beliefs (and desires): The 
proposition updates or informs the individual’s beliefs, replacing 3) with 4): 
4) ‘That Lewis Carroll is Charles Dodgson’ is true.28 
However, and as we saw in our discussion of LoT2 within our literature review, for this account to 
succeed, it is necessary for an individual to possess both 1), 2) and 3) at the same time, i.e., to 
simultaneously hold mutually inconsistent beliefs. Although this commitment to doublethink may be 
unpalatable to some, it is a phenomenon that Fodor (1990, pp141-144; 2010, pp75-82) freely accepts 
and one that Johnson-Laird must also, on pain – ironically – of inconsistency. Fortunately, this is a 
position Johnson-Laird (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi & Girotto 2004) endorses, identifying a number of real 
                                                          
26 See also McDowell (1977, p173).  
27 Obviously, this is a simplification of the number of belief states concerning the two mental representations that would actually be involved 
in practice: The number has been restricted here for the purposes of presentation only. In reality there would not merely three beliefs at 
play, but many and include, where our examples are concerned, those such as: ‘‘Charles Dodgson is a mathematician’ is true’; ‘‘Lewis Carroll 
is a mathematician’ is false’; ‘‘Lewis Carroll wrote Alice’ is true’; ‘‘Charles Dodgson wrote Alice’ is false’, and many others. Additionally, 
desires as well as beliefs would be included. 
28 Again, this is a simplification of the true state of affairs. In practice, it would not just be the one belief that would be updated, would be 
informed, by the Fregean proposition, but the raft of beliefs attending the two propositions we saw in our previous footnote, i.e., it would 
produce the following set of beliefs: ‘‘Charles Dodgson is a mathematician’ is true’; ‘‘Lewis Carroll is a mathematician’ is true’; ‘‘Lewis Carroll 
wrote Alice’ is true’; ‘‘Charles Dodgson wrote Alice’ is true’, and many others. Again, desires as well as beliefs would also be informed. 
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world cases where mutually inconsistent beliefs or desires are held simultaneously, including the 
Chernobyl engineers who, at the time of the incident, simultaneously believed: 
If the reactor is intact, then it is safe. 
If the reactor is safe, then no graphite is outside it. 
The reactor is intact, and some graphite is outside it. (Ibid., p41) 
As such, this is a position consistent with Johnson-Laird’s stance as a whole and the challenges posed 
to an external semantics by substitutivity/Frege cases can be validly avoided by Johnson-Laird. 
The implementation problem 
There is one final issue raised by Twin and Frege cases, this time concerning the implementation 
problem. It should be remembered that such cases seemingly demonstrated that any solution to the 
hostility between the theories of computation and externalism can only do so in a way that “lead[s] to 
predictive/explanatory failures” (Fodor 1990, p39). That is to say, such breakdowns in the relationship 
between mental representations and states of affairs as highlighted by Putnam and Frege cannot be 
accounted for by a reliable means of reference fixation and any external RTM. Taking this into 
consideration, and as Fodor (Ibid., p24) observes, a potential solution to such a problem is apparent: 
All that follows is this: if psychological laws are broad and computationally implemented, then there must 
be a mechanism whose operation prevents Twin cases and Frege cases from arising among creatures that 
the laws subsume. 
That is to say, if Twin and Frege cases can be demonstrated to not occur, than a reliable form of 
reference fixation is free to answer the implantation problem without difficulties. Our previous 
discussions should demonstrate that this is exactly what Johnson-Laird is capable of doing. For, his 
position that meaning is mutable challenges the supposition at the root of the difficulties that Twin 
cases present: That I and my twin share the same intentional psychology (see Fodor Ibid., p122). 
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that substitutivity/Frege cases may not be what they first appear 
– a breakdown between psychology and referent – but can, in fact, be examples of cognitive 
dissonance and conflicting belief/desire states. Consequently, Johnson-Laird is able to meet the 
assumption that the challenges posed to any solution of the implementation problem by Twin and 
Frege cases are avoidable by denying that true Twin and Frege cases occur. 
Slingshot arguments 
Finally, our literature review diagnosed that to be consistent with correspondence theories, Johnson-
Laird must be opposed to slingshot arguments, i.e. “argument[s…] designed to provide a formally strict 
proof of the claim that all true sentences designate (denote, refer to) one and the same thing, as well 
as all false sentences do” (Shramko and Wansing 2009, p430). Unfortunately, Johnson-Laird never 
explicitly faces the challenges of slingshot arguments, so no firm answers to this assumption can be 
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made here. However, this may still make no difficulties for this research, as the problem of slingshot 
arguments can be dissolved, a dissolution Johnson-Laird can easily uphold without inconsistency. For, 
it may be argued that slingshot arguments are not applicable in standard meaning contexts under 
RTM, as semantic value is not (pace Frege) said to be mere truth value. For, the slingshot arguments 
are dependent on the preservation of logical equivalence, not semantic equivalence, and unless 
semantic content is not taken to be truth value, logical equivalence is not preserved. This therefore 
rejects the formal translation inherent in the slingshot argument, wherein propositions can be 
translated into truth values without loss of meaning. If this is denied (as in Russellian definite 
descriptions, for example), the argument fails. Furthermore, as Davidson (1969 p754) observes: 
I think there is a fairly simple explanation for our frustration: we have so far left language out of account. 
Statements are true or false because of the words used in making them, and it is words that have 
interesting, detailed, conventional connections with the world.  
As such, the blanket translation of propositions into the formal system necessary for the success of 
slingshot arguments can be denied, as it misses the detailed nuance necessary for meaning. 
Consequently, referentialists, such as Johnson-Laird, may follow Baumgartner (2010, p112) in arguing: 
if the question as to the identity of facts is raised in isolation, the fact theorist can easily counter a 
corresponding slingshot by stipulating that facts are fine-grained entities whose identity depends on the 
predicates and singular terms used to state them.  
Consequently, if semantic contents are taken to be states of affairs and not truth values, as is 
diagnosed under Johnson-Laird’s iconicity, slingshot arguments fail and the assumption that slingshot 
arguments can be answered is consistent within his position. 
Summary 
It has been found that, in the majority of cases, the assumptions inherited with a correspondence 
theory of meaning are commensurate with Johnson-Laird’s broader philosophy. However, this 
investigation also identified a number of areas where dissonance seems to have been introduced or 
difficulties have not been addressed. The areas where consistency are found are: 
a) A commitment to externalist semantics.  
b) A rejection of internalist hypotheses and arguments. 
c) An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts. 
d) That a reliable and consistent mode of reference fixation is possible.  
e) An epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
f) An eternalist stance on the metaphysical status of time.  
g) That properties and relations have some form of ontological reality. 
h) That two signs who possess the same referent have the same meaning. 
i) That meaning is mutable. 
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j) That the apparent informativeness of content found in substitutivity/Frege cases can be 
explained. 
k) That the challenges presented to the implementation problem by Twin and Frege cases can 
be resolved 
l) That slingshot arguments can be answered. 
 
The areas where dissonance or incompleteness are found are: 
a) That the limitations of genre or pictorial form, where mental representations are concerned, 
can be accounted for.  
b) That the one-way nature of reference can be explained.  
c) That Brentano’s question/problem can be answered and that reference can be explained in a 
scientifically reducible, empirical way. 
d) The need for determinism. 
e) That counterfactuals (and those propositions that entail negation, disjunctives, empty names 
and modality) can refer to something and therefore remain meaningful without inconsistency. 
 
Consequently, it has been found that the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into 
Johnson-Laird’s philosophy is not wholly consistent. As such, the answer to the last of our research 
questions is a ‘no’. 
Findings 
Through the application of critical philosophical analysis to the arguments and hypotheses of Philip 
Johnson-Laird, a number of results have been derived. Firstly, it has been discovered that externalism 
appears to be the correct approach to take when countering the semantic arguments levelled against 
cognitive science and encapsulated by the CRA and SGP. This conclusion was reached, as it was found 
that grounding symbols to an ontologically real world, that is independent from any one observer, 
successfully introduces language entry and language exit rules into a theory of mind. This grounding 
relation allows symbols, such as Johnson-Laird’s mental models, to get off the language ‘roundabout’.  
 
Secondly, it has been determined that Johnson-Laird’s appropriation of Peirce’s correspondence 
theory of meaning necessitates the inclusion of the problematic concepts of an Interpretant and 
mental signifiers (for such things as negation and other abstract concepts), and that these inclusions 
lead Johnson-Laird into both the homunculus and symbolic fallacies he was trying to avoid by adopting 
a referentialist semantics. Furthermore, these mental signifiers were found to conflict with Johnson-
154 
 
Laird’s own naturalism constraint, in that they introduce something not found in a state of affairs into 
a mental representation. It was further found that dissonance also existed between Peirce and 
Johnson-Laird concerning the role of mental images in cognition. As such, it was concluded that 
Peirce’s theory of iconism is both an internally and externally inconsistent addition to Johnson-Laird’s 
RTM.  
 
Finally, it has been shown that a number of difficulties raised by correspondence theories have not 
been addressed by Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses: The limitations of genre/pictorial form, the one-way 
nature of reference and Brentano’s problem need to be tackled before the theory can be confidently 
accepted. Moreover, it was found that there are difficulties for Johnson-Laird’s theory where free will 
and negation are concerned, as Johnson-Laird’s rejection of determinism is antithetical to 
correspondence theories while his account of negation has been demonstrated to be problematic. 
 
Consequently, In relation to the research questions of this investigation, these findings can be 
summarised thus: 
Q1)  Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of 
the RTM’s commentators (i.e., the CRA, the SGP, holism and the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies)? 
A1)  Yes, Johnson-Laird’s theory is successful where the relation it bears to the CRA, the SGP, 
semantic holism and the homunculus and symbolic fallacies are concerned. 
 
Q2)  Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent? 
A2)  No, Johnson-Laird’s theory fails where both 1) the logical coherence of its specific 
correspondence theory of meaning, in its own right, is concerned and 2) the logical 
coherence between the theory’s iconism and the rest of Johnson-Laird’s account of cognition 
is concerned. 
 
Q3)  Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s broader 
philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
A3)  No, Johnson-Laird’s theory fails where the logical consistency between his existing 
philosophy of mind with the positions necessary for a correspondence theory of meaning, 




As such, the above demonstrates that Johnson-Laird’s theory is not able to answer in the affirmative 
to our three research questions and, following from our Method, is therefore claimed to be falsified.  
Evaluation 
It is necessary to establish the validity and importance of the findings outlined above before asserting 
any final conclusions. That is, it is incumbent on this research to identify potential weaknesses or 
shortcomings of the investigation and make comment upon how these may affect the validity of the 
findings therein, as well as to ascertain the potential influence or interest such findings may have on 
the current literature or to contemporary researchers.  
 
To this end, we must first reaffirm that these findings are only applicable to the work of Johnson-Laird 
and should not be generalised to any other referentialist RTM (as found, for example, in McGinn 1989; 
Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Waskan 2006; Fodor 2010; Rapaport 2011; Schweizer 2012) without 
further work. As we saw in our Method chapter, this limitation is due the fact that, since only the 
hypotheses and arguments of Johnson-Laird were analysed, the nuance that exists between the 
different referentialist RTM positions has not been captured and the scope of this study’s findings will 
not include these other positions.  
 
It should also be clarified that, through this research’s application of the philosophic method of 
analysis and synthesis, the operation of Johnson-Laird’s referentialist philosophy of mind and 
language has perspicuously been demonstrated and, because of this transparency, this research has 
been able to identify areas where inaccuracy are introduced (i.e., signs for negation etc.). Additionally, 
it is of interest to observe that, under a Popperian epistemology, the establishment of logical 
consistency is not sufficient for the determination of a theory’s accuracy, i.e., it is a method that 
cannot aver that it is true that meaning is determined by reference (for there is an infinity of logically 
consistent theories that do not obtain). However, logical inconsistency, for Popper, can be sufficient 
to disprove a theory and can remove it as a ‘provisional conjecture’ (see Popper and Miller 1983, 
pp155-156). Furthermore, under a Quinean epistemology, the establishment of a theory’s accuracy is 
measured against holist principles, that is:  
that scientific statements are not separately vulnerable to adverse observations, because it is only jointly 
as a theory that they imply their observable consequences. (Quine 1987, p228) 
As such, the establishment of a lack of cohesion between the hypotheses that comprise Johnson-
Laird’s theory is sufficient to disprove it under both a Popperian and a Quinean epistemology. 
Consequently, the findings made by this research can be said to be of importance to current literature: 
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They show that there is an error within Johnson-Laird’s philosophy that means that it cannot be an 
accurate description of semantic content and must be removed as a ‘provisional conjecture’. Finally, 
these findings are also of interest in that they support the conclusions of other investigations (e.g., 
Vosgerau 2006). 
 
However, although our findings have been found to be a valid and important contribution, that, in 
itself, is not sufficient for them to be considered conclusive. For, as Popper (1968, p20) argues, only 
the ‘fittest’ of theories, i.e. those who have survived “the fiercest struggle for survival”, can stand with 
any confidence. As such, for the above to remain with any certainty, they will have to first be 
supported by a broader test of Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses than has been undertaken here. That is, 
for confidence in the findings of this thesis to be established, they first have to be triangulated with 
the results of other, methodologically divergent, investigations.  
 
Moreover, although the application of philosophic analysis and synthesis is a repeatable, ordered 
process, that is no guarantee of successful application. For, as Russell (1918, p498) observes: 
When you pass from the vague to the precise by the method of analysis and reflection[…] you always run 
a certain risk of error. If I start with the statement that there are so and so many people in this room, and 
then set to work to make that statement precise, I shall run a great many risks and it will be extremely 
likely that any precise statement I make will be something not true at all. 
As such, this research’s findings not only need to be triangulated with those from methodologically 
divergent studies, they also need to be replicated and confirmed in their own right. 
 
Therefore, although this study’s findings are valid and important on both Popperian and Quinean 
grounds, they can in no way be said to be conclusive. To establish confidence in these findings, further 
research is required to: a) Confirm their (and those of Vosgerau 2006) conclusions; and b) triangulate 
its findings with other forms of investigation.  
Conclusion 
When looking to the conclusions we can draw from our findings, we first have to remind ourselves of 
our Thesis Aim: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 
semantics into such a representational theory of mind. 
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Consequently, it can be seen that the hypothesis in question has been assessed to be invalid; that the 
inclusion of a Peircean iconism within Johnson-Laird’s research project/programme is unsuccessful 
and that we can now state that Peircean iconism, is in itself, both internally and externally inconsistent 
and that a number of updates need to be made to Johnson-Laird’s philosophy as a whole before any 
correspondence theory of meaning can be introduced without difficulty.  
 
However, it was also found that the successful grounding of mental models generally is effective in 
preventing the homunculus and symbolic fallacies as well as meaning holism. As such, this thesis 
concludes that the inclusion of some form of correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s 
mental model RTM, after a number of updates, could be both successful and productive, but that the 
Peircean approach is not so. Finally, it was also found that these findings are both important and 
interesting and support the conclusions from the investigations of others (e.g., Vosgerau 2006). 
However, it should be noted that these findings and conclusions need to be supported by further 











As we have already discussed what our findings might mean, how valuable they are and why they may 
be of interest at the end of the last chapter, this chapter will, following from this, reflect on these 
conclusions and will put forward a number of pertinent interpretations and opinions we have 
concerning them. That is, in contrast to the traditional thesis format, this chapter will solely try to 
clarify some of the implications of this research’s findings and attempt to suggest avenues for related 
future research. To achieve this, this chapter will follow the structure from that of our Findings, with 
our discussion being broken into three sections, each covering pertinent topics and inferences raised 
by each of our research questions: 
1) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of the 
RTM’s commentators (i.e., the CRA, the SGP, holism and the homunculus and symbolic 
fallacies)? 
2) Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and externally 
consistent? 
3) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s broader 
philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
§1 Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic 
objections of the RTM’s commentators? 
The first section of our Findings chapter concluded that the introduction of a correspondence theory 
of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s analogical RTM was a valid strategy for avoiding the issues raised by 
the CRA and the SGP. However, the introduction of this externalism raises some interesting points of 
discussion regarding:  
1) The position any theory that contains externalism must implicitly hold toward the 
mereological fallacy.  




The mereological fallacy 
Firstly, during our Findings chapter it was observed that not only must an individual’s mental signs be 
grounded, but also that individuals must be capable of grounding their own signs, i.e., must possess 
language entry and exit rules. That is, it was observed that meaningful content does not come pre-
loaded. Rather, human cognitive systems possess “original” content (McGinn 1989, p155). As such, 
this causal referentialism propounded by Johnson-Laird – and others – raises further questions 
concerning ‘bedridden AI’, i.e. those systems which “exhibit no "language-entry" and "language-exit" 
transitions, to use Wilfrid Sellars' terms, and have no capacity for non-linguistic perception or bodily 
action” (Dennett 1980, p429). For, it now seems questionable whether systems that do not possess 
original content and the sensory apparatus to interact with the world non-linguistically truly possess 
meaning. Furthermore, this implies that for a man-made system to mimic human understanding (i.e., 
for Strong AI, extra-linguistic interactions with the world are needed to be implemented. Ergo, it 
seems that adopting externalism implicitly demands holding that intelligence is necessarily embodied. 
 
Furthermore, this – implicit – move toward embodied intelligence by Johnson-Laird requires an, as 
yet, unspoken acceptance and reaction to the mereological fallacy. For, this call for referentialism 
must conclude that the mind is not an enclosed system. Rather, externalism claims that for meaning 
and consciousness to be present in a system, that system must be enmeshed with its environment. 
That is, externalists state that the environment is necessary for the content of mental states. 
Consequently, adherents of a referentialist RTM, such as Johnson-Laird, are eo ipso opposed to the 
hypothesis that the mind is solely encapsulated by the brain and therefore inherently accept the 
mereological fallacy (see Bennett and Hacker 2003; Damasio 2005; Byrge et al 2014; Pfeifer et al 2014). 
For example, McGinn (1989 pp15-19; 100-107; 117) argues that his externalism is innately opposed to 
substantialism and any mind/brain identity theory as:  
1) Under substantialism, “the brain does lie literally in the head [rather than being enmeshed 
with its environment]. So it is a consequence of externalism that this simple kind of 
[substantialist] materialism is false” (Ibid. p15). 
2) The referentialist mind does not have any intrinsic properties, only relational ones and so 
cannot be a substance (Ibid. pp100-103), while the brain, quite clearly, is a substance.  
Consequently, any externalist must follow the logical inference and conclude that the mind cannot 
equal the brain. Moreover, this chain of reasoning leads McGinn (1989, p103) to explicitly accept that 
a consistent externalism avoids the mereological fallacy, stating: “what seems immediately clear is 




Weak and strong externalism 
Additionally, we saw in our literature review that correspondence theories of meaning presuppose a 
reliable mode of reference fixation. In this regard, Johnson-Laird’s use of Peirce’s theory of congruent 
reference fixation enables him to answer this question: He answers the question ‘How is reference 
fixed’ with iconicity (i.e., with logical form or relation structure). However, an issue needs to be 
clarified with this hypothesis, an issue that concerns what McGinn (1989, pp7-8) identifies as the 
distinction between strong and weak externalism. A distinction McGinn (Ibid.) defines as: 
Weak externalism[…] is the thesis that a given mental state requires the existence of some item belonging 
to the nonmental world, and that its identity turns on that item. Strong externalism[…] is the thesis that 
a given mental state requires the existence in the environment of the subject of some item belonging to 
the nonmental world, and that its identity turns on that item. The latter thesis is stronger than the former 
because the former does not entail that the subject of the mental state in question should be 
environmentally related to the extramental item in question – as it might be, causally. Crudely put, strong 
externalism ties mental states to a particular part of the world – the part the subject himself inhabits – 
while weak externalism ties mental states to the world at large, whether or not the required nonmental 
entity is where the subject himself is located. (McGinn 1989, pp7-8) 
This distinction is pertinent, as Johnson-Laird has not clarified the criteria that delimits to what an 
iconic mental model refers and is said to mean. That is, he has not answered the question: Can icons 
only correspond to those states of affairs with which an individual is causally related (i.e. does he hold 
strong externalism) or can they be linked to any state of affairs in the universe regardless of its relation 
to the individual (i.e. does he hold weak externalism)? That this distinction is important and needs to 
be clarified by Johnson-Laird’s theory can be seen once we analyse both types of externalism and see 
that each raise questions that need to be answered before a theory that contains them is to remain 
valid. 
 
For, to hold strong externalism is to hold that some form of causal connection needs to be established 
between items in an individual’s environment and that individual’s mental models to institute content. 
That is, under strong externalism, although iconism is necessary for reference it is not sufficient, 
iconism and an appropriate causal relation are. However, such an appropriate causal relation is 
currently absent from Johnson-Laird’s philosophy and needs to be introduced if he is to validly hold 
strong externalism. Nevertheless, establishing such an appropriate causal relationship may be 
problematic. For example, if this appropriate cause is identified with reliable perceptual experiences 
of states of affairs, as McGinn (1989, pp70-80) argues to be intuitively the case for strong externalism, 
then it seems we are led into some form of circularity. For, how can we individuate a state of affairs 
unless we already know and understand it? Or, as McGinn (Ibid.) argues: 
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there is a circularity lurking within the heart of [causal theories of perceptual content…] The circularity 
comes into focus when we ask what sort of causal relation it is that confers content. It cannot, of course, 
be any old causal relation – or else any property instantiated along the incoming causal chain would come 
to be represented by the experience. We need to single out the right kind of distal object, viz. the kind of 
object that is perceived once the content has been acquired. But now it seems unavoidable that the 
causal relation we need to isolate be identified as the perception relation itself. The theory then is that 
experiences come to have their content by virtue of being perceptions of the property in question[…] an 
experience can only count as a perception of an F if it already has the content F. 
That is, if the appropriate causal relation between an individual and a state of affairs is taken to be 
that individual’s reliable perceptual experience of that state of affairs, then for the capacity to fix 
content, an individual first needs to know to what that content refers (i.e., to understand a property 
etc., a person must already understand that property etc.). As such, the intuitive notion of perceptual 
experience is an unsuccessful candidate for an appropriate causal relation and, before strong 
externalism can be adhered to without inconsistency, Johnson-Laird needs to first identify a valid and 
appropriate causal relation for reference fixation.1  
 
However, weak externalism also seems to be problematic; it also seems to lead to unintuitive or 
inconsistent consequences. For example, compare A) a dream of a specific state of affairs, a particular 
sculpture say, with B) hearing a report or description of a real sculpture that just happens to possess 
the identical logical form as that from the dream. In both these cases a mental representation with an 
identical logical form, or relation structure, is generated; a mental representation that is the icon of 
an ontologically real fact. Now, if iconicity alone is said to be sufficient for reference fixation (i.e., if no 
further criteria for reference is established), this means that the mental model produced from A) is 
equally as meaningful as B) and both A) and B) are about the ontologically real fact. This is a situation 
that intuitively seems to be false, it seems instinctive that we do not want to hold a theory that 
concludes that made up fantasies, which just coincidentally share the logical form of real states of 
affairs, are actually meaningful locutions about that state of affairs, even if the individual that 
possesses the model denies they are (cf. an ant’s drawing of Churchill in Putnam 1981, p1).2  
 
Therefore, it seems that if Johnson-Laird accepts strong externalism, his iconicity needs to be 
developed: As the logical form alone is only necessary for reference fixation (i.e., not sufficient) and 
something further is needed (e.g., some valid and non-circular appropriate cause). However, this leads 
                                                          
1 McGinn (1989, pp1-119) also offers further arguments against the notion of strong externalism other than those surrounding appropriate 
causal relationships. Additionally, for further issues concerning appropriate causal relationships in strong externalism, see the literature 
surrounding Kripke’s Naming and necessity 
2 Some, such as Devitt (2014, pp270-271), may reject the use of intuition here. However, others argue for the validity for such an approach 
(e.g., Gendler 2010; Papineau 2014, pp186-189). 
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us into a number of difficulties, the least of which being to establish a valid definition of ‘appropriate 
cause’.3 Nevertheless, if Johnson-Laird rejects strong externalism and adopts a weak form of 
referentialism, he is tasked with explaining the unintuitive notion that certain signs (e.g., those made 
by individuals with no knowledge of states of affairs) are meaningful. 
Summary 
The first section of our Findings chapter found that the introduction of externalism into Johnson-
Laird’s philosophy of mind was successful in its aims (i.e., in averting the CRA and SGP). However, this 
update rises a couple of areas for discussion: 
1) Our Findings chapter found that certain versions of the RTM are able to avoid the issues raised 
by the CRA and SGP by introducing language entry and language exit rules. However, it was 
also identified that the implementation of such rules requires extra-linguistic interaction with 
a system’s environment (see Dennett 1980). This necessity entails that unembodied 
‘cognitive’ systems, or bedridden AI, are not capable of grounding their symbols and, 
therefore, of possessing true semantic content. Consequently, to hold such a position 
concludes in accepting that only embodied systems (i.e., those with extra-linguistic perceptual 
systems) are capable of true cognition. Furthermore, the complex and embodied 
intercommunication with the world such extra-linguistic interaction necessitates implies that 
cognition must be spread over both these systems and the world (see McGinn 1989, pp100-
107). Consequently, it seems that those who argue for a referentialist RTM (e.g., McGinn 1989; 
Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Johnson-Laird 2002; Waskan 2006; Fodor 2010; Rapaport 2011; 
Schweizer 2012) implicitly accept the arguments from Bennett and Hacker (2003) concerning 
the mereological fallacy and have made steps to ensure that such an argument can no longer 
be used as ammunition against their philosophy of mind.4 
 
2) Although it is clear that Johnson-Laird has introduced a form of referentialism into his 
philosophy of mind to avoid the issues raised by the CRA and the SGP, he has not yet clarified 
which type of externalism has been introduced. That is, he has not identified whether his 
iconism encompasses a strong or a weak externalism. This deficit is important, for if it is 
clarified that he holds the former, then he is tasked with clarifying a valid and consistent 
appropriate cause that establishes reference along with iconism. Alternatively, if Johnson-
Laird adheres to a weak externalism, he must explain the unintuitive notion of icons referring 
to and meaning unknown and unintended states of affairs. 
                                                          
3 Some of these difficulties are discussed by McGinn (1989, pp70-89).  
4 A rigorous analysis of the success of these steps is outside the purview of this research. 
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§2 Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning both internally and 
externally consistent? 
From the second section of our Findings chapter, it was discovered that Johnson-Laird’s appropriation 
of Peirce’s correspondence theory of meaning not only inevitably leads him into the homunculus and 
symbolic fallacies, but also produces other, fatal, inconsistencies and deficiencies. As such, although 
the first section of our Findings chapter found that analogue representations must explain semantic 
content via some form of referentialism or correspondence theory, it is now not clear what form of 
correspondence it should take (i.e., not which type of externalism, not whether the externalism is of 
a strong or a weak nature), except that it cannot be along strict Peircean lines.5 As such, it seems that 
an investigation into referentialist theories of meaning that can be validly and consistently applied to 
Johnson-Laird’s analogical models, and an attempt to sketch a solution to the deficit, which the 
removal of Peirce from Johnson-Laird’s philosophy creates, may be of some interest within these 
pages as well as for future research. Subsequently, this section will engage in a discussion of how the 
deficit created by the removal of Peirce may be rectified. 
Alternative correspondence theories of meaning and a criteria of success 
For Johnson-Laird’s explanation of cognition and semantics to remain valid, how the analogous mental 
models at the heart of his theory connect with reality needs to be revised. That is, his correspondence 
theory of meaning needs to be updated. For this to be achieved, a replacement referentialist theory 
of semantics that aligns with Johnson-Laird’s analogous mental models and that can be suitably 
grafted onto his existent theory without inconsistency and/or deficiency needs to be found. Many 
potential replacements can readily be identified within the literature (e.g. Russell 1918; McGinn 1989; 
Waskan 2006; Fodor 2010), however this discussion will not attempt to find or construct the most apt 
referentialist semantics for Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models. Rather, this discussion will limit 
its ambitions to constructing a criteria for success against which such theories can usefully be 
measured. To construct such a measure, we have looked to the findings from our investigations into 
correspondence theories of meaning and the hypotheses of Johnson-Laird to divine a raft of key 
criteria. Consequently, this thesis proposes that any prospective semantic explanation will only be 
considered a valid and productive contribution to Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory if, and only if, 
it is able to answer in the affirmative to the following questions: 
1) Is the theory based on a correspondence between word and world? 
                                                          
5 Interestingly, this leaves us in a position Johnson-Laird was in the 1980s and 1990s, with the details and minutia of the relation between 
mental models and the world not being clear. 
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2) Does the theory explain how a specific proposition corresponds to a specific state of affairs 
through a congruent process akin to that which Peirce terms iconicity? That is, does the theory 
answer in the affirmative to the following: 
a. Do propositions mirror, are analogous to or are isomorphic with a state of affairs in 
the world?6 
b. Do propositions contain or mirror the same components that make up the relevant 
state of affairs? 
c. Do the relations between the components of a proposition mirror the relations 
between the parts found in its corresponding state of affairs? 
3) Does the theory provide a full account of the foundation of meaning in counterfactuals? 
4) Is the theory able to account for negation? 
5) Is the theory free from any form of purely mental symbolism? 
6) Is the theory absent from hypotheses which lead to the creation of other tensions within 
Johnson-Laird’s theory as a whole (e.g. to his theory of reasoning etc.)? 
 
Now this criteria of success has been proposed, it needs to be both demonstrated and tested. To this 
end, a raft of semantic theories propose themselves, however, this discussion will attempt to 
authenticate its measure by using a paradigm correspondence theory of meaning that can be found 
in one of the most influential philosophical works of the twentieth century: Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus. This work is famous for its introduction of the concept of the ‘picture theory’ of 
meaning into the philosophy of language and is an archetypal account of correspondence by 
congruence.7 However, before we can begin an investigation into the picture theory of meaning’s 
validity for Johnson-Laird, it should be noted there are a number of competing and highly divergent 
interpretations of the Tractatus and that the one that will be taken by this thesis can in no way be 
considered an uncontroversial reading of Wittgenstein. When looking to the relevant literature, 
Positivist (e.g. Carnap 1959) as well as Resolute (both weak (e.g. Diamond 1981; Conant 2000; Kuusela 
2011) and strong (e.g. Rickets 1996; Read and Deans 2003; Goldfarb 2011)) readings of the Tractatus 
can be found alongside the ‘standard’ Ineffable interpretation this thesis will favour and which is 
                                                          
6 Taking cognitive science (as defined by this research) and Johnson-Laird’s conception of ‘world’. 
7 Although, as Stern (1995, p36) points out, the standard translation of Wittgenstein’s “Bild” is “picture”, this may in fact be a misnomer that 
could create confusion. This is because the term “picture” inspires a potentially incorrect image of the operation of Wittgenstein’s use of 
“Bild” that does not fully capture the isomorphic character it is said in 4.014 to possess. Therefore, Stern recommends that either the term 
“Bild” is maintained when discussing the theory, or that, following the usual translation of Hertz’s The Principles of Mechanics (a work that 
greatly inspired the writing of the TL-P (see 4.04, 6.361)), the term should be translated into “model”, which does capture the original nature 
It can easily be perceived why following this proposal would be preferable given the project of this chapter, but, as “picture theory” is the 
standard translation, confusion may be generated when quoting other works. As such, this discussion will follow convention and continue 
use of the incorrect “picture” phraseology.  
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exemplified by the likes of Hacker (1997) and Mounce (2003).8 Finally, it needs to be highlighted that 
a connection between the works of Wittgenstein and Johnson-Laird is not a novel, nor a controversial, 
observation and has been articulated a number of times in the past. For example, both McGinn (1989, 
pp176-177) and Waskan (2006, pp171-172) have observed a relation between Wittgenstein and Craik 
(and therefore, by extension, with Johnson-Laird). Additionally, Johnson-Laird (2002, p80) has himself 
identified a connection between his own work and Wittgenstein’s, stating: 
Early formulations of iconicity were Maxwell’s (1910) analysis of diagram and Wittgenstein’s (1922) 
“picture” theory of meaning[.] 
This is a sentiment he has expressed on a number of different occasions (see also Johnson-Laird 1993, 
p4; 2005, p186; 2006, p435), but one which, unfortunately, misses the subtle differences between the 
nuanced positions held by the two correspondence theorists (Peirce and Wittgenstein).9 
 
Now these preliminaries have been established, it may be enlightening to first outline Wittgenstein’s 
picture theory before we compare it against our criteria of success. As such, this discussion will 
continue with a description of the ineffable Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (hereinafter, the T-LP). 
Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning 
When first introduced to the ideas contained within the TL-P, it is important to be aware that the 
picture theory of meaning is based on two important hypotheses:  
i) Wittgenstein’s insights into the logical structure of representation.  
ii) His metaphysical views on the structure of the world, views I will refer to, following 
standard phraseology from the secondary literature, as logical atomism.10  
Language as representation 
The germ for the particular theory of semantics which is the backbone to the TL-P can be found in a 
remark from Wittgenstein’s notebooks made on 29/09/1914, in which it is stated: 
The general concept of the proposition carries with it a quite general concept of the coordination of 
proposition and situation: The solution to all my questions must be extremely simple. 
In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally. (As when in the law-court in Paris a 
motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.) 
                                                          
8 This metaphysical reading of the TL-P is – pragmatically – being favoured as it is one that contains a complete correspondence theory of 
meaning and only because of this fact. This thesis is making no comment on exegesis nor authorial intent.  
9 Interestingly, Johnson-Laird has previously demonstrated an aversion to the work of Wittgenstein within his writings. An aversion identified 
by Wason (1996) and described by Garnham (1996, p51) as a “dislike”. 
10 It should be highlighted that Wittgenstein may not agree with this designation due to certain theoretical divergences between Russell, 
from whom the name derives, and himself. 
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Here Wittgenstein believes he has hit upon a discovery which will eventually lead to an understanding 
of the nature of propositions and meaning.11 In becoming aware of the relationship between language 
and the modelling process employed by the Parisian law courts, Wittgenstein has had the insight that 
both are equivalent forms of communication, that both are equivalent methods used to describe a 
possible state of affairs, but which are doing so via differing media (one by physical symbolic objects 
and the other by written or spoken symbolism). The inevitable conclusion of such a line of thought 
was the realisation that an investigation into how models and other common forms of depiction are 
able to describe the world will lead, ex hypothesi, to insights into how language is also able to do the 
same (4.014 – 4.016).12 To express this line of thought succinctly: Wittgenstein’s conclusion that 
language and representation are intimately related is initially derived from the following logical 
process:  
(1) Communication is representation. 
(2) All representations operate using the same laws of depiction. 
(3) Language is a form of communication. 
 ∴    
(4) Language is a form of representation (following (3) and (1)). 
 ∴    
(5) Language must operate using common laws of depiction (following (4) and (2)). 
 ∴    
(6) An investigation into the laws of depiction will constitute an investigation into the nature of 
language. 
 
Later, in the TL-P itself, Wittgenstein builds upon these thoughts, detailing a further argument to 
support his thesis that propositions are pictures and, therefore, that an investigation into 
representation constitutes an investigation into language. During phrases 4.016-4.021 and 4.03, 
Wittgenstein supports his hypothesis by appealing to the fact that a sentence which an individual has 
never previously encountered, can, unlike a name (4.026), but analogous to any other kind of 
commonly regarded picture (2.172), still successfully express its sense and is able to be meaningful 
even though that meaning has never been explained or defined for that person (4.02) (i.e. it is possible 
for old expressions to communicate a new sense (4.03)). That is, as part of the definition of any picture 
is that its sense is apparent to an individual without definition (4.172), then, following modus ponens, 
if propositions are able to do the same then they should be classified as pictures. Ergo, as language 
                                                          
11 This particular story about the Parisian law courts and the genesis of Wittgenstein’s picture theory entered the zeitgeist through von 
Wright (1955). 
12 All references structured in this way will, unless specified, allude to the numbered propositions found within the Pears and McGuiness 
translation of the TL-P. 
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does behave in this manner (4.021), it is therefore a mode of depiction (4.01). Finally, Wittgenstein 
also supports this classification of language as a form of depiction by appealing to the fact that the 
origins of written language are to be found in hieroglyphic script (4.016). This early form of symbolism 
operates more obviously via depiction than the symbolism of today, but what is not obviously 
apparent is that our current “alphabetic script developed out of [hieroglyphic script] without losing 
what was essential to depiction” (Ibid.). The implication of this being: Although our common scripts 
are not obviously built upon the laws of representation, we ought to look to those scripts’ histories 
and origins in hieroglyphs to see that we should not be fooled by appearances, but instead be assured 
of their fundamental pictorial nature via analysis. 
The nature of representation 
These initial discoveries lead Wittgenstein into a deeper examination into the nature of representation 
more generally, which results in him gaining a greater appreciation of its variegated forms of 
instantiation, becoming aware that “not only paintings, drawings, photographs and other obviously 
pictorial representations[…] but also maps, sculptures, three-dimensional models, and even such 
things as musical scores and gramophone records” (Kenny 1975, p54) are examples of pictures. From 
an analysis of this broad range of exemplars, Wittgenstein draws three main properties common to 
all forms of representation, and which must be present within any medium of depiction (including 
language) for it to function as such. These are: 
(i) That those individual elements that constitute a representation (e.g. a doll in a 3D model or a 
word in a proposition) must correspond to an individual element in the represented state of 
affairs (2.13-2.131). 
(ii) That the relationship between the elements in the represented state of affairs must be 
mirrored in the relationship between their corresponding elements in the representation 
(2.14, 3.21). 
and 
(iii) That a representation must be able to not represent the world, i.e., must be capable of being 
false as well as being true (2.21).13 
 
To clearly explicate the role and implications of these three properties in and upon language, it will be 
necessary to divide this section. As such, we will: 1) Looking into the above three properties’ 
repercussions upon true propositions; and 2) investigate their repercussions upon false and negative 
propositions.  
                                                          
13 These three properties have also been articulated as Wittgenstein’s analysis that representations must have 1) Content, 2) Structure and 




The obvious implication upon language of function i) above is that a proposition (i.e. an interpretable 
sentence) “does not have meaning in itself, but requires some supplementation in order to acquire a 
complete meaning” (Russell and Whitehead 1999, p44). As such, propositions need to correspond with 
a state of affairs found in the world to acquire meaning. That is, a proposition’s truth is determined 
by “a corresponding complex of the objects” of the proposition (Ibid.). Ergo, where language is 
concerned, for the Ineffable TL-P, truth is based on realist principles and the objective construction of 
the world. This is explained through the fact that propositions are not discrete individual units (3.143), 
but are in fact composite structures (2.0122), what makes a proposition a proposition is that it is built 
from individual simple words that correspond to, and therefore mean, simple objects in the world 
(3.203, 3.22) (due to this naming relation between sign and object, these base words are called 
‘names’ (3.202)). But this raises the question: How, exactly, does a specific word name a specific 
object? How is a standardised correspondence between a name and an object established? Within 
the TL-P, Wittgenstein identifies that this link is established by a random naming relation, i.e. “we 
make an arbitrary determination” (5.473). Therefore, what correlates a sign to an object (making it a 
symbol) is a conscious act of christening by a person or group. Furthermore, Wittgenstein contends 
that for a proposition to be meaningful, it must not only be composed from individual mental entities 
that refer to an object, but the organisation – the logical form – of the representations in the 
proposition must mirror the organisation – the logical form – of the entities as they are found in the 
state of affairs in the world (2.15). 
 
In summary then, names realise the first of the properties identified by Wittgenstein and the 
organisation of these names the second. That is, the relationship between names in a propositions 
mirror the organisation of the objects in the state of affairs referenced (3.14, 3.21).14 
False and negative propositions 
However, there appears to be an apparent tension with representations’ final property, for how can 
(iii) now be possible without violating functions (i) and (ii)? How can a picture still be a picture if it is 
false and if its elements, by definition, then do not mirror what they represent? Wittgenstein realised 
that this issue only arises if we mistakenly think that a model as a whole behaves exactly like its 
elements (or, in the case of language, if a proposition’s behaviour is akin to a name’s). To solve this 
problem, we need to realise that the semantic behaviour of the two are not identical; we need to 
realise that, as Wittgenstein states in his Notebooks (p95), “a proposition [or a picture as a whole] is a 
                                                          
14 Interestingly, this reliance on an ‘arbitrary determination’ for fixing the reference of names (i.e., property (i)) and logical form (i.e., property 
(ii)) makes the picture theory, technically, an amalgamation of correspondence by correlation and correspondence by congruence. 
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standard to which facts behave; with names [or pictorial elements] it is otherwise”. As a result, 
whereas names (or pictorial elements) derive their meaning [Bedeutung] from a direct 
correspondence with an item found in the world (3.203), propositions (or whole pictures) get their 
sense [Sinn] by being compared to reality (3.3). This is why “names are like points: propositions like 
arrows” (3.144), names and other pictorial elements are defined and specific, whereas propositions 
and other pictures are freer (3.221). As such, whereas these aforementioned pictorial elements have 
to have a veridical connection with reality, propositions and full pictures do not; they are able to depict 
possible realities (2.201-2.203) which can then be compared to the world or, in the language of the 
TL-P, can be “laid against reality like a measure” (2.1521). Pictures, therefore, are not limited to how 
we find the world like names are, they can experimentally combine the world’s simple objects, which 
do obtain, to generate states of affairs, which do not, thereby solve our apparent problem of how 
pictures are capable of being false. This former fact (that it is names which provide meaning 
[Bedeutung]) can be seen in that both a proposition and its negation have the same constituents and 
therefore the same meaning [Bedeutung] (4.024), yet, although p and not-p mean the same, they have 
a completely differing sense that, after being compared to reality (2.223), can be either true or false. 
 
This distinction, between the behaviour of names and propositions, is founded upon work we have 
already encountered by Gottlob Frege, who, whilst realising that the object a name refers to (i.e. its 
referent) provides it with its meaning, identified that there are situations where reference 
[Bedeutung] is not enough, where sense [Sinn] is also required. As such, along with a metaphysical 
constituent for semantic content operating within the picture theory of meaning, a psychological 
aspect is introduced, i.e. Wittgenstein’s picture theory employs both narrow and broad content. It is 
important to note here, though, that Wittgenstein does not view the meaning of pictures (i.e. 
propositions) or its elements (i.e. names) as being entirely and independently constituted by either its 
sense (narrow content) or referent (broad content) respectively. It is just meant that for the provision 
of semantic content, it is necessary that both sense [Sinn] (2.221) and referent [Bedeutung] (3.203) 
are present. When Wittgenstein is translated as saying that “only propositions have sense” (3.3), this 
should not be taken to mean that he holds the opinion that names are a separate entity who derive 
their meaning totally from their referent and have nothing to do with sense. This is seen in the original 
German, where it is stated: “Nur der Satz hat Sinn; nur im Zusammenhang des Satzes hat ein Name 
Bedeutung” (my emphasis). Implying, in accordance with the context principle from Frege (1980, px) 
(i.e. “never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition”), 
that words are meaningless while on their own (irrespective of either sense or reference). The point 
here is that both Bedeutung and Sinn are only present in “the nexus of a proposition” (3.3). That is, in 
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the words of Kenny (1973, p5), “the understanding of names and the understanding of propositions 
stand or fall together”. Instead of any putative independence, propositions actually have both 
meaning and sense [Bedeutung und Sinn]: Its constituents provide the meaning and the picture as a 
whole its sense (3.3). 
 
All this provides the groundwork for an explanation of negative statements. Wittgenstein employs this 
distinction between sense and reference to explain statements such as ‘There is not a car in this room’, 
by arguing that this type of proposition refers to the same state of affairs as its un-negated counterpart 
(‘There is a car in this room’), but asserting that the two propositions possess a different sense 
(4.0621). Wittgenstein further states that this difference in sense is created by an operation that 
reverses the truth-values of the elementary proposition (5.2341), thereby reversing the false sense of 
‘There is a car in this room’ to the true statement ‘There is not a car in this room’. However, what 
needs to be answered here is: What signifies that this operation is to be performed on the sense/truth 
functions of a proposition? That is: How do we know when an operation is to be carried out? Looking 
to the TL-P we find: 
4.0621 But it is important that the signs ’p’ and ‘~p’ can say the same thing. For it shows that nothing in 
reality corresponds to the sign ‘~’. 
The occurrence of negation in a proposition is not enough to characterize its sense ‘~~p = p’. 
The propositions ‘p’ and ‘~p’ have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same 
reality[...] 
5.2341 The sense of a truth function of p is a function of the sense of p. 
Negation, logical addition, logical multiplication, etc. are operations. 
(Negation reverses the sense of a proposition.) 
Consequently, it appears that it is the symbol ‘~’, or ‘not’ in natural language, that signifies that an 
operation on the sense of a proposition is to be performed. As such, Wittgenstein, like Peirce, employs 
a sign for negation.15 
 
 
                                                          
15 There is one further conclusion that this necessity for a proposition to possess both meaning and sense leads to and that may be of 
interest. This reliance on sense, and the need that a proposition must be compared to reality to uncover its truth-values, suggests that only 
declarative sentences, i.e., those with truth values such as ‘The book is on the desk’, are covered by Wittgenstein’s theory of semantics. 
Although this may be the case, a lot of seemingly meaningful communication relies on non-declarative sentences. For example, statements 
such as ‘Shut the door!’ or ‘Is the door shut?’ seem to be meaningful yet they cannot be said to be either true or false. Consequently, 
Wittgenstein’s use of sense in this regard seems to exclude a large number of generally accepted propositions from meaningful discourse. 
A possible solution to this deficit may be found in Lewis (1970), who argues that such non-declarative sentences can be, after analysis, 
reduced to declarative sentences by the use of performative verbs. For example, ‘Shut the door!’ will be reduced to ‘I tell you to shut the 
door’ and ‘Is the door shut?’ to ‘I ask you if the door is shut’. This is an approach that accords with comments found within the TL-P itself: 
4.002[…] Language disguises the thought; so that from the external form of the clothes one cannot infer the form of the thought they clothe, 
because the external form of the clothes is constructed with quite another object than to let the form of the body be recognized. 
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The doctrine of showing 
However, along with true and false propositions, which can say their meaning, Wittgenstein identifies 
a further form of proposition: Those that show their meaning. This term, that of ‘showing’ or of being 
‘shown’, highlights a theory at the very heart of the TL-P and one whose understanding is vital if the 
message of that work is to be comprehended. In fact, Wittgenstein said of the doctrine in his Letters 
from Cambridge (p98): 
The main point is the theory of what can be expressed (gesagt) by prop[osition]s – ie by language[...] and 
what can not be expressed by prop[osition]s, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I believe, is the cardinal 
problem of philosophy. 
 
To clarify, this cardinal problem of philosophy, and arguably the main point of the TL-P, concerns those 
propositions that attempt to express things that are fundamentally ineffable and entails a number of 
sub-theses that deserve explication in their own right. 
Saying and Showing 
When gaining an understanding of what the concept of ‘showing’ is, it is important to appreciate that 
its meaning only becomes clear when we see it in its right context: On one arm of a dichotomy opposed 
to ‘saying’. That is to say, within language there are two ways in which items can be expressed: Those 
that can be said and those which can only be shown. The character of the former type (things that can 
be said) is quite apparent: They are the things which can be detailed and described using the operation 
of language and words we have detailed above. As for the latter (those that can only be shown), this 
is not the case: They cannot be put into words. As such, when we wish to express such thoughts, we 
must employ nonsensical language in such a manner as to portray these ineffable concepts. 
Consequently, these are merely pseudo-propositions that “say nothing” (4.461), instead the very 
structure of the language used to express them (i.e., logical form) informs us about those aspects of 
the world they are attempting to convey. In this sense, the expressions are informative as they let us 
‘read off’ such things as logical truths from them.16 This is the view that, according to Hacker (2001, 
pp14-15), certain sentences: 
fail to conform with the logical syntax of language and are a self-conscious attempt to say what can only 
be, and indeed is, shown by features of the relevant symbolism[…] hence they lack sense. They are not 
nonsense, but senseless, i.e. have, in a manner of speaking, zero sense. 
Or, as Wittgenstein expresses it in ‘Some remarks on Logical Form’ (p169): 
                                                          
16 Within the literature the term 'pseudo-proposition' is used to denote a string of words which appears to be a united and interpretable 
declarative sentence that can communicate a sense [Sinn] from one individual to another but which in fact is not. That is to say, a pseudo-
proposition is a meaningless string of words which only appears to be a proposition. Although these forms of proposition appear to be 
readily interpretable (i.e. can easily be mistaken to express a sense and contain semantic content) on first appearance it is important to 
recognise that after analysis it is revealed that such strings in fact are not (i.e. they express no sense and are linguistically meaningless). 
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the forms of the entities are contained in the form of the proposition which is about these entities. For 
the sentence, together with the mode of projection which projects reality into the sentence, determines 
the logical form of the entities. 
Nonsense 
To fully appreciate this operation of showing, it will be illuminating to analyse Wittgenstein’s nuanced 
use of the term ‘nonsense’ in the TL-P. Within the work, Wittgenstein uses a number of terms to signify 
nonsensical propositions: 
1) Sinnlos: Denote expressions that are best described as ‘saying nothing’. In the TL-P the phrase 
is used in connection with logic, tautologies and contradictions (see 4.461; 5.132; 5.5351). 
As such, it appears to be a ‘positive’ form of nonsense, identifying propositions which, 
because of the subject matter, are not able to possess sense.  
2) Unsinn/unsinnig: Best described as ‘utter nonsense’. More commonly used in the TL-P than 
Sinnlos, Unsinn/unsinnig appears to be the harshest distinction of a nonsense term and 
refers to expressions which are just plain, straightforward, nonsense (for Unsinn see p4; 
5.5303; 5.5351; 5.5422; 5.571, for unsinnig see 3.34; 4.003; 4.124; 4.1272; 4.1274; 4.4611; 
5.73; 5.5351; 6.51; 6.54).17 
As such, although some propositions do not picture a real or possible state of affairs, some do so while 
being Sinnlos while others are Unsinn/unsinnig. Both types of propositions are technically nonsensical, 
however the latter can tell us nothing (e.g., “Socrates is identical” (5.473), while the former’s logical 
form can show us certain truths that cannot be put into words (e.g., “it is either raining or not raining” 
(4.461)). 
The operation of representation 
While Wittgenstein covers what representations do, he also explains how representations are able to 
do so. From this investigation Wittgenstein uncovers a range of characteristics which any 
representation must possess in order to represent. These are:  
4) Have structure: The particular connexion of axiomatic elements that comprise a 
representation, e.g. the relationship between the dolls in the Parisian law court (2.15). 
5) Possess pictorial form: The way a depiction’s structure mirrors that of a state of affairs found 
within the world. For example, a model mirrors the three-dimensional and spatial relation of 
a scene’s objects, while a painting depicts the relation of its colours (2.15-2.17). 
                                                          
17 However, some read Wittgenstein’s use of ‘nonsense’ as more nuanced than is presented here. These theorists, such as Lugg (2003, p343), 
argue that unsinng propositions do not express sheer nonsense, but are in fact a form of showing, averring that propositions are: 
sinnlos when taken to ‘represent [stellen]’ the ‘scaffolding of the world’, and as unsinnig when taken to ‘describe’ it (6.124)[...] in both case 
the thoughts in question have to be presented, displayed, exhibited (rather than represented, asserted, said). 
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6) Possess representational form: The media from which a picture is created. For example, a 
painting has a representational form based upon colour and an architect’s model one from 
spatial extension (2.173). 
7) Possess logical form: The fundamental structure which any depiction must have in order to 
represent a state of affairs via any medium (i.e. via any pictorial and representational form). 
For example, a sculpture, a painting and a sentence that all picture the same state of affairs 
have different pictorial and representational forms, but all have the same logical form. That is 
how they are all pictures of the same event, yet still picture differently (2.18). 
8) Be a logical picture: Be a representation whose pictorial form is logical form. Therefore, as 
every picture that represents the world must do so using logical form (no matter its pictorial 
form), every picture is, perforce, a logical one (2.181-2.182). 
9) Possess logico-pictorial form: Logico-pictorial form is what everything that can be considered 
a representation must have, to be a picture qua picture. It is a conflation expressing the 
necessity that before a representation can represent it must first possess logical form and 
some sort of pictorial form in common with that being represented, thereby highlighting the 
need for the possession of all five previous functions to represent (2.2).  
 
Therefore, the conclusions that Wittgenstein draws from his investigation into the operation of 
picturing, are that for an image’s elements to mirror those of a state of affairs, its representational 
form must show its fundamental structure via its pictorial form. This fundamental structure must, in 
turn, possess logical form in common with the aforementioned state of affairs. If this is the case, the 
representation has attained logico-pictorial form, is considered a logical picture, has a sense and 
successfully depicts a portion of the world (either rightly or wrongly). 
Summary 
A summary of Wittgenstein's analysis of representation can be found in Kenny (1975, pp62-63) who 
highlights the following eight crucial theses that are the result of the TL-P’s analysis: 
(1) A proposition is essentially composite. 
(2) The elements which compose a proposition are correlated by human decision with 
elements or reality. 
(3) The combination of such correlated elements into a proposition presents – without 
further human intervention – a possible state of affairs. 
(4) A proposition stands in an internal relation to the possible state of affairs which it 
presents. 
(5) This internal relationship can only be shown, it cannot be informatively stated. 
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(6) A proposition is true or false in virtue of agreement or disagreement with reality. 
(7) A proposition must be independent of the actual state of affairs which makes it true 
or makes it false 
(8) No proposition is a priori true. 
 
Once this, primarily congruent or isomorphic, operation of language has been analysed and detailed, 
the next question that the picture theory needs to answer is: What, exactly, is it that these 
representations are depicting? That is: What are these worldly objects with which names are supposed 
to be correlated? For, it is obvious that the TL-P’s account of meaning can only be accurate if it 
investigates and explains that which is represented along with representation. These are questions 
whose answers can be found within the TL-P by a metaphysical doctrine identified within the 
secondary literature as the theory of ‘logical atomism’. 
Logical atomism 
Now we have explained the first of Wittgenstein’s conceptions we identified as comprising the central 
hypotheses of the TL-P, we can move on to detailing his second: His metaphysical theory of the make-
up of reality, i.e., of the composition of the world. Within the secondary literature, this theory has 
been labelled ‘logical atomism’. As previously stated, this appellation is one taken from the 
philosophical writings of Wittgenstein’s mentor Bertrand Russell and, as such, may be one that leads 
to some confusion in some readers over the ontology of the TL-P and may even be one that 
Wittgenstein would reject. However, no matter this debate, this section will focus solely upon 
illuminating the metaphysical and ontological theses and arguments found in the TL-P. This shall be 
achieved by:  
1) Covering Wittgenstein’s physicalist metaphysics.  
2) Explaining the atoms that are the foundation of this physicalism.  
3) Elucidating the nature of states of affairs that are generated by these atoms.  
4) Discussing the metaphysical status of relations, properties and concepts.  
5) Detailing the types of state of affairs a proposition can mirror.  
Wittgenstein’s metaphysics 
Wittgenstein's metaphysical views are, sequentially, the first to be covered in the TL-P, occupying the 
focus of the propositions numbered from 1 to 2.1.18 The most fundamental of these are the first two 
of the main body of the work: 
                                                          
18 Interestingly, this positioning of Wittgenstein’s metaphysics in the TL-P may, in itself, be somewhat illuminating. For, the debate over 
whether the work is realist (i.e., states that meaning is derived from the world – see Hacker 1997) or anti-realist (i.e., that we only know the 
world via language – see Ishiguro 1969) essentially hangs on causational order (i.e. does knowledge of the world lead to a knowledge of 
language or does a knowledge of language lead to knowledge of the world) and that Wittgenstein chose to put comments concerning the 
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1 The world is all that is the case. 
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things. 
These laconic sentences establish Wittgenstein’s materialist ontology, which is fundamental to the 
rest of his thought within the TL-P. These two aphorisms establish that there are two types of entity 
to be found in the world, facts and things, from which Wittgenstein moves on to state that, although 
there is this conceptual dualism, it is based on an ontological monism. This can be seen when 
examining the following quotes:  
2 What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs. 
2.01 A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). 
This shows us that, for Wittgenstein, all that exists are physically real objects and their relations to 
one another (for how are non-physical ‘things’, such as some form of Cartesian soul, able to combine 
with those of a physical nature?) Wittgenstein supports this hypothesis by showing that as relativism 
is not the case and reality is objective (employing a reductio ad absurdum argument to show that 
relativism can only inevitably slide into nonsense (2.0211-2.0212)), there must be something providing 
the world’s fixed nature and that this substance that provides reality’s form must itself be unchanging 
and fixed, i.e., that there must exist simple elementary and unchanging objects to provide the 
subsistence to the world’s unalterable form (2.023 and 2.026-2.027). This chain of reasoning can be 
summarised as follows:  
(1) The world is objective (2.0211-2.0212). 
(2) The form of physical objects is unchanging (2.027). 
           ∴    
(3) The world’s form is unalterable (Following (1), see 2.022). 
           ∴   
(4) Some substance must underlie and provide this unalterable form (Following (3), see 
2.024). 
           ∴    
(5) Simple (i.e., atomic) physical objects provide the substance of the world (following (2) 
and (4), see 2.023 and 2.026-2.027).  
 
Wittgenstein further supports this axiomatic ontology concerning objects by appealing to the fact that 
as the world is composed of molecular facts (states of affairs), these facts have to be broken down, 
but by following this course of action we must reach a point where reality can no longer be 
decomposed, for otherwise an infinite regress will result. Simple objects are said to be precisely those 
                                                          
world before those concerning language seems to suggest that he views knowledge of the world as prior to that of language, thereby 
implying a realist metaphysics.  
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physical entities that provide this metaphysical foundation (see 2.0201-2.021). This is a view which 
can be viewed as a foreshadowing of Wittgenstein’s own observation from the Philosophical 
Investigations (hereafter, the PI) that “explanations must come to an end somewhere” (PI 1).19 
Accordingly, the above logical process culminates in one final proposition: 
          ∴   (6)    Objects cannot be molecular; must be atomic (Following (5), see 2.021). 
Atoms 
Although facts, or states of affairs, hold more importance in Wittgenstein’s ontology (1.1), it is 
important to begin an elucidation of the metaphysics of the TL-P by first focusing, and shedding light, 
upon the elements that compose those facts, i.e. on objects or things. As such, the fundamental 
concept that underlies the whole of Wittgenstein’s view on the make-up of the world is the belief that 
reality is constructed out of the discrete atoms, or ‘simples’, our last section’s analysis resulted in 
(2.02).20  
 
However, what still needs to be clarified is: What, for the TL-P, are these simple objects which are the 
backbone of Wittgenstein’s ontology? Are they the everyday medium-sized objects with which people 
usually interact (such as tables and chairs)? Are they the microscopic atoms of physics that are now 
known to make up these medium sized objects? Or, are they some form of strange and foreign entity 
found in the world of the quantum? Of these questions Wittgenstein is unfortunately elusive, never 
providing a definitive answer. Throughout the TL-P, Wittgenstein uses a range of entities as examples 
of what constitute an object: From sense-data (2.0131) to everyday objects (3.1431).21 Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein’s ultimate position on the matter in the TL-P is to assert that, as we are only aware of 
the existence of objects via a priori reasoning, any talk of examples would be both nonsensical and 
groundless and, in fact, “to ask whether a formal concept exists is nonsensical. For no proposition can 
be the answer to such a question” (4.1274). This a priori reasoning is one which originates in thoughts 
found in the Notebooks 1914-1916 (p60), where Wittgenstein expresses the idea in a less terse 
manner: 
It seems that the idea of the SIMPLE is already to be found contained in that of the complex and in the 
idea of analysis, and in such a way that we come to this idea quite apart from any examples of simple 
objects, or of propositions which mention them, and we realize the existence of the simple object--a 
priori--as a logical necessity.22 
                                                          
19 All references structured in this way will, unless specified, allude to the numbered propositions found within the G.E.M Anscombe 
translation of the PI. 
20 These simple entities, which are the building blocks of the world, are the atoms that provide the theory as a whole with the ‘atomism’ of 
its title. 
21 See also PI 47  
22 There is, however, a residual issue here: If the atoms of the world are in fact smaller than the average sized objects to which we attach 
names and commonly discuss via propositions, then those names actually signify a state of affairs and therefore must be classed as a 
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States of affairs 
As previously mentioned, the importance of these simple atomic objects is not found in their presence 
alone but in their relations with others and the resulting structure this creates, i.e., objects are not 
ends but means (1.1). This is a point eloquently discussed by Griffin (1964, p31): 
The world is not just things; we would not characterise the world by listing objects. We would not, I think, 
because[…] objects are unalterable: they are unalterable both in the sense that they remain the same 
through change [2.0271] and in the sense that they are present in any possible world [2.022 and 2.023]. 
That is, no matter what changes we imagine something’s going through, the objects involved are what 
have not changed; and no matter how we imagine the world as different from what it is, the objects will 
be common both to this and the imagined world. If being unalterable in this sense is a necessary condition 
of being an object, then of course it is of no help characterizing a world to list the objects. Such lists would 
be identical for all possible worlds, so nothing characteristic could be given by them. 
As such, it is in an important – and, indeed, the central – facet of these axiomatic components of the 
world that they are able to combine, relate or form bounds with their peers, without which the 
molecular composition of the world (both as we know it and its potential counterfactuals), would not 
be possible (2.0121 and 2.0141). This last observation is, in itself, one important enough to the picture 
theory to need to be highlighted one last time: A state of affairs, a situation or a fact is generated 
from/supervenes upon nothing but relations between atomical objects (2.01). From here, further 
complex molecular facts are generated through the relations between the more fundamental states 
of affairs, which in turn are related to one another to create yet more multifaceted facts, and so on 
until we reach the highest level, the world in totality (see 4.221-4.2211 and 1.1).  
Relations, properties and concepts 
This previous discussion has introduced something new into our ontology that we must clarify before 
we can continue: That of relations. When discussing the TL-P’s view on relations, it is important to 
highlight that, as 4.12, 4.26 and 4.1272 make clear, we are also simultaneously talking of properties 
and concepts as the three operate on similar principles. Therefore, a discussion of one is able to 
constitute, with minor alterations, a discussion of all three. Where relations are concerned, the TL-P 
states:  
3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial 
objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. 
Then the spatial arrangement of these things then will express the sense of the proposition. 
                                                          
proposition, not a name. But, according to Frege’s context principle (3.3), a proposition cannot be a proper name. A potential solution to 
this problem may be found at 5.26, wherein it is stated that “We can describe the world completely by means of fully generalised 
propositions, i.e. without first correlating any name with a particular object[…] we simply add, after an expression like, ‘There is one and 
only one x such that …’, the words, ‘and that x is a’”. This means that, if average sized structures such as tables and chairs are composed 
from a multitude of atoms, then what we consider names for them are actually generalised propositions of the nature Wittgenstein 
describes. When we subject the names for objects such as tables and chairs to analysis, it is discovered that they are actually structured like 
the example given, thereby naming and showing the relations of the simples that make up our table or our chair. 
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3.1432 Instead of, ‘The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’, we ought to put ‘That 
“a” stands to “b” in a certain relationship says that aRb.’[…] 
4.122 […] It is impossible, however, to assert by means of propositions that such internal properties and 
relations obtain: rather, this makes itself manifest in the propositions that represent the relevant states 
of affairs and are concerned with the relevant objects. 
Meaning that, within a proposition, if the corresponding sign for object a is found to the left of the 
propositional element ‘bigger than’, while the name for b is to the right of the same element, this then 
shows (i.e. does not say) that a is bigger than b in the exact same way it would in a painting if a 
occupied more space than b. The only divergence in the two instances (between language and 
painting) is that the differences in the representational form employed by language can obscure this 
function of its elements.23  
Language and the world 
Now that the mechanics behind the substance of the world as we perceive it have been made clear 
(i.e. that states of affairs are generated by relationships between unchanging axiomatic physical 
entities), we are now in a position to clarify the three possibilities what Wittgenstein has uncovered 
produces: 
1) Potential states of affairs that do obtain: These are situations/relationships that are both 
allowable by the objects in the world and are actually present. That is to say, the real facts 
found in the world or all that is the case. These facts are known as the true. For example, the 
fact that 'The Earth is closer to the sun than Mars' (See 1-1.12; 2.04). 
 
2) Potential states of affairs that do not obtain: These are situations/relationships that are 
allowable by the objects in the world but which are not actually present. That is to say, the 
potential but non-existent facts, or all that is not the case. These facts are known as 
counterfactuals or the false. For example, the fact that 'The Earth is farther from the sun than 
Mars' (See 1.12; 2.022; 2.05; 3.24). 
 
3) States of affairs that cannot obtain: This refers to situations that cannot exist through the 
limitations of the objects found in the world (i.e. those that denote relationships that are 
impossible to create with the given physical objects). These facts are not false, as may first be 
assumed, they are unimaginable, they are utter nonsense [Unsinn/unsinnig]. For example, 
'Earth and Mars are prime numbers' (See pp3-4; 4.003).  
                                                          
23 Although this putative non-reality of relations, properties and concepts has historically been attributed to the picture theory by some (see 
Anscombe 2001), others disagree with this, stating instead that Wittgenstein held a realism concerning such phenomena and argue that the 




All these explanations, taken in conjunction, should furnish a reader with the answers to the questions 
with which our prior section on ‘Language as representation’ closed. That is, they should supply an 
understanding of what it is, for the TL-P, that language is representing. As we have seen, language is 
said to depict the world, which itself consists of states of affairs that supervene, ultimately, upon 
axiomatically simple objects. As such, within the nexus of a proposition, names depict these simple 
objects (therefore providing meaning [Bedeutung]), and propositions as a whole depict a fact, 
providing sense [Sinn]. To put it succinctly: Within language, or the propositions that comprise it, 
names represent or picture objects (3.202-3.203), relations between these words draws the relations 
between the objects in the world and propositions as a whole represent or picture facts or state of 
affairs (3.21), while properties containing relations, properties and concepts can only be shown 
(3.1431-3.1432; 4.122). 
The picture theory, Johnson-Laird and our criteria of success 
Now that this correspondence theory of meaning has been defined, we are in a position to lay it 
against our criteria of success and attempt to establish whether or not the picture theory would make 
a suitable addition to Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models. Once this is done, the following is 
found: 
1) Is the theory based on a correspondence between word and world?  
Yes. The picture theory relies upon a correspondence between word and world (see 2.1511; 
3.22). 
 
2) Does the theory explain how a specific proposition corresponds to a specific state of affairs 
through a congruent process akin to that which Peirce terms iconicity? 
Yes and no. Although it relies on correspondence by correlation to align the atomic ‘names’ 
of language with the ‘atoms’ of the world, the picture theory also operates through a process 
reminiscent of Peircean iconicity. This latter point can be seen in its answer to the following 
questions:  
a. Do propositions mirror, or are analogous to, or are isomorphic with a state of affairs 
in the world?  
Yes. It relies on a form of congruence between proposition and reality, termed, in the 
language of the TL-P, as ‘logical form’ (see 2.151; 2.16; 2.161; 2.18). 
b. Do propositions contain or mirror the same components that make up the relevant 
state of affairs? 
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Yes. It explains logical form via propositions containing the same components as the 
relevant state of affairs (see 2.13; 2.131). 
c. Do the relations between the components of a proposition mirror the relations 
between the parts found in its corresponding state of affairs? 
Yes. The picture theory completes its account of logical form through the components 
of the propositions mirroring the relations of the components of the state of affairs 
(see 2.14; 2.21). 
 
3) Does the theory provide a full account of the foundation of meaning in counterfactuals? 
Yes. It relies on the Fregean concept of sense and reference to explain how counterfactuals 
are still meaningful while not corresponding to a specific worldly state of affairs (2.201-2.203; 
3.144). 
 
4) Is the theory able to account for negation? 
Yes. It uses Fregean sense and operations on truth values to explain negation. A negative 
proposition corresponds to the exact same state of affairs as its un-negated counterpart. A 
negating symbol signifies that an operation has been performed on the proposition to reverse 
its truth functions (4.0621; 5.2341). 
 
5) Is the theory from any form of purely mental symbolism? 
No. Following from 4), the picture theory uses a sign to negate propositions. 
 
6) Is the theory absent from hypotheses which lead to the creation of other tensions within 
Johnson-Laird’s theory as whole (e.g. to his theory of reasoning etc.)? 
No. It relies on Fregean sense as well as reference to account for meaning (2.201-2.203; 
3.144). Therefore, the picture theory employs both narrow and broad content. Furthermore, 
as Putnam (1988, pp19-56) shows, narrow content constitutes an internalist account of 
content, which, as we have already seen, is antithetical to Johnson-Laird’s externalist 
correspondence theory of meaning and leads to – now familiar – problems (e.g., “the meaning 
of a symbol cannot be another symbol”).24 Additionally, the picture theory’s use of purely 
mental symbolism (see 5)) clashes with Johnson-Laird’s naturalism constraint. Finally, the 
atomic concept of language adhered to by Wittgenstein, wherein propositions are composed 
                                                          
24 In fact, such difficulties with narrow content are what led Fodor (2010) to abandon his commitment to a dualistic notion of content in 
place of a monistic, purely broad, conception. 
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from ‘names’ that are correlated with atoms in the world, is antithetical to the analogical, i.e., 
non-decompositional, mental models.25 
 
Consequently, according to our criteria of success, the ineffable reading of Wittgenstein’s TL-P will not 
make a valid, productive nor successful inclusion into the work of Johnson-Laird and will not save the 
latter from its deficiencies. For, Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning:  
1) Uses a sign for negation.  
2) Employs both narrow and broad content.  
3) Gas an atomic concept of language.  
These are issues because, as we have seen, 1) leads to the homunculus and symbolic fallacies and 
clashes with Johnson-Laird’s naturalism constraint; 2) creates a dissonance with Johnson-Laird’s 
externalist semantics and counteracts his motivations for initially adopting a correspondence theory 
of meaning; and 3) clashes with his analogical RTM.26 
Criteria of success tested 
Although the above attempts to demonstrate our criteria of success, we have not yet endeavoured to 
perform our second task: Showing that the criteria are an accurate determinant of a theory’s validity 
and its productive contribution to Johnson-Laird’s philosophy of mind and language. Although, as 
Popper (1957; 1968; 1974; 1994) shows, proving this is not possible, we may be able to use others’ 
research to corroborate our findings and maintain our criteria as a ‘provisional conjecture’. To do this, 
we may be able to look to Jonathan Waskan to support our findings. When we do this, we find that 
Waskan (2006, pp171-172; p292) similarly dismisses Wittgenstein’s theory of meaning as it does not 
meet his own criteria of success for a semantics of analogical models. For, the picture theory does not 
manage “to simultaneously (i) maintain consistency with basic brain facts and (ii) support a distinction 
between sentential and imagistic representations” (Ibid.). As such, it seems that it may be possible to 
establish some confidence in our criteria of success and its potential usefulness in future research. 
However, due to the minimal scale of this argument, future research into both the success of our 




                                                          
25 However, if this latter facet of the picture theory is translated as an ‘arbitrary’ correlation between natural language terms and mental 
models, the difficulties highlighted here may be dissolved. 
26 Again, this last point may be dissolved if the naming relation in the picture theory, when introduced to Johnson-Laird’s thought, is 




Having recommended the abandonment of Peirce’s iconism from Johnson-Laird’s philosophy during 
our Findings chapter, this discussion has attempted to in some way rectify the deficit such a move 
creates. In doing so, we have proffered, demonstrated and tested a criteria of success for a 
replacement correspondence theories of meaning, using Wittgenstein’s picture theory as an example. 
From this process, it was determined that: a) The metaphysical TL-P will not work as a valid nor a 
productive addition to Johnson-Laird’s philosophy; and b) our criteria of success stands as a 
‘provisional conjecture’.  
§3 Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s 
broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
After investigating the consistency of Johnson-laird’s referentialist RTM, the third and final section of 
this thesis’ Finding chapter concluded that this correspondence-based incarnation of the mental 
model theory is inconsistent. However, this investigation and this conclusion raise a couple of 
interesting points that merit attention here. These points concern:  
1) A concern over the implicit commitments a correspondence theory of meaning 
necessitates, regardless of whether these commitments are, or can be made to be, 
consistent with Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy.  
2) The implications this finding of inconsistency may have on Johnson-Laird’s RTM project as 
a whole. 
Unacceptable commitments 
First, one concern that may be raised regarding the third section of our Findings chapter relates to 
those commitments entailed by a correspondence theory of meaning. For, even those assumptions 
that we have determined to be consistent with Johnson-Laird’s philosophy may be, in their own right, 
unacceptable or too unintuitive for Johnson-Laird, or any other theorist, to freely admit into their 
philosophy without reservation. For example, it was found that the following hypotheses are both 
implicit to corresponded theories and consistent with Johnson-Laird’s philosophy: 
a) A commitment to externalist semantics.  
b) A rejection of internalist hypotheses and arguments. 
c) An ontological realism concerning states of affairs/facts. 
d) That a reliable and consistent mode of reference fixation is possible.  
e) An epistemic scepticism of meaning. 
f) An eternalist stance on the metaphysical status of time.  
g) That properties and relations have some form of ontological reality. 
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h) That two signs who possess the same referent have the same meaning. 
i) That meaning is mutable. 
j) That the apparent informativeness of content found in substitutivity/Frege cases can be 
explained. 
k) That the challenges faced to the implementation problem by Twin and Frege cases can be 
resolved. 
l) That slingshot arguments can be answered. 
However, this list includes some rather daunting positions many would find hard to accept, or be 
forced to accept (e.g., eternalism, determinism and an epistemic scepticism of meaning). This is an 
issue that needs to be highlighted within this thesis, for consistency alone may be no measure of the 
true acceptability of such a referentialist program as is undertaken by Johnson-Laird. That is to say, it 
may be the case that any correspondence theory of meaning introduces too many unpalatable 
metaphysical commitments into a philosophy and, for this alone, may well be found to be 
unacceptable by some. 
 
Moreover, one reaction to this research’s findings may be the adaptation of Johnson-Laird’s current 
philosophy to make it consistent with those commitments of externalism that were identified as 
creating dissonance. However, these implicit, inconsistent, hypotheses (i.e., that a) the limitations of 
genre or pictorial form can be accounted for, that b) the one-way nature of reference can be 
explained, c) that Brentano’s question/problem can be answered and d) an adherence to 
determinism) again include a number of somewhat controversial positions that may be simply 
unacceptable to some. Consequently, although it is possible that Johnson-Laird’s philosophy can be 
made consistent with the implicit hypotheses entailed by a correspondence theory, these theories in 
their own right may not be conscionable. That is, correspondence, in its own right, may contain too 
high a level of residue difficulty to be an acceptable theory of meaning.  
Degenerative science 
This research’s findings may be, for a number of reasons, far more troublesome for Johnson-Laird than 
they first appear. Firstly, our Findings seem to show that although Johnson-Laird’s research 
programme is adapting to problematic facts, that seems to be all that it is doing: It seems to possess 
only a focus on difficulties and is engaged in only a reactionary response to those difficulties. Secondly, 
it was found that Johnson-Laird is engaged in a reactionary response that is making no further 
hypotheses but only proliferating further inconsistencies. These may be issues for Johnson-Laird, for 
under the sophisticated falsificationist epistemology of Lakatos (1984), if a research programme has 
ran out of explanatory power and is only concerned with anomalous facts, that programme is said to 
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be a degenerative science and its abandonment is recommended. As such, the increased inconsistency 
and problematic facts identified by this research in the current phase of Johnson-Laird’s theory may 
lead to more serious conclusions than simply the need to make further updates. 
 
Before we continue, however, a brief explication of Lakatos’ epistemology is required. To clarify, 
Lakatos’ sophisticated falsification is founded on the distinction between progressive and 
degenerative research programmes; where a research programme is defined as a succession of 
continuous theories that are adaptations to known facts, which in turn should anticipate, i.e., predict, 
novel ones. Each consecutive replacement theory constitutes a problemshift within a research 
programme (Ibid., pp38-47). To retain a continuity between successive theories and ensure the one 
theory constitutes a problemshift to one research programmes but not another, a research 
programme entails two factors (Ibid., p48):  
1) A hard core of central theories that cannot be changed.  
2) A protective belt of hypotheses that surround the hard core and that can be updated so as to 
protect the hard core.  
For a theory to be progressive, “each step [in a research programme must be…] consistently content 
increasing” (Ibid., p49); that is, its problemshifts must have “heuristic” (i.e., explanatory) power (Ibid., 
p69). If this is not the case, then the problemshift and/or the programme are deemed to be 
degenerative and its abandonment recommended (however, an otherwise progressive research 
programme may have degenerative phases or problemshifts within its progress (Ibid., pp68-69; p71)). 
A degenerative programme may be identified via a number of “typical signs” (Ibid., p77): 
(1) Is instantiated by problemshifts with no explanatory/predictive power (Ibid., pp68-69). 
(2) A focus on only anomalous facts (Ibid., p68). 
(3) A feeling of a Kuhnian ‘crisis’ (Ibid.). 
(4) A proliferation of inconsistencies (Ibid., p77). 
(5) A reactionary response to problematic facts. That is, the replacement of problemshifts with 
those that do not predict further problemshifts (Ibid., p88). 
Nevertheless, a research programme cannot be declared degenerative and be eliminated by any single 
investigation, for such a study can be incorporated into the research programme and be used as a 
base for further problemshifts. As such, there is no “instant learning[…] rationality works much slower 
than most people tend to think” (Ibid., p87) and any investigation that finds a research programme to 
possess the typical signs of degeneration is merely a piece of “constructive criticism” to that 
programme (Ibid., p92). Consequently no investigation can eliminate a programme, they can only be 




Applying this epistemology and its typology to the work of Johnson-Laird, it is found that the research 
programme is his analogical RTM; the hard core of his theory are the base theories of RTM covered in 
our literature review (i.e., propositional attitudes, functionalism, computation, and Marr’s tri-level 
hypothesis); and his supplementary hypotheses, including his theory of semantic content, constitute 
the protective belt of his research programme. Finally, Johnson-Laird’s recent referentialist move 
constitutes the most current problemshift of his analogical RTM research programme. As such, it is 
interesting to note that our Literature Review found that the motivations for this shift were the 
arguments encapsulated by the CRA and SGP and not for any explanatory power offered by a 
correspondence theory (i.e., (2) and (5) above) and our findings discovered that the problemshift 
merely proliferates inconsistencies (i.e., (4) above). As such, and looking to Lakatos’ typical signs of a 
degenerating research programme, this suggests that Johnson-Laird’s RTM is in a degenerative 
position as he seems to be only in the business of updating auxiliary hypotheses to protect his 
analogical RTM rather than increasing explanatory power (cf. Ibid., p112). However, this is in no way 
a confirmed conclusion, only an observation. As such, a potential avenue for future research may be 
an investigation into Johnson-Laird’s theories to identify if this accusation is accurate, i.e., to identify 
if Johnson-Laird’s research program is progressing and still making novel predictions or if it is merely 
reacting to problematic facts and should be labelled a degenerative science. If such a study finds that 
this move does represent a degenerative problemshift for Johnson-Laird, “the hard core [of his 
programme] might have to be abandoned” (Ibid., p49). However, it should be remembered that:  
1) A degenerative problemshift does not equate to a degenerative research programme.   
2) Any one study will never result in the abandonment of Johnson-Laird’s research 
programme, it can only serve as “constructive criticism” and inspiration for further 
problemshifts (Ibid., p92).  
Consequently, even if such a study as here proposed concludes that Johnson-Laird’s current 
problemshift is degenerative, Johnson-Laird may still replace his semantics with some other semantic 
account in a progressive problemshift and continue on a valid and progressive research programme. 
 
As such, under the sophisticated falsificationist epistemology of Lakatos (Ibid.), this research’s findings 
may be used to identify Johnson-Laird’s referentialist RTM as a degenerative problemshift in his 
research programme. However, what needs to be established are the limits of this observation. That 
is, it would be of interest for future research to investigate whether this finding merely represents a 
degenerative phase in an otherwise healthy and progressive research programme, or whether this 




To summarise, the third section of our Findings chapter raised and investigated two points of 
discussion: 
1) The introduction of a correspondence theory into Johnson-Laird’s philosophy may introduce an 
unacceptable level of residual difficulties. That is, as correspondence necessitates a 
commitment to such controversial hypotheses as eternalism, determinism and an epistemic 
scepticism of meaning, it may present itself to some as too controversial a position to accept 
into Johnson-Laird’s philosophy, even if it is, or can be made to be, consistent. 
 
2) That, when viewed under the sophisticated falsificationist epistemology of Lakatos (Ibid.), it 
seems that Johnson-Laird’s move to referentialism may stand as a degenerative problemshift. 
That is, our findings may be viewed as a demonstration that Johnson-Liard’s recent 
developments to his analogical RTM are merely reactionary changes that proliferate 
inconsistencies and that have no heuristic (i.e., predictive) power. This is a serious accusation, 
as this may be indicative of a degenerative research programme, which, if so, may lead to a 
need to abandon one or more of the core theories of Johnson-laird’s RTM (i.e., propositional 
attitudes, functionalism, computation or Marr’s tri-level hypothesis). As such, future research 
into this observation is recommended.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has tasked itself with reflecting on the findings of our last chapter and investigating any 
implications or areas and topics of interest they raise. Through this process, a number of observations 
supplementary to our findings were made: 
1) Johnson-Laird’s externalism is dependent on a system’s extra-linguistic connection with its 
environment and this extra-linguistic connection is necessarily opposed to the mereological 
fallacy. 
2) Johnson-Laird has not clarified whether the externalism he has introduced into his philosophy 
of mind is of a weak or a strong nature. Further, the difficulties implicit in either type of 
externalism have not currently been addressed by Johnson-Laird. 
3) The removal of Peirce’s iconism from Johnson-Laird’s philosophy leaves a deficit that needs 
to be filled if his referentialist RTM is to validly continue. 
4) The context of Johnson-Laird’s broader philosophy demarks a criteria of success any 




5) Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning, detailed within his TL-P, fails to meet this criteria of 
success and does not stand as a viable replacement correspondence theory for Johnson-Laird. 
6) Correspondence theories, generally, necessitate a number of daunting hypotheses to operate 
successfully. Furthermore, these implicit hypotheses are of such a nature that some may 
reject them instantly. 
7) This investigations’ findings may be evidence that Johnson-Laird’s RTM project may be in a 
degenerative phase.  
As well as these observations, several further proposals for future research were also made (additional 
to the need to verify and triangulate this study’s findings and investigate other referentialist RTM 
approaches identified during the Evaluation of our findings): 
1) An investigation into the validity of the criteria of success established by this thesis for putative 
replacements of Peircean iconism, as well as further studies measuring other correspondence 
theories of meaning against this criteria. 
2) Further research to establish the accuracy of the claim that Johnson-Laird is currently in a 
degenerative phase. Or, research into whether the findings of this research concern a 





We began this research by observing a gap in the current cognitive science literature; in observing that 
there is currently an absence of detailed scrutiny of the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird’s shift 
toward an externalist representational theory of mind. This conclusion was reached through a review 
of the cognitive science literature on the recent reaction to semantic arguments against the 
representational theory of mind (a suite of arguments encapsulated by John Searle’s Chinese room 
argument). From this review, it was identified that, due to such arguments, many theorists have been 
motivated to shift from an internalist, syntactical account of meaning toward an externalist, 
referentialist semantics. From here, and through a review of correspondence theories of meaning in 
their own right, we further observed that this shift constitutes both a substantial and, to some, 
controversial move that necessitates considerable analysis before its adoption should be confidently 
asserted as valid; a level of analysis that is currently lacking in the literature. As such, we were led to 
the recommendation that research into the validity of this move be conducted. However, due to the 
nuanced differences found in the myriad referentialist positions within the representational theory of 
mind paradigm, such a broad piece of research was found to be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Instead, an investigation into just one of these positions would be practicable. In this case, the position 
held by the psychologist Philip Johnson-Laird was singled out as the focus of such an investigation, as 
he is both an outspoken and long term advocate of the introduction of a correspondence theory of 
meaning into the account of semantic content offered by cognitive science. Consequently, we were 
led to the following research aim: 
Aim: To assess the validity of the hypothesis that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence 
theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the 
critiques of its commentators and to test the success of the inclusion of a Peircean referentialist 
semantics into such a representational theory of mind. 
 
With this gap in the literature and research objective clarified, it was then established that the best 
method to employ in meeting this aim would be the philosophic method of decompositional analysis 
and synthesis. This is a method more commonly employed within the discipline of philosophy and 
entails the breaking down of a theory, argument etc., into its component parts by analysis, before a 
reconstruction of these parts through synthesis. This method is therefore a two-step process designed 
to make perspicuous the atomic hypotheses that make up a position as well as their interaction and 
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relations. In this instance, this method was applied in relation to the following research questions; 
questions designed specifically to interrogate Johnson-Laird’s hypotheses in relation to our aim: 
1) Does Philip Johnson-Laird’s updated semantics circumvent the semantic objections of 
the representational theory of mind’s commentators? 
2) Is Charles Sanders Peirce’s iconic correspondence theory of meaning (i.e., the 
particular correspondence theory of meaning implemented by Johnson-Laird) 
internally and externally consistent? 
3) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning, generally, into Philip 
Johnson-Laird’s broader philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
With this framework established, it was argued that, if the application of the method of philosophic 
analysis and synthesis produced affirmative answers to all three of the above questions, Philip 
Johnson-Laird’s referentialist shift would be said to be valid and successful. However, if just one 
negative response were generated to any one of them, the move would be deemed to be invalid and 
unsuccessful.  
 
Finally, it should be clarified that this method was deemed to be both appropriate and valid in this 
instance as:  
(i) It is an acceptable approach under the post-positivist paradigm (i.e., it will operate 
within Johnson-Laird’s own framework and will produce findings acceptable under his 
own lights. 
(ii) That due to the object of study here (i.e., semantic content), the ‘traditional’ 
quantitative and qualitative methods employed within this post-positivist paradigm 
are not suitable, leading us to analysis and synthesis by inference to the best 
explanation.  
(iii) As the semantic arguments that inspired the move to externalism derive from 
philosophical analysis, it seems only appropriate to reapply the method when 
investigating how successful this move is at subverting them. 
Findings 
Now that these preliminaries have contextualised our research, we are in a position to summarise the 
findings our application of philosophical analysis and synthesis has produced. From this investigation, 
a number of results were derived: 
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1) The introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning, and such a theory’s implicit 
language entry and exit rules, is a successful counter to the semantic arguments against the 
representational theory of mind, as summarised by the Chinese room argument. 
2) Philip Johnson-Laird’s introduction of C.S. Peirce’s correspondence theory of meaning involves 
the reintroduction of the homunculus and symbolic fallacies through the inclusion of mental 
signifiers (for such things as negation and other abstract concepts) and the concept of an 
Interpretant found within C.S. Peirce’s theory of icons.  
3) Mental signifiers (for such things as negation and other abstract concepts) conflict with Philip 
Johnson-Laird’s own naturalism constraint, i.e.: 
a natural mental model of discourse has a structure that corresponds directly to the 
structure of the state of affairs that the discourse describe. (Johnson-Laird 1983, p125)  
4) A tension exists between C.S. Peirce and Philip Johnson-Laird over the role of mental images 
in cognition, with the former holding that they are the basis for cognition and reasoning, while 
the latter is explicit in his denial of this position.  
5) The limitations of genre/pictorial form are not accounted for within Philip Johnson-Laird’s 
iconic mental models. 
6) The one-way nature of reference within a two-way theory of iconism is not explained within 
Philip Johnson-Laird’s iconic mental models.  
7) Brentano’s problem is not accounted for within Philip Johnson-Laird’s physicalist iconic mental 
models.  
8) Philip Johnson-Laird’s adherence to free will is antithetical to correspondence theories of 
meaning: The intuitive notion that future tensed propositions are meaningful cannot be 
simultaneously held with Johnson-Laird’s position that there are no determinate, concrete 
future states of affairs. 
 
Consequently, when these findings are applied to the research questions of this investigation, 
specified earlier, the following is uncovered:  
Q1) Does Johnson-Laird’s updated account of meaning circumvent the semantic objections of 
the representational theory of mind’s commentators? 
A1) Yes. The introduction of language entry and exit rules, through a correspondence theory of 
meaning, ensures that a system’s symbols are grounded and that such a system is able to 




Q2) Is Peirce’s structural correspondence theory of meaning internally and externally 
consistent?  
A2) No. As Peirce’s iconism employs the concept of both an Interpretant and purely mental 
symbolism, the theory is internally logically inconsistent (see point 2) above). Furthermore, 
as Peirce and Johnson-Laird differ on the role of mental imagery in cognition and the 
necessity of the naturalism constraint, Peirce’s theory is also found to be externally logically 
inconsistent (see points 3) and 4) above). 
 
Q3) Is the introduction of a correspondence theory of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s broader 
philosophy of cognition logically consistent? 
A3) No. Johnson-Laird fails to account for the limitations of genre/pictorial form, the one-way 
nature of reference within a two-way theory of iconism or Brentano’s problem before his 
introduction of a correspondence theory. Consequently, such an introduction is therefore 
logically inconsistent (see points 5), 6) and 7) above). Furthermore, there is a direct and 
explicit tension between Johnson-Laird’s commitment to free will and the reliance of 
correspondence theories on determinism to account for future tensed propositions (see 
point 8) above). 
As such, and in reference to our stipulation that ‘if it is discovered that the theory concerned can 
answer in the affirmative to all three of our research questions, it will be considered a logically 
consistent position and will remain as a provisional conjecture; if a negative response is produced to 
any one of them, the inclusion of an externalist account of meaning into Johnson-Laird’s theory of 
mind will be found to be inconsistent and the theory will be said to have been falsified’, we are led to 
the finding that, as Philip Johnson-Laird’s hypothesis cannot answer in the affirmative to all three of 
these questions, his referentialist move should be considered invalid and unsuccessful under both the 
Quinean and Popperian epistemologies.  
Implications of findings 
A number of implications can be derived from the finding that Johnson-Laird’s philosophy of mind is, 
as it currently stands, logically inconsistent and should be considered falsified. These implications are 
pertinent to both Philip Johnson-Laird’s philosophy specifically and to externalist semantics generally. 
Those inferences concerning Johnson-Laird specifically, are: 
1) For Johnson-Laird to retain the possibility of progressing on with a productive research 
programme, he needs to abandon his iconic correspondence theory of meaning and rethink 
his account of semantics.  
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2) Johnson-Laird’s wider philosophy of mind demarks a criteria of success, which must be met 
by any putative replacement correspondence theory of meaning, if this replacement is to 
produce a valid and logically consistent philosophy of mind. 
  
The implications that can be drawn from the above finding that are pertinent to externalist semantics 
generally are: 
1) Externalist accounts of meaning are dependent on a system’s extra-linguistic connection with 
its environment and that this extra-linguistic connection is necessarily related to the 
mereological fallacy. 
2) It is necessary for a theorist to clarify whether the externalism they hold is of a weak or a 
strong nature and that the complications implicit in either type of externalism must also be 
addressed by that theorist. 
3) Correspondence theories, generally, necessitate a number of daunting hypotheses in order to 
operate successfully (for example, eternalism, determinism and an epistemic scepticism of 
meaning) and these implicit hypotheses alone are of such a nature that some theorists may 
reject an externalist semantics or a referentialist shift out of hand. 
Evaluation 
With these conclusions and inferences drawn, this investigation proceeded to demonstrate that a 
sufficient level of critical scrutiny had been applied to such findings, thereby evidencing that the level 
of confidence placed on them is justified. In this regard, it should be stressed that the method of 
philosophic analysis and synthesis employed in this study has produced enlightening data concerning 
a notoriously ephemeral object of study: Meaning. Furthermore, as this method, and its findings 
concerning logical consistency, are informative under both the Popperian and Quinean epistemologies 
– in that they are repeatable, falsifiable and naturalised with cognitive science – this research was 
capable of contributing to the literature at face value (i.e., without the need to engage in further, 
paradigmatic, argument). Finally, this investigation was deemed to be a success as its design, through 
its focus on establishing logical consistency, was able to meet our research aim and assess the validity, 
or lack thereof, of the claim that the introduction of a Peircean correspondence theory of meaning 
into Philip Johnson-Laird’s mental model theory of mind saves the latter from the critiques of its 
commentators. 
 
It is important to note, however, that there were also some limitations to this investigation. For 
example, although the confining of focus to the thought and argument of the psychologist Philip 
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Johnson-Laird was deemed a necessity, this limitation caused problems concerning generalizability. 
For, it was found that the nuance found in the literature between the related referentialist positions 
within the representational theory of mind means that the conclusions reached by this research are 
only applicable to the work of Johnson-Laird and no other, at least without much further work. That 
is, our findings cannot be generalised to the theories of others working within the referentialist 
representational theory of mind (e.g. Brooks 1990; Harnard 1990b; Waskan 2006; Fodor 2010; 
Rapaport 2011; Schweizer 2012). Finally, it was also determined that further research into the 
arguments of Johnson-Laird, repeating and triangulating this study’s findings, is necessary before this 
investigation’s conclusions can be assuredly asserted. 
Recommendations 
In carrying out this investigation, a number of areas that would benefit from further research were 
identified. It was therefore recommended that: 
1) Further studies be conducted to verify and triangulate this study’s findings. That is, further 
research is needed to confirm our findings in their own right. 
2) Investigations into the success of other referentialist representational theories of mind should 
be conducted. That is, further research into the success of the work of those others operating 
within the cognitive science paradigm who have made the referentialist shift (e.g., William 
Rapaport, Paul Schweizer and Jonathan Waskan) would be beneficial. 
3) Investigation into the validity of the criterion of success, for putative replacement to Peirce’s 
iconism within Johnson-Laird’s philosophy, established by this thesis be carried out. 
4) Further research applying this criterion of success to other, replacement correspondence 
theories of meaning (i.e., those that may putatively fill the gap left in Johnson-Laird’s 
philosophy by the removal of Peirce) be conducted. 
5) Studies into the accuracy of the claim that Johnson-Laird’s research programme is currently in 
a degenerative phase be undertaken. That is, research into whether the findings of this thesis 
signify a degenerative problemshift or a degenerative research programme for Johnson-Laird. 
Final remarks 
To conclude, this research has met its aim and identified that the introduction of Charles Sanders 
Peirce’s theory of iconism into Philip Johnson-Laird’s analogical mental models is not successful and 
ought to be reconsidered. However, what this research cannot make comment on is the success, or 
otherwise, of the myriad similar semantic shifts recently taken in the literature. Rather, and in closing, 
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the message that should be taken from this investigation is that correspondence theories of meaning 
are substantial and complex hypotheses and their inclusion into any wider philosophy is no trivial 
matter: This research has shown that if the sizable nature of these accounts of semantics are not fully 
respected and their adoption within a wider philosophy of mind is taken without due levels of analysis, 
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